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[A]ll law is universal but about some things it is not possible to make a 
universal statement which will be correct. In those cases, then, in which it 
is necessary to speak universally, but not possible to do so correctly, the law 
takes the usual case, though it is not ignorant of the possibility of error. ... 
When the law speaks universally, then, and a case arises on it which is not 
covered by the universal statement, then it is right, when the legislator fails 
us and has erred by over-simplicity, to correct the omission - to say what 
the legislator himself would have said had he been present . .•. And this 
is the nature of the equitable, a correction of law where it is defective ow-
ing to its universality . ... [W]hen the thing is indefinite the rule also is 
indefinite, like the lead rule used in making the Lesbian moulding,· the 
rule adapts itself to the shape of the stone and is not rigid, and so too the 
decree is adapted to the facts. 
-Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Contemporary moral philosophy, political theory, and jurispru-
dence have converged to create a quite bafHing dilemma. This di-
lemma is generated by the apparent incompatibility of three principles, 
each of which grounds features of our system of law and government, 
and each of which carries substantial normative weight. The first I 
shall call the punishment principle - a moral principle, doctrinally 
entrenched in American criminal and civil law, which holds that indi-
viduals who are morally justified in their actions ought not to be 
1. ARISTOTLE, Nicomachean Ethics, in 2 THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 1729, 
1795-96 (David Ross trans., revised by J. Urmson, Jonathan Barnes ed., 1984). 
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blamed or punished for those actions. The second is the principle of 
the rule of law - a complex jurisprudential principle that requires law 
to conform to a set of formal values, such as generality and coherence, 
as a means of protecting substantive moral values like liberty and 
equality. The third is the principle of democracy and the separation of 
powers - a principle of political morality that vindicates the right of 
majorities to be self-governing by assigning policymaking powers to a 
democratic legislature and restricting the executive and judiciary to 
the secondary tasks of policy implementation and application. 
These three principles now serve as cornerstones of our legal and 
political systems. Yet, if genuinely incompatible, one or more of them 
must be abandoned: we must resign ourselves to the punishment of 
the justified or sacrifice systemic values that have long been invoked to 
justify our commitment to structural pluralism and rule-governed 
adjudication. 
I. THE DILEMMA 
Because our fundamental moral, political, and jurisprudential 
principles are not in obvious conflict, the dilemma engendered by their 
mutual defense takes some construction. Let me begin at its seemingly 
remote beginning. 
A. The Correspondence Thesis 
Consider the following hypothetical. Smith is attacked by a hood-
lum while walking her dog through the city park. Smith justifiably 
believes that her life is in peril, and she is thus forced to choose be-
tween killing the hoodlum or being killed or maimed herself. Jones is 
a jogger who witnesses the hoodlum's attack on Smith. Jones must 
choose between permitting Smith to kill the hoodlum or intervening to 
prevent that killing. Long is a concession stand owner who also wit-
nesses the event. Long must choose between restraining Jones from 
intervening to prevent the hoodlum's death or allowing that 
intervention. 
The morality of each actor's choice appears to be determined by 
what I will call the correspondence thesis. The correspondence thesis 
asserts a moral claim about the justification of codependent actions. It 
holds that the justifiability of an action determines the justifiability of 
permitting or preventing that action. According to the correspon-
dence thesis, if Smith is justified in killing the hoodlum (as a means of 
self-defense), then Jones is not justified in intervening to prevent that 
killing, and hence Long is justified in restraining Jones' intervention. 
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The correspondence thesis rests on the intuition that because an 
action cannot be simultaneously right and wrong, one actor cannot be 
justified in performing an act while another is simultaneously justified 
in preventing that performance.2 The intuitive plausibility of the the-
sis can be cashed out as follows. Step one: Right action is action that 
accords with the balance of reasons for action. 3 Reasons for action are 
objective in the sense that their rightmaking characteristics are univer-
sal. If it is right for one to do an act, it must be right for all others that 
one do it. If, for Smith, the balance of objective reasons for action 
favors action A (where A is killing the hoodlum in self-defense), then 
the balance of reasons in favor of Smith's doing A must be the same for 
Jones and Long, i.e., it must dictate the conclusion on their part that it 
is right that Smith do A. Step two: Where other actors face choices 
between alternative actions that will or will not thwart action A, the 
rightness of A entails the wrongness of those actions that will thwart 
A. Jones, for example, faces the choice between intervening to prevent 
Smith from killing the hoodlum or not intervening. It would be mor-
ally anomalous if A were the right thing for Smith to do, while 
preventing A was the right thing for Jones to do. The objective rea-
sons that constitute the content of morality must make it right (for 
Jones as for everyone else) that Smith do A, so those same reasons 
seemingly cannot make it right that Smith not do A. Hence, the bal-
ance of reasons for action must demand the permission of justified ac-
tions and the restraint of attempts to thwart justified actions. 
It is useful at this early stage to stop to consider a series of objec-
tions that might be made to the correspondence thesis. By putting 
2. As Kant argued: 
Each member of the commonwealth has rights of coercion in relation to all the others, 
except in relation to the head of state. For . . • he alone is authorised to coerce others 
without being subject to any coercive law himself .... But if there were two persons exempt 
from coercion, neither would be subject to coercive laws, and neither could do to the other 
anything contrary to right, which is impossible. 
IMMANUEL KANT, On the Common Saying: "This May Be True in Theory, But It Does Not 
Apply in Practice," in KANT's PoLmCAL WRmNGS 61, 74-75 (H.B. Nisbet trans., Hans Reiss 
ed., 1970) (emphasis added). 
3. Joseph Raz puts this principle as follows: "It is always the case that one ought, all things 
considered, to do whatever one ought to do on the balance of reasons." JOSEPH RAz, PRACTI· 
CAL REASON AND NORMS 36 (1975) (footnote omitted). As Raz makes clear, the phrase ought 
all things considered functions in this principle to indicate "what ought to be done on the basis of 
all the reasons for action which are relevant to the question, and not only on the basis of the 
reasons the agent in fact considered or could have considered." Id. at 36 n. •. For similar state-
ments of the conditions of right action, see STEPHAN L. DARWALL, IMPARTIAL REASON 99 
(1983); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 341, 408 (1971). For alternative conceptions that 
epistemically limit the conditions of right action, see RICHARD A. FUMERTON, REASON AND 
MORALITY: A DEFENSE OF THE EGOCENTRIC PERSPECTIVE 90-128 (1990); Donald Davidson, 
How is Weakness of the Will Possible?, in MORAL CONCEPTS 93 (Joel Feinberg ed., 1970). I 
criticize such alternative conceptions infra text accompanying notes 151-55. 
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these to rest at this point, we can both better appreciate the claim 
made by the correspondence thesis and forestall future confusion 
about its implications. First, one might be tempted to resist the corre-
spondence thesis because of the following sort of case. Suppose that 
Green has grounds for reasonably believing that she is being stalked by 
a man who seeks to kill her. Suppose further that she reasonably be-
lieves that a man who she discovers quietly circling her house is the 
stalker. She thus reasonably believes her life to be in peril and shoots 
at the man as he approaches her. However, the man, Brown, is there 
simply to read her electric meter. Reasonably believing his life to be in 
peril, Brown shoots back, misses, and is killed by another shot from 
Green. 
Is this not a case of two individuals, each of whom is entitled to 
prevent the other from doing a justified act? Does this case not 
demonstrate that the correspondence thesis is false, because the justifi-
ability of Green's conduct does not make it unjustifiable for Brown to 
resist it, and the justifiability of Brown's conduct does not make it 
unjustifiable for Green to resist it? Each appears to be justified in at-
tempting to thwart the actions of the other. Therefore, the justifiabil-
ity of one actor's conduct does not appear to determine the 
justifiability of the other's permission of that conduct. 
This analysis is initially plausible only because the meaning of the 
phrase justified action is equivocal. The phrase is alternatively em-
ployed to capture both right action and nonculpable action. But the 
conditions of right action and the conditions of nonculpable action are 
distinct. And the correspondence thesis is a thesis solely about the 
conditions of right action; it is not a thesis about the conditions of 
nonculpable action. Let me explain. 
An individual is nonculpable if she does an action justifiably believ-
ing it to be right. Alternatively, an individual is culpable if she does an 
action believing it to be wrong or unjustifiably believing it to be right. 
Culpability is thus a condition of an actor's state of mind. It reflects 
the degree of epistemic justification with which an actor concludes 
that her actions are right. An actor is epistemically justified in believ-
ing an action to be right if, under the circumstances, she has invested a 
reasonable amount of time, talent, diligence, and resources to acquire 
information about her circumstances and to determine the demands of 
morality in such circumstances. She has invested a reasonable amount 
of time, talent, diligence, and resources in these tasks if the costs of 
investing more of these goods are greater than the costs of a wrong 
decision discounted by its probability. In the case described above, 
one might well conclude that Green justifiably believed herself entitled 
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to shoot Brown. She rightly believed that an innocent person is enti-
tled to use deadly force in cases of imminent peril, and, given what she 
knew of the activities of her stalker, she reasonably concluded that she 
was in such peril and, thus, that the costs of investing further time to 
determine more accurately the identity of the unknown man in her 
garden were sufficiently great as to outweigh the discounted costs of 
shooting an innocent man. At the same time, Brown justifiably be-
lieved that he was entitled to defend himself. He rightly concluded 
that, as an innocent person, he was entitled to use deadly force to de-
fend himself against imminent peril, and he invested a reasonable 
amount of time and diligence to determine that Green was indeed 
placing him in such peril. 
The correspondence thesis is thus plainly false if construed as a 
thesis about the conditions of culpability. Two individuals can justifia-
bly believe that they are each entitled to thwart the actions of the 
other, for they can possess sufficiently different amounts of informa-
tion, time, talent, and resources as to make it reasonable for them to 
entertain different beliefs about what they are each entitled to do. 
Construed epistemically, the thesis that the justifiability of an action 
determines the justifiability of permitting or preventing that action is 
thus false. 
But the correspondence thesis is not an epistemological thesis 
about the conditions of culpability. It is a metaphysical thesis about 
the conditions of right action. While culpability is a function of an 
actor's state of mind, the rightness of an action is a function of the 
degree to which an action satisfies the objective criteria specified by 
our best normative theory.4 The correspondence thesis claims that the 
criteria of right action specified by our best moral theory cannot make 
contradictory actions simultaneously right. While two individuals 
might be justified in believing that thwarting one another's actions is 
right, it cannot in fact be right for each to thwart the actions of the 
other. If the action of one individual is right, it cannot be simultane-
ously right for the other to prevent that action. 
Thus, while Green and Brown may have reasonably believed that 
they should shoot one another, only one of them acted rightly in so 
doing. Because Brown was not attacking Green, Green did not act 
rightly in shooting Brown. Had she refrained from shooting Brown, 
an innocent life would have been saved at no cost to her own life. If 
taking an innocent life is categorically wrong (according to our best 
4. See supra note 3. For a critique of this distinction, see FUMERTON, supra note 3, at 102. I 
reply to criticisms of the sort raised by Fumerton infra text accompanying notes 151-55. 
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deontological theory), then Green acted wrongly in shooting Brown, 
for Brown was an innocent actor. If maximizing the preservation of 
innocent lives is right (according to our best consequentialist theory), 
then Green acted wrongly, for her action took one innocent life with-
out saving others (for her life would have been preserved had she not 
shot Brown). Once it is clear that the correspondence thesis is not a 
thesis about culpability, but a thesis about right action, it is clear that 
hypotheticals such as that involving Green and Brown are not 
counterexamples to it. 
However, one might think that, while the previous hypothetical of 
Green and Brown makes the correspondence thesis plausible for both 
deontological and consequentialist accounts of right action, the truth 
of the thesis is in fact theory-dependent. While the thesis might be 
necessarily true of a consequentialist account of right action, it need 
not be true of a deontological account of right action. I shall have a 
great deal to say about this suggestion in Part IV, which is devoted to 
determining the relative truth of the correspondence thesis for conse-
quentialists and deontologists. At this stage, however, it is worth rec-
ognizing the plausibility of the thesis for both sorts of theorists. 
Consequentialists are committed to the claim that right action con-
sists in maximizing good consequences or minimizing bad conse-
quences. 5 Monistic consequentialists embrace a single-valued theory 
of the good. Thus, utilitarians define the good in terms of human plea-
sure or happiness. 6 Egoists define the good in terms of what will serve 
the individual's own interests. 7 And virtue theorists define the good in 
5. For the classic defenses of consequentialism, see JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION 
TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 11-33 (Jonathan Barnes & H.L.A. Hart 
eds., 1970) (1781); JOHN s. MILL, Utilitarianism, in SELECTED WRITINGS OF JOHN STUART 
MILL 243 (Maurice Cowling ed., 1968); HENRY SIDGWICK, THE METHODS OF ETHICS 381-473 
(1874). For more modem defenses, see FUMERTON, supra note 3, at 50-60, 90-223; DONALD 
REGAN, UTILITARIANISM AND Co-OPERATION (1980); PETER SINGER, PRACTICAL ETHICS 8-
13 (1979); R.M. Hare, Ethical Theory and Utilitarianism, in 4 CONTEMPORARY BRITISH PHI-
LOSOPHY 113 (H.D. Lewis ed., 1976); Kai Nielson, Against Moral Conservatism, 82 ETHICS 219 
(1972); Peter Railton, Alienation, Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality, 13 PHIL. & 
PUB. AFF. 134 (1984). For critical discussions of consequentialism, see DAVID LYONS, FORMS 
AND LIMITS OF UTILITARIANISM (1965); THE LIMITS OF UTILITARIANISM (Harlan B. Miller & 
William H. Williams eds., 1982); DEREK PARFIT, REAsONS AND PERSONS 24-51 (1984); 
ANTHONY QUINTON, UTILITARIAN ETHICS (1973); SAMUEL SCHEFFLER, THE REJECTION OF 
CoNSEQUENTIALISM (1982); UTILITARIANISM AND BEYOND (Amartya Sen & Bernard Williams 
eds., 1982); Bernard Williams, A Critique of Utilitarianism, in UTILITARIANISM: FOR AND 
AGAINST 75 (J.J.C. Smart & Bernard Williams eds., 1973). 
6. See, e.g., BENTHAM, supra note 5, at 11, 34-50; MILL, supra note 5, at 249; SIDGWICK, 
supra note 5, at 30-42. 
7. See, e.g., Jesse Kalin, In Defense of Egoism, in ETHICAL THEORY: CLASSICAL AND CON-
TEMPORARY READINGS 85 (Louis P. Pojman ed., 1989); FUMERTON, supra note 3, at 129-67. 
For helpful critical discussions of ethical egoism, see KURT BAIER, THE MORAL POINT OF VIEW 
188-91 (1958); DAVID GAUTHIER, MORALS BY AGREEMENT (1986); MORALITY AND RA-
TIONAL SELF-INTEREST (David P. Gauthier ed., 1970); THOMAS NAGEL, THE POSSIBILITY OF 
2210 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 90:2203 
terms of what will make individuals virtuous. 8 Pluralist consequen-
tialists, on the other hand, embrace a multivalued theory of the good. 
They maintain that the good should be maximized but then define the 
good in terms of some complex combination of the above sorts of 
values. 
As a thesis about the conditions of right action, the correspon-
dence thesis appears necessarily true for consequentialists. 9 In our 
previous tale in which a hoodlum attacks Smith while Jones, the jog-
ger, and Long, the concessionaire, look on, the death of the hoodlum 
is a better state of affairs than is its only alternative, the death of 
Smith. And it is a better state of affairs not only for Smith, but also for 
Jones and Long. Because the only criterion of right action for the 
consequentialist is whether an action promotes good states of affairs, it 
follows that Smith, Jones, and Long should all promote this good state 
of affairs. At the very least, it cannot be right on consequentialist 
grounds for Jones to interfere with Smith's act of self-defense, even if 
for some reason it is not obligatory for Jones to join Smith in her 
endeavor. 
In contrast to consequentialists, deontologists are committed to the 
claim that the goodness of an act lies not in its consequences but in the 
inherent quality of the act itself. 10 According to deontological moral 
ALTRUISM (1970); PARFIT, supra note 5, at 3-24; JAMES RACHELS, THE ELEMENTS OF MORAL 
PHILOSOPHY 65-78 (1986); SIDGWICK, supra note 5, at 72-79, 107-74; W.D. Falk, Morality, Self, 
and Others, in ETHICS 349 (Judith Thomson & Gerald Dworkin eds., 1968); Alasdair Macintyre, 
Egoism and Altruism, in 2 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 462 (Paul Edwards ed., 1967); 
Brian Medlin, Ultimate Principles and Ethical Egoism, 35 Ausn. J. PHIL. 111 (1957). 
8. See, e.g., ARISTOTLE, supra note 1; ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 210-15 
(1981); BERNARD MAYO, ETHICS AND THE MORAL LIFE (1958). For general discussion and 
critical examinations of virtue-based theories of the good, see LAWRENCE C. BECKER, ON JUSTI-
FYING MORAL ARGUMENTS 181-91 (1973); JOHN M. COOPER, REASON AND HUMAN GOOD IN 
ARISTOTLE (1975); WILLIAM K. FRANKENA, ETHICS 3-71 (2d ed. 1973); IRIS MURDOCH, THE 
SOVEREIGNTY OF GOOD 1-45 (1970); CHRISTINA SOMMERS, VICES AND VIRTUES IN EVERY-
DAY LIFE 143-231 (1985); RICHARD TAYLOR, ETHICS, FAITH, AND REASON (1985); THE VIR-
TUES (Robert B. Kruschwitz & Robert c. Roberts eds., 1987); JAMES D. WALLACE, VIRTUES 
AND VICES (1978); Robert B. Louden, On Some Vices of Virtue Ethics, 21 AM. PHIL. Q. 227 
(1984); Gregory E. Pence, Recent Work on Virtues, 21 AM. PHIL. Q. 281 (1984); Gregory W. 
Trianosky, Supererogation, Wrongdoing, and Vice: On the Autonomy of the Ethics of Virtue, 83 J, 
PHIL. 26 (1986); Susan Wolf, Moral Saints, 79 J. PHIL. 419 (1982). 
9. See infra section III.A for a much more extensive analysis of this supposition. 
10. For the classic articulation of deontological moral theory, see IMMANUEL KANT, CRI-
TIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON (Lewis W. Beck trans., Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1956) (1978); IMMAN-
UEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS (H.J. Paton trans., 1964); 
IMMANUEL KANT, LECTURES ON ETHICS (Louis Infield trans., Methven & Co. 1979) (1930). 
For more contemporary discussions, see H.B. ACTON, KANT'S MORAL PHILOSOPHY (1970); 
BAIER, supra note 7, at 187-213; C.D. BROAD, FIVE TYPES OF ETHICAL THEORY 116-42 (1930); 
ALAN DONAGAN, THE THEORY OF MORALITY (1977); C.E. HARRIS, APPLYING MORAL THEO-
RIES 127-57 (1986); THOMAS NAGEL, MORTAL QUESTIONS (1979); D.D. RAPHAEL, MORAL 
PHILOSOPHY 55-66 (1981); DAVID Ross, KANT'S ETHICAL THEORY (1954); ROBERT P. WOLFF, 
THE AUTONOMY OF REASON: A COMMENTARY ON KANT'S "GROUNDWORK OF THE META-
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theories, certain act-types are intrinsically right or intrinsically wrong. 
Thus, if it is right to preserve innocent life, one cannot take an inno-
cent life even if, in so doing, one saves a great many more innocent 
lives. 11 Contemporary deontologists often refine this anticonsequen-
tial claim by describing morality as a set of agent-relative categorical 
imperatives.12 Morality directs each agent not to kill innocent persons 
even if such a killing would prevent a greater number of similar kill-
ings by others. 
A deontological, or agent-relative, theory of morality does not 
share the characteristic that appears to make the correspondence the-
sis necessarily true for the consequentialist. It is logically possible that 
a (certain sort of) deontological theory would render the correspon-
dence thesis false. 13 Suppose, for example, that morality contained an 
agent-relative obligation not to kill and an agent-relative permission 
(or obligation) to kill when necessary to preserve one's own life. 
Under such a set of moral directives, it would be right for Smith to 
defend herself by killing her attacker. But suppose that this morality 
also contained an agent-relative obligation to prevent killings by 
others, even when those killings are in self-defense. Then it would be 
right for Jones to prevent Smith from (rightly) defending herself. On 
such a theory, there is no correspondence between what it is right for 
Smith to do and what it is right for Jones to do. 
While such a deontological theory entails the rejection of the cor-
respondence thesis, it does not contain any formal contradiction. Yet 
its content is highly implausible. Agent-relative morality is still uni-
versal: if it is right for Smith to defend her own life, it is right for 
Jones to defend his own life. The view here considered has to both 
PHYSICS OF MORALS" (1973); Philippa Foot, Morality as a System of Hypothetlcal Imperatives, 
84 PHIL. REv. 305 (1972). 
11. As Finnis puts it, "one should not choose to do any act which of itself does nothing but 
damage or impede a realization or participation of any one or more of the basic forms of human 
good." JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 118 (1980). 
[This] perhaps unfamiliar formulation ... is well recognized, in other formulations: most 
loosely, as "the end does not justify the means"; more precisely, though still ambiguously, as 
"evil may not be done that good might follow therefrom"; and with a special Enlightenment 
flavour, as Kant's "categorical imperative": "Act so that you treat humanity, whether in 
your own person or in that of another, always as an end and never as a means only." 
Id. at 122 (quoting IMMANUEL KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICs OF MORALS 47 
(Lewis W. Beck trans., 1959) (1785)). Finnis has further developed his deontological theory in 
JOHN FINNIS, FUNDAMENTALS OF ETHICS (1983); JOHN FINNIS ET AL., NUCLEAR DETER-
RENCE, MORALITY AND REALISM (1987). 
12. See, e.g., THOMAS NAGEL, EQUALITY AND PARTIALITY 40, 85-86 (1991); THOMAS 
NAGEL, THE VIEW FROM NOWHERE 152-54 (1986); NAGEL, supra note 7, at 90-95; PARFIT, 
supra note 5, at 143. 
13. But see infra section 111.B for a defense of the claim that a plausible deontological theory 
would incorporate the correspondence thesis. 
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admit this and contend that it is also right for Jones to prevent Smith 
from defending her life. The agent-relativity of such a deontological 
morality prevents these norms of rightness from contradicting them-
selves, but it does not prevent their mutual assertion from being highly 
untenable. Were morality to combine such maxims, individuals would 
be persistently prevented from doing what they would be entitled, and 
perhaps obligated, to do. Morality would make us moral gladiators in 
an arena in which one actor's moral success would depend upon an-
other's moral failure. 
It thus seems that any plausible deontological moral theory would 
subscribe to the correspondence thesis. If true, then the correspon-
dence thesis does not depend for its intuitive viability on any particu-
lar moral theory. 
B. Role-Relative Morality: The Rejection of the 
Correspondence Thesis 
Compelling as the correspondence thesis appears on any plausible 
moral theory, its intuitive appeal seems to give way when one is forced 
to take into account role-related considerations. Suppose now that 
Smith is married to a man who frequently beats her and her three 
children. She rightly believes that there is a strong probability that her 
husband will eventually attempt to kill them all. She also rightly be-
lieves that at that point she will be unable to defend any of them. And 
she rightly believes herself unable to guarantee their safety if they at-
tempt to flee from him. She thus plausibly takes the balance of reasons 
for action to favor a preemptive strike, notwithstanding the fact that 
she recognizes and takes seriously the law's refusal to recognize a spe-
cial battered spouse defense to homicide. She waits until her husband 
is asleep, enters his bedroom and fatally shoots him. 
Suppose that Jones is a judge who must decide whether to convict 
or acquit Smith. Jones considers Smith morally justified in shooting 
her husband, for Jones concurs that the balance of reasons applicable 
to her choice favored such a killing. But Jones is a judge charged with 
the task of applying the law, and the law does not permit the acquittal 
of those who claim self-defense but admit the absence of any imminent 
threat of harm. Jones, like Smith, must thus decide whether to break 
the law. He must decide whether to comply with the decision rule 
that demands punishment of those who kill without legal justification 
or to break that rule and acquit one who is morally justified.14 
14. I have found it useful throughout this article to invoke the distinction between conduct 
rules and decision rules earlier coined by Bentham and recently revived by Meir Dan-Cohen. See 
JEREMY BENTHAM, A FRAGMENT ON GOVERNMENT AND AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCI· 
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Suppose, finally, that Long is responsible for designing and main-
taining our political and legal systems. Among the many tasks re-
quired to foster democracy, preserve the separation of powers, 
maintain law and order, and ensure right action by citizens and offi-
cials is the task of appointing and disciplining members of the judici-
ary. Long, like Jones, recognizes the plausibility of Smith's claim of 
justification. Long also recognizes that Jones might rightly conclude 
that he should acquit Smith, notwithstanding the decision rule that 
requires her punishment. Long thus faces the choice between disci-
plining Jones, should Jones fail to comply with the decision rule, and 
licensing the sort of judicial legislation that justified judicial disobedi-
ence would represent. 
We are now in a position to appreciate the dilemma to which I 
referred in the Introduction. Jones and Long face choices which pit 
our fundamental moral, political, and jurisprudential values against 
one another. If the correspondence thesis applies to acts of punish-
ment in the same way that it applies to preventative and permissive 
acts, then Jones should acquit Smith, and Long should not discipline 
Jones for such an acquittal. It would seem that the correspondence 
thesis should be as true of acts of punishment as of acts of prevention, 
because punishment labels an act as wrong and thus serves to prevent 
future actors (including the actor who is punished) from performing 
that act in similar circumstances. If Smith's act is right, it seems 
wrong to respond to that act with sanctions that imply either that 
Smith should not have performed that act or that future actors should 
not perform the same act in similar circumstances. But if judges like 
Jones acquit those who are morally justified in breaking the law, what 
will become of the rule of law? For law seemingly ceases to be law if 
judges are entitled to rethink its wisdom in every case to which it ap-
plies and to disregard it whenever it is inferior to the rule that they 
would fashion. 15 And if system designers like Long refuse to disci-
pline members of the judiciary who disobey democratically enacted 
decision rules, what will become of democracy and the separation of 
powers? For the majority does not rule itself, and the powers of gov-
PLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 430 (Wilfrid Harrison ed., 1948); Meir Dan-Cohen, Deci-
sion Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625, 
625-30 (1984); see also DAVID DAUBE, FORMS OF ROMAN LEGISLATION 24 (1956) (discussing 
distinction of conduct and decision rules in Talmudic law). Conduct rules constitute those rules 
that are intended to guide the daily behavior of citizens. Decision rules constitute those rules 
that are intended to guide judges in the adjudication of disputes concerning the behavior of 
citizens. 
15. As Lon Fuller argued, the substitution of individual judgment constitutes a failure to 
comply with the "internal morality of the law," and thus "results in something that is not prop-
erly called a legal system at all ..•• " LON FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 39 (2d ed. 1969). 
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ernment are not kept separate, if individuals are entitled to substitute 
their own considered opinions for those of a democratic legislature.16 
Yet the correspondence thesis applies only if the balance of reasons 
for action is indeed the same for Jones and Long as for Smith. That is, 
it applies only if it is right for Jones and Long, as well as for Smith, 
that Smith violate the conduct rule prohibiting homicide in a situation 
in which there is no fear of imminent harm. The rule of law is secure 
if reasons apply to Jones that do not apply to Smith - reasons that 
make Smith's conduct wrong for Jones, notwithstanding its rightness 
for her. Such reasons, if sufficiently weighty, might justify the judicial 
punishment of an admittedly justified offender. Even if such judicial 
reasons are insufficient to justify Jones' punishment of Smith, our com-
mitment to democracy and the separation of powers is secure if rea-
sons apply to Long that do not apply to Jones - reasons that make 
Jones' acquittal of Smith wrong for Long, notwithstanding its possible 
rightness for Jones. In such a case, Long might be justified in punish-
ing Jones for not punishing Smith. 
But the cost of preserving our systemic values is the cost of aban-
doning the punishment principle. According to this principle, individ-
uals whose actions are morally justified ought not be punished for 
their actions. 17 This principle could be justified by what legal philoso-
phers and criminal law theorists have called a "weak version" of the 
principle of retribution. The principle of retribution holds that indi-
vidual desert is both a necessary and a sufficient condition of praise 
and blame: morally culpable individuals deserve punishment and thus 
should be punished even when their punishment will not serve to ad-
vance any welfare goal, for example, the prevention of crime (the 
strong version of the retributive principle18); morally innocent individ-
uals (individuals who are justified, excused, or who otherwise fail to 
satisfy conditions of responsibility) do not deserve punishment and 
thus should not be punished, even when their punishment might fur-
16. [G]ood reasons for avoiding the creation of nondemocratic political elites militate 
against judges being given the authority to modify extant legal rules on the basis of their 
personal perceptions of what is likely to have the best consequences in the instant case •••• 
[T]he whole point of the legislative enterprise would be lost if the courts were given the 
authority to subvert it. 
ROLFE. SARTORIUS, INDIVIDUAL CONDUCT AND SOCIAL NORMS 178 (1975). 
17. "[E]very moral man must be appalled at the judicial execution of the innocent or at the 
punishment, torture, and killing of the innocent. Indeed, being appalled by such behavior par-
tially defines what it is to be a moral agent." Nielson, supra note 5, at 220. 
18. See, e.g., John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHIL. REV. 3, 4 (1955) ("What we may 
call the retributive view is that punishment is justified on the grounds that wrongdoing merits 
punishment."). For a powerful defense of this position, see Michael S. Moore, The Moral Worth 
of Retribution, in REsPONSIBILITY, CHARACTER AND THE EMOTIONS: NEW EssAYS IN MORAL 
PHILOSOPHY 179 (Ferdinand Schoeman ed., 1987). 
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ther some welfare goal (the weak version of the retributive 
principle19). 
More interesting for present purposes is the support that the corre-
spondence thesis provides for the punishment principle. If the corre-
spondence thesis is true of acts of punishment, then the justifiability or 
unjustifiability of an individual's act determines the justifiability or un-
justifiability of that individual's punishment, for the balance of reasons 
that determines the morality of her act is identical to the balance of 
reasons that determines the morality of her punishment. Insofar as an 
actor is justified in performing an act, another actor cannot be justified 
in punishing her for that act. 20 
The punishment principle is intuitively compelling because it ap-
pears morally repugnant to blame or punish individuals who have 
done precisely what they should have done. To abandon the punish-
ment principle is to threaten individuals with a catch-22: to escape 
punishment they must depart from the balance of reasons for action -
and so act immorally; to preserve the morality of their conduct they 
must conform to the balance of reasons for action - and so suffer 
punishment. 
But the recognition of role-relative reasons for action puts the pun-
ishment principle in jeopardy, for it entails the indefensibility of the 
correspondence thesis. If morality requires conduct in accord with the 
balance of reasons for action, and if that balance differs among the 
citizen, judge, and institution designer, then there may be instances in 
which the punishment of the justified is itself justified. The most that 
the punishment principle can do under role-relative morality is serve 
19. See, e.g., Rawls, supra note 18, at 11. 
20. The vindication of the punishment principle by the correspondence thesis distinguishes 
the punishment principle from what Rolf Sartorius has called the reflection principle. According 
to the reflection principle, "[w]here an individual has correctly decided that he ought to do X, 
any higher-order judgment about his decision to do X or his actual act of doing it ought to 
license or approve of, rather than disapprove of or penalize, the decision and/or the act itself." 
SARTORIUS, supra note 16, at 56-57; see also Larry Alexander, Law and Exclusionary Reasons, 
18 PHIL. TOPICS 5, 10-11 (1990) [hereinafter Alexander, Law]; Larry Alexander, Pursuing the 
Good - Indirectly, 95 ETHICS 315, 323-25 (1985) (discussing Sartorius' reflection principle) 
[hereinafter Alexander, Pursuing the Good]. The reflection principle, as stated by Sartorius, pre-
supposes that the reasons for action may differ as between an actor and one who judges that 
actor. It thus constitutes a normative thesis about the sort of judgment that ought to be made 
concerning an actor's conduct, rather than a conceptual thesis about the sort of judgment that 
must be made about that conduct. If the correspondence thesis is true, the reflection principle is 
also true (and it thus collapses into the punishment principle). But this is because the reasons for 
higher-order judgments about an actor's conduct are identical to the reasons for that conduct; 
hence, if the conduct is justified, the only justifiable judgment about that conduct must be one of 
approval. It is not because the reasons for judgment include a second-order principle that holds 
that, notwithstanding the fact that the reasons for conduct and the reasons for judgment about 
that conduct may not be different, the reasons for judgment ought to be calculated as if they 
were identical to the reasons for conduct. 
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as a reason, albeit a possibly weighty one, to refrain from punishing 
the justified offender.21 But because such a reason must be added to 
the balance of reasons for and against punishment, it may be insuffi-
cient to compel the acquittal of the justified.22 
The dilemma is now clear. Either we must give up the punishment 
principle, and acquiesce in the punishment of justified offenders, or we 
must give up our traditional understanding of the systemic principles 
that currently justify our system of adjudication. More precisely, 
(1) either judges must violate the punishment principle and punish 
citizens who justifiably break the law, or they must violate the rule of 
law and disobey decision rules that require the punishment of the justi-
fied; similarly, (2) either system designers must violate the punish-
ment principle and punish judges who justifiably disobey decision rules 
(by refusing to punish justifiably disobedient citizens), or they must 
violate the principle of democracy and the separation of powers by 
permitting the substitution of individual judicial judgment for the will 
of a legislative majority. 
The first alternative in each of these cases appears the inevitable 
result of embracing the possibility of role-relative morality, or what I 
shall callperspectivalism. 23 If institutional roles create new reasons (or 
21. The punishment principle, under this analysis, collapses into the reflection principle. See 
supra note 20. 
22. I say this on the assumption that the punishment principle (like the reflection principle 
with which it is identical on this analysis, see supra notes 20-21) cannot function as an exclusion-
ary reason for action. This assumption follows from the arguments that I have advanced on 
behalf of the claim that exclusionary reasons are incoherent. For a summary of these arguments, 
see infra text accompanying notes 39-40. For the original, quite lengthy version of these argu-
ments, see Heidi M. Hurd, Challenging Authority, 100 YALE L.J. 1611, 1620-41 (1991). 
If the deontologist considers both the punishment principle and the role-relative reasons for 
action unique to citizens, judges, and institution designers to be both intrinsically rightmaking 
and at least practically incompatible, then the deontologist will be confronted with moral conflict 
that only the sort of moral balancing described here can seemingly resolve. For a classic discus-
sion ofdeontological balancing, see W.D. Ross, THE RIGHT AND THE GOOD 16-47 (1930). But 
cf. Barbara Herman, Obligation and Performance: A Kantian Account of Moral Conflict, in 
IDENTITY, CHARACTER AND MORALITY: EssAYS IN MORAL PSYCHOLOGY 311, 319 (Owen 
Flanagan & Amelie 0. Rorty eds., 1990); Barbara Herman, The Practice of Moral Judgment, 82 
J. PHIL. 414 (1985) [hereinafter Herman, Moral Judgment] (arguing that practical reason re-
quires not balancing of reasons, but detecting interlocking exceptions to reasons). For an appre-
ciation of the general debate concerning the existence and resolution of deontological moral 
conflicts, see the essays collected in MORAL DILEMMAS (Christopher W. Gowans ed., 1987). 
23. It is crucial not to confuse a theory of role-relative morality with a theory of metaethical 
relativism. A theory of role-relative morality is entirely consistent with a theory of metaethical 
realism - that is, a theory that holds that propositions about morality are true or false independ-
ent of anyone's beliefs about them. Indeed, the puzzle with which this article deals is only inter· 
esting if it is supposed that metaethical relativism is false. If metaethical relativism were true, the 
correspondence thesis would be trivially false. The truth of moral propositions would be relative 
to the beliefs of individuals (in the case of metaethical subjectivism) or to the beliefs of communi-
ties (in the case of metaethical conventionalism). Insofar as beliefs can differ, the morality of any 
given act could differ as between individuals or communities. Hence, it would be trivially true 
that an actor might be morally justified (from her perspective) in doing an act that another (who 
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eliminate otherwise valid reasons) for action, the correspondence the-
sis is false and morality may compel the punishment of the justified. 
The second alternative appears the inevitable result of denying the 
possibility of role-relative morality. If citizens share with officials an 
identical set of reasons for action, then the correspondence thesis is 
true, and justifiable disobedience by a citizen will justify disobedience 
by an official, which in tum will justify approval by a system designer. 
II. THE PRESUPPOSITIONS OF THE DILEMMA 
The dilemma that I have sketched would not arise if either of two 
things were true. First, if the content of the law perfectly mirrored the 
content of morality, so that citizens and officials were never called 
upon to do anything contrary to the balance of moral reasons for ac-
tion, then citizens and officials would never be justified in violating the 
law. Second, if the law, qua law, provided reasons for unconditional 
obedience, then, even if it did not perfectly mirror morality, it would 
nevertheless preclude any instances of justified disobedience by citi-
zens. In either case, we would have no cause for moral concern over 
the punishment of disobedient citizens, and hence in either case there 
would be no occasion on which a judge might be justified in refusing to 
punish a disobedient citizen. The dilemma therefore is a product of 
two presuppositions: (1) that the content oflaw departs from the con-
tent of morality; and (2) that the authority of law departs from the 
authority of morality. 
A. The Asymmetry of Law and Morality 
The content of law fails to cohere with the content of morality 
even in legal systems, like our own, that make real efforts to pass laws 
that accord with the demands of morality. Because this is not obvi-
ously true, and because the dilemma with which I am concerned pre-
supposes its truth, it is useful to see why it is true. Let us begin with 
the criminal law proper and then tum to civil sanctions under tort law. 
Anglo-American penal systems purport not to punish justified of-
occupies a different role) is morally justified (from his perspective) in punishing. Therefore, the 
puzzle generated in this Part is only significant if metaethical relativism is false. I have elsewhere 
argued that it is. Heidi M. Hurd, Note, Relativistic Jurisprudence: Skepticism Founded on Con-
fusion, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1417, 1459-506 (1988). 
While this article thus presupposes that metaethical relativism is false, it does not presuppose 
that metaethical realism is true. Some noncognitivists believe that they can duplicate virtually all 
of the claims of metaethical realists. See SIMON BLACKBURN, SPREADING THE WORD (1984); 
Jeremy Waldron, The Irrelevance of Moral Objectivity, in NATURAL LAW THEORIES 158 (Robert 
P. George ed., 1992). If they are right, then the question of whether morality is role-relative is as 
significant for them as for moral realists. 
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fenders. 24 Sometimes this is captured by the fact that many of those 
who are justified in their actions are not interpreted to be "offenders" 
at all. The sheriff who arrests a federal mail carrier for murder, while 
that carrier is carrying the mail, literally "obstructs the mails," but 
does not legally obstruct the mails, because his obstruction is justified. 
The sheriff who risks damage to federal property in his attempt to 
arrest a murderous mail carrier does not recklessly risk its damage 
because legal recklessness amounts to taking a substantial and unjusti-
fiable risk.25 In these cases, the good consequence achieved (appre-
hending a murderer) renders the sheriff's conduct nonpunishable, for 
the sheriff is said to lack either the actus reus or the mens rea of the 
offense in question. Sometimes the refusal to punish such a justified 
offender is captured by a separate defense, such as the Model Penal 
Code's "balance of evils" defense: Conduct that is otherwise criminal 
is not punishable if "the harm or evil sought to be avoided by such 
conduct is greater than that sought to be prevented by the law defining 
the offense charged . . . . "26 
Yet, despite the manifest reluctance of the criminal law to punish 
justified offenders, it will nevertheless demand such punishment in the 
cases with which I will be concerned in this article. In such cases, the 
law demands action that fails to comport with the balance of reasons. 
It nevertheless preempts individual calculation of or action on that 
balance. Consider four such cases. First, individuals who violate laws 
that they rightly consider fundamentally mistaken will find themselves 
without recourse to exculpatory doctrines, their moral calculations 
preempted by those of the lawmaker. Thus, in the event that abortion 
again becomes illegal, women who rightly conclude that the law 
prohibiting abortion fails adequately to weigh their liberty interests 
against the interests of the fetuses they carry will nevertheless be 
thought to be preempted by the law from deciding that they should 
have abortions. 
Second, civilly disobedient offenders, who rightly believe that a law 
is so immoral that it justifies illegal actions to obtain its repeal, are 
thought to be rightfully punished. Draft protesters, for example, 
might rightly think that a war is sufficiently immoral that it justifies 
them in trespassing into Selective Service offices to disrupt operations. 
24. JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 249-51 (1987); JEROME HALL, 
GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 444-45 (1947). 
25. These illustrations are loosely constructed from the facts of United States v. Kirby, 74 
U.S. (7 Wall.) 482 (1868) (county sheriff prosecuted for obstructing the mail after arresting on-
duty federal mail carrier suspected of murder). See infra text accompanying note 88. 
26. MODEL PENAL CODE§ 3.02 (Proposed Official Draft 1962). 
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But the moral justification invoked by these protesters for violating 
laws prohibiting criminal trespass and the destruction of government 
property will not be afforded legal recognition; rather, it will be held to 
be preempted by the laws that license the draft. 27 
Third, our law requires judges to punish offenders for whom the 
law has created an exception but who fail the conditions of that excep-
tion. The battered wife might rightly think that if she does not kill her 
husband in his sleep she will be unable to prevent him from taking her 
life. But she fails to fulfill the conditions of self-defense, for she does 
not bring about her husband's death while under a threat of imminent 
harm. In such a case, she may not be civilly disobedient (in the classic 
sense), for she may believe that the law is (in general) justified in re-
quiring imminent peril as a condition for the use of deadly force, and 
she probably does not act in order to bring about any changes in that 
law. Nevertheless, as in cases of civil disobedience, the law of self-
defense preempts her ability to invoke a legal justification for her 
(morally) justified conduct.28 
The fourth class of justified offenders who are unable to avail 
themselves of any legal justifications consists of those offenders whose 
justification for violating the law is too personal to be given legal rec-
ognition by the balance of evils defense, or by other exculpatory doc-
trines. The citizen who fuids herself at a red light in the middle of the 
night while in the middle of nowhere may rightly conclude that, while 
the inconvenience of stopping is negligible, the danger to herself and 
others from running the red light is nil. Such a citizen may well be 
justified in running the red light, but the law will regard her justifica-
tion as preempted by the rules of the road. 
In each of these cases, Anglo-American criminal law demands the 
punishment of justified offenders. Now consider the civil law. Unlike 
27. As section 3.02 of the Model Penal Code states: 
(1) Conduct which the actor believes to be necessary to avoid a harm or evil to himself or to 
another is justifiable, provided that: 
(c) a legislative purpose to exclude the justification claimed does not otherwise plainly 
appear. 
MODEL PENAL CoDE § 3.02 (Proposed Official Draft 1962); see State v. Tate, sos A.2d 941 
(N.J. 1986) (holding necessity defense unavailable to quadriplegic who possessed marijuana for 
medical purposes because state statute allowing use of controlled substances under physician 
supervision suggested a legislative intent to exclude the defense). 
28. Thus, according to section 3.02 of the Model Penal Code: 
(1) Conduct which the actor believes to be necessary to avoid a harm or evil to himself or to 
another is justifiable, provided that: 
(b) neither the Code nor other law defining the offense provides exceptions or defenses 
dealing with the specific situation involved .•.. 
MODEL PENAL CODE§ 3.02 (Proposed Official Draft 1962). 
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the criminal law, the civil law generally does not "punish" justified 
offenders with civil liability. This is made particularly clear by negli-
gence law, which explicitly exempts from liability those who act on the 
balance of reasons for action. One must pay damages under the law of 
negligence only if one is unjustified in having taken risks that material-
ized in harm to a plaintiff. 
Tort law is less clear about its refusal to "punish" the justified in 
cases that invite the application of strict liability. Insofar as tort law 
imposes liability in these cases without regard to the justification with 
which a defendant harmed the plaintiff, it might be thought to "pun-
ish" the justified. Thus, for example, in cases like Vincent v. Lake Erie 
Transportation Co., 29 individuals are thought to be justified in using or 
damaging the property of others, for doing so prevents a greater loss to 
themselves. Yet the law requires that they compensate those whom 
they justifiably injure. In cases that involve harms caused by privately 
owned wild animals, owners are thought to be justified in keeping the 
animals so long as they do so nonnegligently. Yet the law holds them 
liable for all injuries that their animals cause. 30 In cases that involve 
injuries caused by abnormally dangerous activities, such as dynamiting 
tunnels or transporting gasoline, those who engage in such activities 
are thought to be justified if they conduct themselves nonnegligently. 
But they are nevertheless held liable for all injuries that they cause.31 
On their face, these sorts of cases certainly seem to suggest that in 
at least some instances individuals will be civilly "punished" for mor-
ally justified conduct. But this suggestion is misleading. While the 
balance of reasons for action may favor the use of others' property in 
circumstances of necessity, or the ownership of wild animals, or ab-
normally dangerous activities, the balance of reasons for action in such 
cases probably also requires the compensation of those injured. Thus, 
while defendants in such cases may have justifiably caused harm, they 
are probably unjustified in their refusal to abide by the civil law that 
requires compensation for such harm. Put differently, the reasons that 
judges would have to exact compensation in these cases are reasons for 
defendants to volunteer compensation in the first place. For in such 
cases, compensation vitiates the defendant's unjust enrichment. If re-
dressing unjust enrichment is a reason for a judge to require compen-
sation, it is a reason for a citizen to offer it.32 And defendants who in 
29. 124 N.W. 221 (Minn. 1910) (holding shipowner liable for loss of plaintiff's dock even 
though shipowner acted reasonably in tying ship to dock during storm). 
30. RESrATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 509 (1965). 
31. RESrATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§§ 519, 520 (1965). 
32. The thesis that unjust enrichment constitutes a morally legitimate reason for the imposi-
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fact wrongly refuse to compensate those whom they injure are notjus-
tified offenders of the civil law. Hence, while judges should require 
them to compensate those whom they injure, this imposition of liabil-
ity does not mean that genuinely justified offenders will be held civilly 
liable. For genuinely justified offenders are those who would be justi-
fied both in causing harm and in not paying for that harm. 
Tort law thus generally does not make genuinely justified offenders 
liable. The only exceptions to this occur when strict liability is im-
posed on defendants who neither acted negligently nor were personally 
enriched by conduct that caused harm to a plaintiff. Some product 
liability cases have this flavor, 33 as do some cases that involve abnor-
mally dangerous activities pursued for public (rather than private) 
benefit. 34 In such cases, strict liability is imposed on individuals who 
have done the right thing and who have not been unjustly benefited by 
so doing. Unless morality provides individuals with a reason to pay 
for all the harms that they cause, these parties seem to have no moral 
reason to offer compensation to those whom their justified conduct 
injures. Insofar as tort law imposes liability anyway, it "punishes" the 
justified. 
It is thus contingently true that our legal system sometimes im-
poses criminal and civil liability on actors who act morally.35 We 
tion of civil liability has been advanced by JULES COLEMAN, MARKETS, MORALS AND THE LAW 
166-201 (1988); JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JULES L. CoLEMAN, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: AN 
INTRODUCTION TO JURISPRUDENCE 167-89 (1984); Jules L. Coleman, Moral Theories of Torts: 
Their Scope and Limits: Part II. 2 LAW & PHIL. 5 (1983); George P. Fletcher, Fairness and 
Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537 (1972). See also Heidi M. Hurd, Correctlng Injus-
tice to Corrective Justice, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 51, 62-84 (1991) (discussing Jules Coleman's 
unjust enrichment theory of tort liability). 
33. Koos v. Roth, 652 P.2d 1255 (Or. 1982); Seigler v. Kuhlman, 502 P.2d 1181 (Wash. 
1973), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 983 (1974). 
34. Brody v. Overlook Hosp., 296 A.2d 688 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1972), revd., 317 A.2d 
392 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1974), affd., 332 A.2d 596 (N.J. 1975). 
35. Some would go further. Some would claim that it is necessarily true that in all legal 
systems the content oflaw must depart from the content of morality. Hence, it is necessarily true 
that the law will call for the punishment of the justified. 
Fred Schauer, for example, has recently argued that legal rules are necessarily suboptimal in 
comparison to moral rules. FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES 100-02 (1991). 
Legal rules are, for Schauer, a species of prescriptive rules authored to guide the behavior of 
others. Id. at 17-37. Prescriptive rules are probabilistic generalizations that are inevitably over-
and underinclusive. Id. at 31-34. Not all dogs create annoying disturbances, and many things 
that are not dogs do create such disturbances; hence, a rule prohibiting dogs from public build-
ings, while probabilistically related to the justification for that rule, is simultaneously over- and 
underinclusive. As Schauer maintains, "it is logically impossible for a rule to generate a result 
for a particular case superior to the result that would have been generated in the absence of rules, 
but ... it is indeed quite possible for rules to generate results in particular cases that are inferior 
to those generated without them." Id. at 101. He explains: 
In many cases, indeed in most cases, the result indicated by applying a rule will be the same 
as the result indicated by directly applying the rule's background justifications . • . . But ... 
t~ere will be some cases in which the result indicated by the rule will be inferior to the result 
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come, then, to the second presupposition of the dilemma that I 
sketched in the opening Part - the presupposition that the law lacks 
the authority to provide citizens with an overriding moral reason for 
obedience. 
B. The Limited Authority of Law 
The most influential contemporary view of the law's authority, 
that advanced and defended by Joseph Raz, conceives oflaw as a prac-
tical authority capable of issuing exclusionary reasons for obedience.36 
According to this view, the sheer fact that a law has been enacted 
provides individuals with a reason for obedience that trumps (virtu-
ally) all reasons for disobedience.37 In the face of such an exclusionary 
reason for obedience, the right thing to do, all things considered, is to 
indicated by direct application of its justification. Yet these instances will not be accompa-
nied by any offsetting instances in the opposite direction . 
. . . The only standard for measurement would be the one ultimate justification, and thus 
the result indicated by that justification would by definition be the best for any particular 
case. Consequently, any rule-indicated result diverging from the justification-indicated re-
sult, would eo ipso be an inferior result. 
Id. at 100-01. 
Schauer's claim that legal rules must necessarily depart from moral rules depends on the 
assumption that the function of legal rules is to guide action. From this assumption, Schauer 
reaches his necessity claim in two steps: (1) For legal rules to guide action more effectively than 
do moral rules, legal rules must be clearer, simpler, and more accessible than are the rules of 
morality; (2) to possess these features, legal rules must be over- and underinclusive vis-a-vis the 
more complex, shaded, reasons for action that morality provides. 
I shall not pursue whether Schauer is correct either in assuming that the function of law is to 
guide conduct or in calculating that law must necessarily depart from morality in order to fulfill 
that function. It is sufficient for our purposes to note that actual legal systems do in fact punish 
some justified offenders because such systems lack a legal defense for every case in which a 
disobedient citizen has a moral justification. It follows from this fact alone that, unless the law 
itself provides citizens with an overriding moral reason to obey the law, there will be cases in 
which individuals are morally justified in violating the law. 
36. JOSEPH RAz, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 3-33 (1979) [hereinafter RAZ, AUTHORITY]; 
JOSEPH RAz, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 23-109 (1986) [hereinafter RAz, MORALITY]; RAZ, 
supra note 3. 
37. This description ofRaz's conception of the dynamics of practical authority is deliberately 
simplistic. Raz argues that the law of a state obligates only if and when the state constitutes a 
legitimate practical authority acting within its proper jurisdiction. The imposition of these con-
straints makes Raz's theory both sophisticated and discriminating, for it makes the question of 
whether the law is authoritative a piecemeal one, the answer to which varies from individual to 
individual and circumstance to circumstance. While I have argued that Raz's theory succumbs 
to the same problems that plague simpler accounts of practical authority, see Hurd, supra note 
22, it does not do so because it simplistically asserts that the law unexceptionally obligates. 
Rather, it does so because it asserts that the law has the power sometimes to obligate. For an 
excellent collection of articles analyzing and critiquing Raz's theory of practical authority, see 
Symposium, The Works of Joseph Raz, 62 S. CAL. L. REv. 731 (1989); see also RICHARD E. 
FLATHMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PoLmCAL AUTHORITY 109-25 (1980) (critiquing Raz's concept 
of the authority of rules); LESLIE GREEN, THE AUTHORITY OF THE STATE 36-51 (1988) (follow-
ing Raz's theory of authority); NEIL MAcCORMICK, LEGAL RIGHT AND SOCIAL DEMOCRACY 
232-46 (1982) (employing Raz's understanding of the authority of law to analyze whether law is 
necessarily coercive); Alexander, Law, supra note 20 (critiquing Raz's theory of legal authority). 
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comply with the law.3s 
Notwithstanding the explanatory power of this model, it has come 
under considerable attack by those who distrust the claim that the law 
should be thought to preempt individual moral judgment. I have ar-
gued, for example, that exclusionary reasons for action are concep-
tually incoherent and, hence, that a theory that accords law practical 
authority cannot be defended. 39 Others have maintained that a system 
of law premised on a claim of practical authority is inherently im-
moral. 40 Still others have maintained that as a psychological matter, 
law does not affect our practical reasoning in a manner that is compat-
ible with an exclusionary account of its authority.41 
Those who have shared my rejection of a theory of practical au-
thority have defended a version of one of two alternative models that 
accord the law only limited authority. One model postulates that law 
possesses what I have called "influential authority": it provides citi-
zens and officials with a new reason for obedience, but it does not ex-
38. More accurately, Raz argues that a legitimate practical authority provides "protected 
reasons" for action. RAz, AUTHORITY, supra note 36, at 18. A protected reason is complex. 
First, it embodies a first-order "content-independent reason" to act as commanded by the law. A 
first-order content independent reason for action stems from the sheer fact that an authority has 
issued a request or command. As Raz describes it: 
A reason is content-independent if there is no direct connection between the reason and 
the action for which it is a reason. The reason is in the apparently "extraneous" fact that 
someone in authority has said so, and within certain limits his saying so would be reason for 
any number of actions, including (in typical cases) for contradictory ones. 
RAz, MORALITY, supra note 36, at 35; see also H.L.A. HART, EssAYS ON BENTHAM 254-55 
(1982) (coining the notion of content-independent reasons employed by Raz); Joseph Raz, Vol-
untary Obligations and Normative Powers, 46 ARISTOTELIAN Socv. PROC. 79, 95-98 (Supp. 
1972) (explicating concept of content-independent reasons). 
In addition to providing a new first-order content-independent reason to act as commanded, a 
protected reason for action also gives a second-order exclusionary reason of the sort described in 
the above text. Hence, upon being commanded to act by a practical authority, one has both a 
new reason to act as commanded and a reason to refrain from acting upon the reasons that one 
previously had not to act as commanded. A protected reason for obedience to the law thus 
makes obedience rational, all things considered, for the only reasons to consider are those that 
require obedience (including, and perhaps limited to, the first-order content-independent reason 
provided by the protected reason itself). For a more extensive discussion of the components of a 
protected reason for action, see Hurd, supra note 22, at 1616-20. 
While the terminology of protected and exclusionary reasons is distinctive to Raz and the 
literature about Raz, the notion that there are rights, rules, and performative acts (e.g., promises) 
that prohibit us from giving weight to certain types of reasons for action (e.g., efficiency, social 
utility) is commonly invoked in anti-utilitarian philosophy. See, e.g., ROBERT NOZICK, AN.AR-
CHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 28-35 (1974) {discussing rights as "side-constraints"); RAWLS, supra 
note 3, at 150-61 (arguing that benefits of slavery are not to be considered in setting up a just 
society). 
39. See Hurd, supra note 22, at 1614-39. 
40. See Michael S. Moore, Authority, Law, and Razian Reasons, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 827, 
859-73 (1989). 
41. See FLATHMAN, supra note 37, at 110-12; SCHAUER, supra note 35, at 88-93. 
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elude reasons for disobedience.42 According to this model, individuals 
are justified in breaking the law in instances in which they accurately 
calculate that the reasons for disobedience outweigh the reasons for 
obedience (including among those latter reasons the fact that the law 
demands obedience). The alternative model that I have defended 
takes the law to possess, at most, "theoretical authority": it cannot 
provide a new reason for action, but it may provide a new reason to 
believe that there are other reasons for action - reasons that existed 
antecedent to the law's enactment.43 That is, the law may provide 
evidence of the conduct that morality requires. According to this 
model, individuals are justified in breaking the law whenever they 
rightly consider it to be poor evidence of their moral obligations. 
Under either ·of these alternative models of the law's limited au-
thority, the demands of practical rationality obligate individuals to 
weigh the merits of obedience against those of disobedience. In those 
instances in which individuals rightly determine that the law fails to 
reflect the balance of reasons for action, individuals are justified in 
breaking the law (and are indeed obligated to do so). This conclusion 
constitutes the second presupposition of the dilemma, for it provides a 
theoretical defense of justified disobedience and generates the need for 
a compatible theory of adjudication. Such a theory will be called upon 
either to embrace perspectivalism and punish morally justified offend-
ers or to preserve the correspondence thesis and acquit morally justi-
fied offenders. The first alternative will require the rejection of the 
punishment principle. The second will require us to sacrifice our 
traditional understanding of systemic values such as the rule of law, 
democracy, and the separation of powers. 
III. SEIZING THE FIRST HORN: A DEFENSE OF 
PERSPECTIVALISM 
Those who have confronted the dilemma that I have sketched have 
felt compelled to seize its first horn and abandon the punishment prin-
ciple. As Larry Alexander has maintained, "[t]here is an always-pos-
sible gap between what we have reason to do, all things considered 
... , and what we have reason to have our ... officials ... require us to 
42. See FLATHMAN, supra note 37, at 119; SCHAUER, supra note 35, at 112-18; Moore, supra 
note 40, at 862-73. 
43. See Hurd, supra note 22, at 1667-77; Heidi M. Hurd, Sovereignty in Silence, 99 YALE L.J. 
945, 1007-28 (1990); see also Alexander, Law, supra note 20, at 7 ("Law in fact is not itself a 
reason to act, first-order or otherwise. Although law can affect our first-order reasons, it cannot 
be a first-order reason."); Donald H. Regan, Authority and Value: Reflections on Roz's Morality 
of Freedom, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 995, 1003-18 (1989) (arguing that laws constitute "indicator 
rules" that sum up, but do not provide, first-order reasons for action). 
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do."44 Recognition of this gap, according to Alexander, requires that 
we give up the punishment principle and punish those who do the 
right thing in breaking the law. "[I]n one role we occupy, that of au-
thority, we should impose sanctions on ourselves for actions that are 
correct in another role we occupy, that of subjects of rules. It may be 
morally good that we punish ourselves for breaking morally good rules 
for morally good reasons."45 Fred Schauer has similarly argued that 
authority is asymmetrical. "If the lack of a (good moral) reason for 
obeying authority does not entail the lack of a (good moral) reason for 
imposing it, then, a fortiori, the practice of imposing authority, and of 
enforcing compliance with rules qua rules, can be seen as sometimes 
justified . . . . "46 
Implicit in the willingness to reject the punishment principle is a 
commitment to role-relative morality or perspectivalism. The "al-
ways-possible gap" that Alexander identifies is a product of the view 
that public roles provide officials with reasons for action that are dif-
ferent from the reasons for action possessed by those who do not oc-
cupy such roles. Hence, a single act may be moral from the 
perspective of a citizen but immoral from the perspective of a judge. 
Alternatively, it may be moral from the perspective of a judge but 
immoral from the perspective of a system designer. I will ultimately 
argue that role-relative morality is misconceived and, hence, that we 
need not and should not embrace the paradoxical conclusion that mo-
rality justifies the punishment of the morally justified. 47 But it is im-
portant to appreciate the power of the claim that the dilemma is an 
inescapable one, and that our theoretical commitments suffer the least 
damage by forfeiting the punishment principle. 
There are two potential sources of role-relative morality. First, 
role-relative morality is thought to follow from the need to prevent the 
moral errors that are the inevitable product of human fallibility. The-
orists who consider error to be the sole source of role-relative morality 
provide what I take to be a pragmatic defense of the need to punish the 
justified. Such a defense furnishes a weak theory of perspectivalism, 
for, in the absence of moral error, there is no basis for defending role-
relative morality, and hence no basis for abandoning the correspon-
dence thesis. But role-relative morality is also thought by some to be a 
product of institutional concerns that would survive the (admittedly 
unlikely) perfection of our practical reasoning. Theorists who take 
44. Larry Alexander, The Gap, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY. 695, 695 (1991). 
45. Id. at 696. 
46. SCHAUER, supra note 35, at 129-30. 
47. See infra Part IV. 
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these institutional concerns to be the source of role-relative morality 
provide a principled defense of perspectivalism that serves as a sub-
stantially stronger reason for sacrificing the punishment principle.48 If 
such theorists are successful in advancing a principled defense of role-
relative morality, then we must conclude that morality is inherently 
paradoxical. It requires us to do what it requires others to prevent or 
punish. 
In this Part, I propose to explore these sources of role-relative mo-
rality. In the subsequent Part, I shall ask whether the considerations 
to which these sources give rise are genuinely role-relative. 
A. Practical Errors: Pragmatic Foundations for Perspectivalism 
Those who seek to derive role-relative morality from considera-
tions of human fallibility must be prepared to explain how such con-
siderations generate differential reasons for action for citizens, officials, 
and institution designers. At least three accounts appear to be 
available. 
1. The Argument from Personal Error 
Alexander has maintained that one reason for the gap between jus-
tified disobedience and justified punishment is that "we as the subjects 
of rules are fallible, and we are more likely to produce those conse-
quences demanded by our moral principles if we are governed not di-
rectly by those principles but by blunt (over- and under-inclusive) 
rules that are relatively easy to follow and to monitor."49 This insis-
tence on rule-governed conduct recalls John Stuart Mill's conviction 
that "[w]hatever we adopt as the fundamental principle of morality, 
we require subordinate principles to apply it by .... "50 Insofar as the 
law provides just such a set of subordinate principles for action, this 
thesis suggests that compliance with the law will accomplish results 
that are morally superior to those achieved by attempts to comply 
with the dictates of morality. 
This claim, by itself, fails to provide a defense of role-relative mo-
rality. It merely suggests that, by virtue of our inevitable fallibility, all 
of us, citizens, judges, and institution designers alike, have a reason to 
48. For a discussion of the distinction between pragmatic and principled defenses of role· 
relative morality, see infra text accompanying notes 72-73. 
49. Alexander, supra note 44, at 696; see SCHAUER, supra note 35, at 149-55. 
SO. MILL, supra note 5, at 266. Such a conviction was born of the recognition that "there is 
not time, previous to action, for calculating and weighing the effects of any line of conduct on the 
general happiness." Id. at 264. Absent such time, individuals are bound to make mistakes that 
lead to wrong action. For a similar defense of the argument from personal error, see Rawls, 
supra note 18, at 23. 
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defer to the law if the law prescribes conduct that accords with the 
relevant moral principles more often than does our own calculation of 
those principles. Those who contemplate disobedience (of either deci-
sion rules or conduct rules) must factor into their calculations the pos-
sibility that they are in error in thinking that the relevant rules are 
over- or underinclusive. If this calculation is itself likely to be errone-
ous, then concern for personal moral error may provide a good reason 
for general deference to the law. But such a reason appears equally 
applicable to citizens, judges, and institution designers. 
To generate differential reasons for action, those who appeal to the 
potential for personal error must provide some account of why the fear 
of personal moral error should lead judges to comply with decision 
rules in instances in which the fear of personal moral error should not 
lead citizens to comply with conduct rules. Such an account would be 
available if judges were prone to greater error than citizens. Under 
such circumstances, a judge would have a more weighty reason to 
abide by the decision rule requiring punishment of a battered wife than 
the battered wife would have in deciding whether to violate the con-
duct rule prohibiting homicide in the absence of imminent peril. But 
because there are grounds for thinking that judges and other officials 
are at least as well situated as are citizens to assess the balance of 
reasons for action,51 the simple argument from personal error fails to 
provide a compelling reason to embrace role-relative morality. 
2. The Argument from Example 
A more sophisticated version of the error thesis is more persuasive. 
Alexander has sketched its foundations as follows: 
Rules are formulated by finite, fallible human beings whose ability to 
foresee and consider possible applications of rules is limited. The rules 
they promulgate will therefore be imperfect. Suppose an agent correctly 
sees that the rule that commands him to do [not-]A in situation X would 
be improved were it to command him to do A in X instead. Suppose he 
then disobeys the rule and does A. 
This argument assumes that A will necessarily have better conse-
quences than [not-]A because a better rule would command A and not 
[not-]A. But ... [s]ome agents will mistakenly believe that departures 
from rules are warranted when in fact no exception is called for, and the 
negative effects of these mistaken exceptions may outweigh the positive 
effects of justified exceptions. 52 
This more sophisticated argument appeals not to the possibility that 
51. I have discussed the conditions that must be met to establish this in Hurd, supra note 43, 
at 1010-15. 
52. Alexander, Pursuing the Good, supra note 20, at 322. 
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an actor's decision to break the law will itself be erroneous, but to the 
possibility that an actor's otherwise correct decision will cause errone-
ous decisions by others. 53 Its claim is that, because morality requires 
action based on the balance of reasons, all things considered, and one 
of the reasons against breaking the law that one must seemingly con-
sider is the possibility that one's (otherwise justified) disobedience will 
serve as a poor example to others, then morality compels the assess-
ment of the precedential value of one's justified acts. Where that prec-
edential value is great, an otherwise justified act of disobedience may 
be unjustified. 
This more sophisticated claim, like its simpler counterpart, fails, 
by itself, to provide citizens and officials with differential reasons for 
action. It merely suggests that all actors who debate the merits of 
abiding by the law must discount the reasons for disobedience by the 
probability that such disobedience will encourage a disproportionate 
amount of unjustified disobedience by others. In order for this claim 
to provide a basis for role-relative morality, it must be supplemented 
with an account of why a judge might have a reason to punish a citizen 
who has correctly calculated that her (otherwise justified) disobedience 
will not encourage a disproportionately greater amount of unjustified 
disobedience. 
The necessary corollary to the sophisticated error thesis is the 
quite plausible claim that the precedential effect of a citizen's (other-
wise justified) disobedience is a less weighty reason for the citizen to 
comply with the law than is the precedential effect of a judge's (other-
wise justified) disobedience. Because public officers occupy highly visi-
ble positions, and because citizens and other officials often take their 
conduct within these positions to define the extent of obedience re-
quired by the law, their disobedience provides a more powerful incen-
tive for (unjustified) disobedience by others than does that of most 
private citizens. 54 Insofar as judicial disobedience is more likely than 
53. See FRED FELDMAN, INTRODUCTORY ETHICS 97 (1978), for the thesis that setting an 
example constitutes a consideration that should enter into the balance of reasons for action. 
54. [E]veryone, judges and citizens alike, has an obligation to support just institutions. 
This obligation to support just laws does not give rise to a general obligation to obey the 
laws on the part of citizens, ... because "it is a melodramatic exaggeration to suppose that 
every breach of law" by a citizen sets such a bad example that it will endanger the just 
system oflaws everyone has an obligation to support .... [I]t is not nearly such an exaggera· 
tion to claim that judges cannot disregard the laws as they exercise their offices without 
demotivating by their example a large number of their fellow citizens to comply themselves. 
For citizens might well think that if even judges can be lawless in their official behavior, 
what reason is there for ordinary citizens to be law-abiding? If this is so, then judges have a 
special obligation to obey the laws as they judge .... 
Moore, supra note 40, at 836 (quoting RAz, MORALITY, supra note 36, at 102) (footnotes omit-
ted). This argument should be supplemented with the observation that, insofar as a court's pre· 
cedent formally influences future judges, a court's disobedience appears formally to encourage 
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private disobedience to encourage moral mistakes by other citizens 
and officials, the argument from example purportedly provides a more 
weighty reason for judges to abide by decision rules than for citizens to 
abide by conduct rules. It provides a basis for thinking that a judge 
might be morally compelled to punish a battered wife who was mor-
ally justified in breaking the law of homicide. 
There is a tempting rejoinder to the argument from example. This 
rejoinder draws on the intuition that we should each be entitled to do 
the right thing, even if it causes others to do the wrong thing. One 
way to unpack this intuition is to invoke an argument that limits the 
consequences that serve as reasons for and against an action to those 
that are the proximate result of that action. When another mistakenly 
employs our justified disobedience as precedent for an unjustified act 
of disobedience, that individual's violation is the sort of voluntary in-
tervening act that breaks the causal chain between our conduct and 
any subsequent unjustified consequences. While all of the proximate 
consequences of our actions serve as reasons for and against those ac-
tions, consequences that are not proximate do not enter into the bal-
ance of reasons that determines right action. In short, while our error 
is of our concern, others' error is not, for the error of others is a proxi-
mate consequence of their voluntary acts, not ours. 
As I will later argue, the attempt to invoke proximate cause limita-
tions to curtail the consequences for which one is causally responsible 
is metaphysically untenable. 55 But, even if this rejoinder could be ren-
dered metaphysically plausible, it would only provide us with a reason 
to think that those who set examples do not cause the unjustified con-
duct of those who take such examples to heart. This would be morally 
significant only if morality required us to refrain from causing harm 
but did not require us to act affirmatively to prevent harm when we 
are capable of doing so. While considerations of individual liberty 
may justify us in thinking that the law ought not to require good 
samaritanism, 56 those considerations are unlikely to be of a type that 
future disobedience on the part of other courts. See RAz, AUTHORITY, supra note 36, at 105-11. 
Insofar as courts will erroneously misconstrue examples of judicial disobedience, precedential 
disobedience may encourage more unjustifiably disobedient adjudication than justifiably disobe-
dient adjudication. 
55. See infra text accompanying notes 143-50. 
56. See FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 133-47 (1960); FRIEDRICH 
A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (1944); JOHN HOSPERS, LIBERTARIANISM: A PoLmCAL 
PHILOSOPHY FOR TOMORROW (1971); TIBOR R. MACHAN, INDIVIDUALS AND THEIR RIGHTS 
(1989); JOHN s. MILL, On Liberty, in SELECTED WRmNGS OF JOHN STUART MILL, supra note· 
5, at 121, 189-207; NOZICK, supra note 38, at ix; MURRAY N. ROTHBARD, THE ETHICS OF 
LIBERTY 161-88 (1982); MURRAY N. ROTHBARD, FOR A NEW LIBERTY 148 (1978); Richard A. 
Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151, 189-204 (1973); John Hospers, What 
Libertarianism ls, in THE LIBERTARIAN ALTERNATIVE 3, 13 (Tibor R. Machan ed., 1974). For 
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will convince us that morality does not require it. Liberty interests 
may be sufficiently hefty to outweigh reasons for affirmatively acting 
to rescue others from peril, but it would take a particularly virile strain 
of libertarianism to exclude reasons for aid altogether from the balance 
of reasons that justifies action. 57 
There thus seems to be no means of denying that practical rational-
ity requires individuals to consider the likelihood that they will induce, 
by example, unjustified conduct on the part of others. Insofar as 
judges are more likely than citizens to encourage unjustified disobedi-
ence by their justified disobedience, it appears that judges have a more 
weighty reason to abide by legal rules than do citizens. As such, the 
argument from example appears to provide a promising basis for vin-
dicating the sort of role-relative morality that would justify the pun-
ishment of justified offenders. The judge ought to punish the battered 
wife for justifiably killing her husband, because if she does not, other 
citizens will resort to deadly force in unjustified circumstances, and 
other judges will unjustifiably acquit those citizens. 
3. The Argument from Opportunity 
The third version of the error thesis is a sophisticated hybrid of the 
first two versions. It holds that one who can affirmatively act to pre-
vent or reduce morally bad consequences has a reason to do so.58 To 
generate a defense of role-relative morality, this premise must be com-
bined with some account of how officials have opportunities that are 
unavailable to citizens to prevent moral harm through their adherence 
to the law. 
This account is plausibly grounded in the following three-step ar-
two quite good collections of essays on the libertarian thesis that liberty is unjustifiably compro-
mised by good samaritan legislation, see THE LIBERTARIAN ALTERNATIVE, supra; THE LIBER-
TARIAN READER (Tibor R. Machan ed., 1982). 
57. Many libertarians are libertarians in part because they consider charity, generosity, and 
kindness to be virtuous only if uncoerced. To preserve opportunities for moral action they insist 
that the state must not legislate virtue. They thus recognize moral duties of good samaritanism, 
but insist that such duties cannot be meaningfully fulfilled if coerced. See, e.g., MACHAN, supra 
note 56, at 162-63; NOZICK, supra note 38, at 167-73; Epstein, supra note 56, at 200, 203-04. 
58. This proposition is less controversial than it may first appear. Moral and political theo-
rists of virtually all stripes are likely to sign onto it once they recognize its limitations. The 
principle as stated is a moral one, not a political one, and hence it need not concern libertarians 
and liberals who object to the legislation of good samaritan obligations. Moreover, the principle 
holds that the opportunity for good samaritanship is but a reason for action, and hence the 
principle is perfectly compatible with the supposition that in many circumstances other reasons 
for action will override it, for example, reasons given by the fact that aid to others will substan-
tially jeopardize the life, liberty, or property of the would-be good samaritan. In the face of these 
limitations, the principle simply affirms the moral value of charity - a value that few are likely 
to deny and, hence, a value that in certain circumstances (i.e., those that pose the opportunity for 
aid to others) functions as one, among many, reasons for action. 
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gument. First, the demands of practical reason compel citizens to act 
on the balance of reasons for action available to them. 59 Whenever 
citizens conclude that the law conflicts with the balance of reasons for 
action, including in that balance the reasons for obedience provided by 
the arguments from personal error and example, citizens should break 
the law.60 
But citizens are fallible. They often lack the ability to assess accu-
rately the balance of reasons for action. 61 What is worse, they lack the 
ability to assess when they lack the ability to assess the balance of 
reasons for action. 62 As a result, citizens would abide by the correct 
balance of reasons for action more often if they could escape the de-
mands of practical reason and simply follow the law on every occa-
sion, including those occasions on which the law both is and appears 
to them to be patently wrong or even gravely immoral. 63 
Thus, citizens face a predicament. Practical rationality dictates 
59. Insofar as right action constitutes action based on the balance of all reasons for action, 
see supra note 3, and insofar as actors may lack the time, talent, resources, or foresight, to deter-
mine all reasons for action applicable to a given decision, the most that practical rationality can 
require is that actors act on the balance of reasons for action reasonably available to them. See 
infra text accompanying notes 151-55. 
60. This is a conclusion to which all theorists who accord law less than practical authority 
are committed. See supra notes 39-41. 
61. As Holly Smith has argued, actors often suffer from both motivational and cognitive 
handicaps. "There are ••• at least four cognitive handicaps that could prevent human agents 
from utilizing a variety of moral principles in actual decision-making: incapacity to comprehend 
the principle, lack of sufficient information to apply it, erroneous empirical beliefs, and limited 
ability to make the requisite calculations." Holly M. Smith, Two-Tier Moral Codes, in FOUNDA-
TIONS OF MORAL AND PoLmCAL PHILOSOPHY 112, 115 (Ellen F. Paul et al. eds., 1990). 
62. "If we do not trust a decision-maker to determine x, then we can hardly trust that deci-
sion-maker to determine that this is a case in which the reasons for disabling that decision-maker 
from determining x either do not apply or are outweighed." SCHAUER, supra note 35, at 98. 
63. "Formal rules, because they refer to a few, easily identified factual circumstances and 
require no great ability in abstract reasoning or empirical knowledge for their application, enable 
ordinary, fallible human beings to come closer to realizing their abstract political/moral princi-
ples than would direct application of those principles .... " Larry A. Alexander, Painting With-
out Numbers: NoninterpretiveJudicial Review, 8 DAYTON L. REV. 447, 460 (1983). But, as Raz 
has argued, in order maximally to reduce moral error, such formal rules must be given the sort of 
preemptive weight that is denied to them under theories of influential and theoretical authority. 
Unless individuals surrender their own judgment, they will not prevent as many errors as rule-
following will prevent in a regime in which the rules reflect the balance of reasons for action 
more often than do individual judgments. 
Suppose I can identify a range of cases in which I am wrong more than the putative author-
ity. Suppose I decide because of this to tilt the balance in all those cases in favour of its 
solution ...• This procedure will reverse my independent judgment in a certain proportion 
of the cases .... If, we are assuming, there is no other relevant information available then we 
can expect that in the cases in which I endorse the authority's judgment my rate of mistakes 
declines and equals that of the authority. In the cases in which even now I contradict the 
authority's judgment the rate of my mistakes remains unchanged, i.e. greater than that of 
the authority. This shows that only by allowing the authority's judgment to pre-empt mine 
altogether will I succeed in improving my performance and bringing it to the level of the 
authority. 
RAz, MORALITY, supra note 36, at 68. 
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that they act on the balance of reasons for action available to them and 
thus that they break the law when they judge the balance of reasons so 
to dictate. But citizens are sufficiently prone to error in assessing that 
balance (as well as in assessing the degree to which they should dis-
count their judgments about that balance by the likelihood of their 
own error) that they would do better to follow the law "blindly/, 
Finally, those who occupy institutional roles have an opportunity 
to rescue citizens from this predicament by acting affirmatively to pre-
vent or reduce moral error. This power stems in part from their 
unique ability to influence by example. But judges also have the power 
to levy sanctions on citizens who break the law, and a threat of sanc-
tions gives citizens a new and often weighty subjective reason for obe-
dience. 64 In most instances, such a reason will be sufficient to tip the 
balance of reasons for action in favor of compliance. Punishment thus 
provides a judicial vehicle for reducing moral error. Insofar as one has 
a reason to act whenever one has an ability to prevent immoral conse-
quences, and insofar as the power of punishment provides judges with 
a unique ability to prevent such consequences, judges have a reason to 
abide by the law (and thus to punish all lawbreakers) that is not a 
reason for citizens to abide by the law. 
This argument differs from the previous two versions of the error 
thesis because it focuses, not on the worry that disobedience will either 
constitute moral error (on one's own part) or cause moral error (on 
the part of others), but on the worry that disobedience will constitute a 
failure to prevent moral error. If citizens would do better to follow the 
law even in circumstances in which practical rationality would dictate 
that they disobey it, and if judges have at their disposal a means of 
providing citizens with a reason for obedience that is so weighty that 
in most circumstances it will be sufficient to prompt citizens to obey 
the law, then judges should employ that power to rescue citizens from 
moral peril. Similarly, if judges would do better to follow entrenched 
decision rules "blindly," but if the demands of practical reason con-
strain them in so doing, then institution designers should use their 
powers of discipline to supplement the balance of judicial reasons for 
action with the subjective reason for obedience that derives from the 
threat of impeachment. Hence, judges and institution designers have 
reasons for punishment that those who are punished do not have when 
deciding to disobey the law. 
64. Such a reason functions as a content-independent reason for action. See supra note 38. It 
is thus akin to, but not identical with, the sort of content-independent reason for action that the 
law, qua law, is thought to give by theorists who attribute to law either practical or influential 
authority. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text. 
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4. Evaluating the Error Thesis 
The error thesis, in either or both of its two more plausible forms, 
constitutes a basis for role-relative morality only if citizens do not 
have, as a reason for obedience, the fact that judges are likely to induce 
error or fail to prevent error if they are forced to adjudicate cases in-
volving civil disobedience. This is an inquiry to which I shall return in 
Part IV. 
At this point it is useful to appreciate both the implications and 
limitations of the error thesis. First, the error thesis explicitly encour-
ages the use of legal institutions as tools of deceit. It claims that citi-
zens will achieve morally superior results if they come to believe the 
false proposition that they should never break the law.65 But the in-
culcation of this belief comes at the price of sacrificing the morally 
right result in instances in which that result cannot be achieved with-
out undermining false faith in the law's ability to achieve moral results 
or without failing to exploit an opportunity to strengthen that faith. 
There are a number of reasons, extensively explored and articu-
lated by others, to doubt that morality is ever best achieved through 
deceit. One might argue, for example, that deceiving others is intrinsi-
cally immoral and thus that it cannot be justified. 66 Yet, as Holly 
Smith has argued, one typically thinks deceit immoral because it 
causes false beliefs, and false beliefs cause wrong acts. 67 But the deceit 
accomplished by punishing the justified purportedly causes individuals 
to hold more true beliefs (about what they ought to do) than they 
65. As Alexander maintains, the error thesis provides a compelling moral reason to create 
institutions "that demand that we act as if their decisions wer~ morally preemptive of all other 
first-order moral reasons. But ... their decisions cannot in fact be morally preemptive." Alexan-
der, Law, supra note 20, at 10. Moreover, it may provide a compelling moral reason "not only to 
establish institutions that make such demands, but also to teach that their demands are morally 
preemptive (though they are not)." Id. at 11. 
Dan-Cohen has argued that the natural acoustic separation that exists between citizens and 
officials makes it both possible and desirable to enact conduct rules that depart from decision 
rules. Dan-Cohen, supra note 14. Citizens can be given conduct rules that do not contain any 
exceptions that might be misconstrued or exploited. Officials can be provided with decision rules 
that call upon them to acquit citizens in exceptional circumstances. Such a combination both 
maximizes rule-following and allows for fairness. To the extent that conduct rules diverge from 
decision rules, however, they function as lies to the public. Contrary to what the public is told, 
ignorance of the law may excuse, use of deadly force will be allowed in special circumstances, 
and duress can exonerate. The public is deceived because the conduct rules encourage it to 
believe otherwise. 
66. See Smith, supra note 61, at 124. As Smith points out, this sort of objection is available 
only to a deontologist. Insofar as the deontological prohibition against deceit is inconsistent with 
the deontological requirement that actors act in accordance with other agent-relative prohibi-
tions and prescriptions, "[w]e cannot conclude that the prohibition against deceit, even for a 
deontologist, shows that [punishing the justified] should not be accepted as the best solution to 
the Problem of Error." Id. 
67. Id. at 125-26. 
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would otherwise hold, and hence to act morally more often than they 
would otherwise act. Thus, in order to base an argument against de-
ceit on some claim that deceit produces harmful beliefs, one would 
have to argue that true beliefs about the principles that justify actions 
are more important than are true beliefs about how one should act. 
Alternatively, one could claim that deceit is inherently immoral 
because it deprives an agent of her autonomy.68 But the background 
thesis would have to be that autonomy is a function of choices based 
on true beliefs about justificatory principles of action rather than on 
true beliefs about how one should act. One who thinks that autonomy 
requires moral action will be unpersuaded by the claim that a system 
that produces more moral action than its alternatives jeopardizes 
autonomy. 
Bernard Williams has argued that, even if deceit can be morally 
innocuous, its use by the state will inevitably result in governmental 
manipulation of the populace that is antidemocratic, and this result is 
not morally innocuous. 69 Members of the state (for example, judges) 
will be called upon by citizens (for example, through the legislative 
enactment of particular decision rules) to act on rules that the former 
know are in some instances either over- or underinclusive. In those 
instances, the true moral rules will compel them to be unresponsive to 
majority will and hence undemocratic in their methods of governance. 
John Rawls has alternatively suggested that any attempt to inculcate 
false moral beliefs (however benign the background intention) will vio-
late what he calls the publicity condition - a formal constraint that 
invalidates moral principles that are undermined by their public artic-
ulation. 70 Rawls takes such a condition as axiomatic to a public con-
ception of justice and so concludes that, because it could not be 
rejected within the original position, it cannot be rejected outside it. 
All of these arguments, to the extent that they point to genuine 
problems with the use of deceit, suffer from the same problem. Unless 
they bear some exclusionary status, 71 these arguments can at most 
serve as reasons for judges and institution designers to refuse to sacri-
fice moral results as a means of preserving a moral myth. They must 
therefore be weighed against the reasons to think the myth a valuable 
one to preserve. Thus, such reasons, while important to explore and 
weigh, provide no basis for thinking that the error thesis could not 
serve as a source of role-relative reasons for action. 
68. Id. at 126-27; see Herman, Moral Judgment, supra note 22, at 431. 
69. See Williams, supra note 5, at 138-39; Smith, supra note 61, at 121-22. 
70. See RAWLS, supra note 3, at 133; Smith, supra note 61, at 122-23. 
71. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
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There is, however, a more important reason to think that the error 
thesis provides a questionable foundation for a defense of role-relative 
morality.72 Implicit in the error thesis is the presupposition that law 
allows individuals to act morally more often than does morality itself, 
for individuals can know and correctly apply the law in instances in 
which they cannot be sure of and cannot easily apply the general prin-
ciples of morality. Yet for the law to approximate morality more often 
than does individual practical reason, the law must be laid down by 
individuals (1) who themselves understand and can apply the general 
principles of morality, (2) who understand how individuals can be 
confused about the content or application of those general principles 
of morality in particular circumstances, and (3) who recognize how to 
overcome this confusion by translating the general principles of moral-
ity into particular prescriptions or prohibitions that will be understood 
and applied in a manner that (more often than not) produces actions 
identical to those that the general principles of morality would require. 
Individuals capable of substituting a list of particular prescriptions 
and prohibitions for the general principles of morality would also be 
capable of identifying instances in which those prescriptions and 
prohibitions are over- or underinclusive (for one could not understand 
how a rule could approximate the outcome prescribed by its back-
ground principles without understanding the circumstances in which 
the rule does not apply). But individuals possessed of this sort of 
knowledge would seemingly be capable of remedying the moral error 
of others by educating them to be equally sophisticated moral reason-
ers, rather than by manipulating them through deception. To put it 
bluntly, if lawmakers know enough to manipulate citizens to act mor-
ally, they must know enough to educate citizens so that they need not 
manipulate them. 
There may remain reasons to think that deception is preferable to 
education. Considerations of economy might suggest that only an elite 
few should master the general principles of morality. The rest should 
act on the rules that are produced by that moral elite, even when doing 
so produces moral errors, for the costs of those errors are not as great 
as the costs that would accompany the universal mastery of the princi-
ples that would reveal the exceptions to those rules. 
But to recognize that legal deception can practically be replaced by 
moral education is to recognize that role-relative morality, if premised 
72. This is a variation of the argument advanced by Holly Smith against two-tiered moral 
codes that replace the complex principles of morality with simple moral rules - rules that collec-
tively comprise what Henry Sidgwick called an "esoteric morality." See SIDGWICK, supra note 
5, at 452-53; Smith, supra note 61, at 128-32. 
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on the error thesis, can be of pragmatic interest only.73 In the absence 
of error the correspondence thesis would apply, because the reasons 
for and against a citizen's actions would exhaust the reasons for and 
against judicial action. While error theorists may be content to make 
their modest pragmatic claim because of their (quite plausible) confi-
dence in human fallibility, it strikes me that one could make a consid-
erably more interesting and theoretically powerful claim on behalf of 
role-relative morality. Even if we were all infallible moral reasoners, 
such that we never misconstrued others' examples of disobedience or 
otherwise miscalculated the balance of reasons for action, there might 
still be principled grounds for thinking that institutional roles create, 
and are in part defined by, reasons for action that are not applicable to 
individuals who do not occupy such roles. If this is the case, then, 
even if citizens never made mistakes about when morality required 
their disobedience of the law, judges might still have moral reasons to 
punish them for their justified disobedience. And even if judges never 
made mistakes about when morality required the acquittal of justifia-
bly disobedient citizens, institution designers might still have moral 
reasons to punish them for their justified failure to punish justified of-
fenders. That is, if principled perspectivalism is defensible, then mo-
rality is inherently paradoxical, for morality in principle requires the 
punishment of those who act morally. The abandonment of the pun-
ishment principle will not constitute a "second-best" solution to the 
problems of human imperfection. It will constitute part of the content 
of an ideal morality. 
B. The Rule-of-Law Values: Principled Foundations for 
Role-Relative Morality 
Lon Fuller maintained that a system can accomplish the rule of 
law only if its enactments are general, public, prospective, clear, logi-
cally consistent, practically possible, relatively constant, and predict-
ably applied.74 With the exception of the first (which simply states a 
73. That is, the theory of role-relative morality is a strategic one, not a normative one. It 
holds that for practical reasons, not for theoretical reasons, judges ought to punish the justified. 
Just as one must recognize that one cannot aim directly at a target when shooting an arrow in a 
high wind, so judges must recognize that they cannot acquit the justified when adjudicating cases 
in a system in which those cases are erroneously construed as examples to the unjustified. But 
just as a high wind does not alter the location of the target one is aiming at but merely changes 
the way in which one aims at it, so too error does not change the content of the principles of 
morality but simply alters the practical manner with which those principles are best realized. If 
one's concern is with the content of morality, and not with the strategic methods necessary for its 
realization, one will find the thesis of role-relative morality to be beside the point, if that thesis is 
premised solely on the fact that actors make errors. 
74. See FULLER, supra note 15, at 33-94. 
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formal condition for the very existence of a system of rules), these 
requirements speak to the importance of three values: the promotion 
of individual liberty; the protection of reliance interests; and the pres-
ervation of equality. 1s 
Many have claimed that these rule-of-law values "generally define 
the job of judging."76 They "justif[y] the judiciary having a limited 
role in a democracy such as ours. . . . [They] mandate that judges 
should not dispense justice in some ad hoc, case-by-case basis."77 Im-
plicit in this claim is the view that rule-of-law values are reasons for 
action unique to adjudicators. They enter into the balance of reasons 
that justifies judicial action but not into the balance of reasons that 
justifies private conduct. As such, the rule-of-law values serve as a 
source of role-relative morality that might well justify the punishment 
of justified off enders. 
In this section, I shall articulate the nature of these values and the 
reasons to think them role-relative. While these values are well known 
in the jurisprudential literature, their ability to provide principled 
foundations for role-relative morality is variable, and hence their sepa-
rate treatment is necessary. 
Throughout this discussion it is important to assume that error is 
not a concern. This assumption will allow us to establish whether 
there are any role-relative reasons for action that are principled rather 
than pragmatic. Our task is to determine whether morality is in prin-
ciple paradoxical - whether it issues different reasons for action to 
different actors so that the same action might be justified, given the 
reasons for action applicable to one actor, and justifiably punished, 
given the reasons for action applicable to another. If the rule-of-law 
values depend for their normative force on the need for judges to pre-
vent erroneous decisionmak.ing on the part of citizens (or other 
judges), then they will not serve as role-relative reasons for action dis-
tinct from those considered in the previous section. They will not, 
that is, serve as reasons to think that morality might in principle de-
mand the punishment of the justified. 
75. Cf. Margaret J. Radin, Reconsidering the Rule of Law, 69 B.U. L. REv. 781 (1989) (argu-
ing that the rule of law is a contested concept because it reflects both instrumental values, such as 
enhancing liberty, and substantive values, such as the embodiment of fairness). 
76. E.g., Michael S. Moore, A Natural Law Theory of Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 277, 
314 (1985). 
77. Id. at 313. "[l]n a constitutional democracy where there is a commitment to adjudicat-
ing disputes rather than having them decided by judicial fiat, the rule of Jaw requires that the 
institutional role and responsibility of the judge be that of applying the Jaw rather than making 
it." SARTORIUS, supra note 16, at 179. 
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1. The Protection of Individual Liberty 
The first value that the rule of law is thought to serve is that of 
personal liberty. Liberty is enhanced when individuals can predict the 
consequences of their actions. To the extent that those consequences 
are variable (so as to make their prediction impossible), or secret (so as 
to preclude their discovery), or vague (so as to prevent their accurate 
assessment), individuals are handicapped in their ability to make plans 
or chart future conduct. Insofar as this handicap chills industry, it 
chills liberty.78 
Because judges alone wield the power of punishment, judges ap-
pear uniquely situated to affect the consequences of individual actions. 
For this reason, the value of liberty appears of concern to judges in a 
manner in which it is not of concern to private individuals. While 
individuals can affect the liberty of others by responding to their ac-
tions in unpredictable ways, they can seldom affect as many individu-
als in as substantial a manner as can judges who impose punishment in 
unforeseeable circumstances. Thus, while the citizen who contem-
plates the violation of the law must factor into her deliberations the 
likelihood that her illegal conduct will be unpredictable to others, and 
hence liberty-limiting, this reason for obedience appears unlikely to 
weigh as heavily in her calculations as it weighs in the calculations of a 
judge who contemplates the violation of the law for purposes of ac-
quitting a justified offender. As Fuller maintained, because the law, 
unlike any other institution, affects the conduct of all citizens, liberty 
interests are uniquely jeopardized when the consequences of the law 
become unknown, unclear, variable, or contradictory.79 If law is to 
protect and enhance liberty, its mandates must be clear and its penal-
ties obvious. 
If judges can make penalties obvious only by applying them to all 
offenders, unjustified and justified alike, then judges have a role-rela-
tive reason to punish the justified. We need not, however, pursue this 
defense of role-relative morality at any great length, for its success 
clearly depends on the assumption that citizens are prone to error. Its 
implicit presupposition is that citizens are often unlikely to see excep-
tions for what they are, and are thus likely to believe erroneously that 
a rule has been altogether altered when it is only the case that an ex-
ception to that rule has been made. They are thus likely to change 
78. See SCHAUER, supra note 35, at 137-41. Schauer treats liberty-based arguments for judi-
cial rule-following as arguments for fostering reliance. Because these are not synonymous, I find 
it useful to distinguish the arguments for liberty from the arguments for protecting reliance inter-
ests. See infra text accompanying notes 82-100. 
79. See FULLER, supra note 15, at 38-41. 
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their course of conduct, or abandon it altogether, when therr predic-
tions are confused by the erroneous belief that the standards that ap-
ply to that conduct have been changed. They will attempt to conform 
their behavior to the example set by the justified offender in instances 
in which that behavior is unjustified. When penalized for violating 
what they mistakenly thought was an old rule, they are likely to be 
confused into paralysis. To prevent this paralysis, rules must be 
promulgated without the exceptions that are likely to be erroneously 
construed as contradictions. Insofar as the acquittal of justified of-
fenders conveys contradictions to those prone to error, justified offend-
ers should be punished. 80 
If individuals were free from error, however, they would not mis-
take the acquittal of justified offenders for an indication that the rules 
to which they should conform their conduct have been altered. They 
would recognize that they would be entitled to violate the law in cir-
cumstances relevantly similar to those in which the justified offender 
violated it, but in no others. That is, the punishment of the justified 
would not serve as a necessary means of preserving the clarity of the 
law or the predictability of the penalties that attend its unjustified 
violation. 
Because the protection of liberty might justify the punishment of 
the justified only in a world in which individuals were likely to mis-
construe the significance of acquittals, a defense of role-relative moral-
ity that relies on the value of liberty collapses into an error argument. 
While judges seemingly have a reason to punisli the justified if doing 
so prevents liberty-limiting errors by others, this reason should be 
counted among those that provide pragmatic rather than principled 
foundations for role-relative morality. 81 
80. This error argument is a version of the argument from example. See supra text accompa-
nying notes 52-57. Its claim is that the judicial acquittal of a justifiably disobedient citizen will be 
erroneously believed to constitute a message that the law making the citizen's conduct an offense 
bas been changed. Other citizens will then engage in such conduct indiscriminately, thus violat-
ing the still-existing law more often than is justifiable. 
81. Moreover, if construed as a version of the error thesis, the argument from liberty may 
very well fail to establish a convincing case for role-relative morality. While our society highly 
prizes the protection of liberty through the rule of law, it bas nevertheless adopted penal codes 
that embody a general balance-of-evils defense to what would otherwise constitute criminal viola-
tions. See MODEL PENAL CooE § 3.02 (Proposed Official Draft 1962), supra note 27. In Part II, 
I charted four sorts of cases in which justified offenders are unable to avail themselves of this 
legal defense. But a considerable number of cases remains in which offenders may escape punish-
ment because the harm done by their offenses is less than the harm averted by those offenses. 
Insofar as we give legal recognition to the moral justification for such offenses, we clearly do not 
think that citizens are so prone to error as to construe all acquittals as acts that repeal rules 
against killing, stealing, destroying property, and so forth. At most, such acquittals will leave 
citizens in doubt about whether particular killings or particular acts of theft would be justified on 
their part under the balance-of-evils defense. We rightly regard this doubt as insufficiently lib-
erty-limiting to warrant the wholesale punishment of justified offenders. 
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2. The Protection of Reliance Interests 
The second rule-of-law value to which those who seek a principled 
foundation for role-relative morality might appeal is the value of pro-
tecting reliance. Three arguments can be distinguished for the impor-
tance of preserving reliance interests. The first is an argument from 
fairness. When individuals justifiably rely upon another's actions or 
statements and change their positions accordingly, fairness dictates 
that they should not be surprised by having their expectations 
thwarted and their positions changed for the worse. The second is an 
argument from industry. Even when individuals unjustifiably rely 
upon the statements or actions of another, their reliance should be 
protected as a means of ensuring that their efforts are not wasted. The 
third is an argument from the value of coordination. Where reliance is 
necessary for the solution of coordination problems and prisoner's di-
lemmas, that reliance should be protected as a means of achieving the 
collective goods that coordination makes possible. 
a. The argument from fairness. Fairness demands that, if one en-
courages others to alter their positions, one should not leave those in-
dividuals worse off by failing to fulfill their expectations. 82 If it is 
unfair to thwart the expectations of those who justifiably alter their 
positions in reliance on one's words or deeds, then, other things being 
equal, neither citizens nor officials should act contrary to the way in 
which they have encouraged others to expect them to act. Thus, the 
argument from fairness appears to provide both citizens and judges 
with a reason to act in accordance with the justified expectations of 
others. Insofar as citizens justifiably rely upon one another to abide by 
the law, citizens have reasons (in some instances, very weighty rea-
sons) to obey laws that in the absence of any reliance interests would 
be justifiably disobeyed. Similarly, insofar as citizens and other offi-
cials justifiably rely on judges to abide by the law, judges have reasons 
(perhaps very weighty ones) to reach decisions that in the absence of 
such reliance interests might not be required. 83 
The argument from fairness would give rise to differential reasons 
for obedience only if the justified expectations concerning citizens' 
conduct differed from the justified expectations concerning judges' de-
82. "[I]t is confessedly unjust to break faith with anyone - to violate an engagement, either 
express or implied, or disappoint expectations raised by our own conduct, at least if we have 
raised those expectations knowingly and voluntarily." MILL, supra note 5, at 285. 
83. The argument from fairness constitutes the basis of what Lon Fuller called "the bond of 
reciprocity" between the citizen and the state. "Government says to the citizen in effect, 'These 
are the rules we expect you to follow. If you follow them, you have our assurance that they are 
the rules that will be applied to your conduct.' " FULLER, supra note 15, at 39-40; see SARTO-
RIUS, supra note 16, at 166. 
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cisions. In particular, the argument from fairness would justify the 
punishment of a justified offender only if there existed legitimate ex-
pectations of the offender's punishment that differed from the legiti-
mate expectations of the offender's obedience. For eo ipso a justified 
offender is one who rightly calculates that the reasons for obedience 
provided by the justified expectations of others are outweighed by the 
reasons for disobedience. For a judge to be justified in punishing such 
an offender on grounds of fairness to others, the judge's failure to pun-
ish would have to threaten sufficient unfair surprise to tip the balance 
of reasons for judicial action in favor of punishing an individual for 
whom unfair surprise did not tip the balance of reasons for private 
action in favor of obedience. 
Four conditions appear necessary to a claim of unfair surprise: 
(1) one must in fact believe that another will do a certain action; 
(2) one's belief must be reasonable, that is, epistemically justified; 
(3) one must change one's position as a result of that belief in a man-
ner that is potentially costly or detrimental to oneself; and ( 4) one's 
change of position must not itself be morally reprehensible. In order 
for justified reliance to provide a judge with a reason to punish a justi-
fied offender, some class of persons must meet the above four condi-
tions. But who might justifiably rely on the punishment of the 
justified? Three categories of persons come to mind: the offender her-
self; those who prosecute the offender (either criminal prosecutors or 
private litigants); and members of the public at large. In order to as-
sess whether any of these might justifiably rely on the punishment of a 
justified offender, one would need to work through the reasons to 
think that one or more of them might meet the four conditions speci-
fied above. There are several reasons to think that while offenders, 
prosecutors, and citizens-at-large may justifiably believe that justified 
offenders will be punished84 they do not alter their position to their 
potential detriment as a result of that belief. 85 As such, they cannot be 
unfairly surprised by a refusal to punish the justified. 
84. These individuals might in fact believe that justified offenders will be punished, and they 
might be justified in so believing because, as we explored earlier, the criminal law and civil law so 
provide. See supra notes 24-35 and accompanying text. 
85. In cases of civil disobedience in which offenders seek punishment as a means of calling 
public attention to an immoral law, offenders might be thought to alter their positions in a poten-
tially adverse manner. Consider the case of a war protester who avoids the draft just because his 
expected punishment is likely to cause public outrage and resentment over the war. If his disobe-
dience is found to be justified and he is acquitted, he will no doubt have cause to complain that he 
is worse off than he would have been had he directed his activist energies toward other projects. 
Such cases are relatively rare. Typically, while a justified offender might be surprised at her 
acquittal, she will not be unfairly surprised, any more than an unjustified offender will be unfairly 
surprised by mercy. Unfair surprises are unfair precisely because they make persons worse off. 
Because acquittals typically make offenders better off, they typically come as pleasant surprises. 
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Yet, even if offenders, prosecutors, or members of the public alter 
their positions to their potential detriment on the basis of a justified 
belief that judges will punish justified offenders, their reliance will not 
be justified unless it is morally legitimate. Individuals are unfairly sur-
prised when their expectations are thwarted only if their expectations 
are not morally reprehensible. Thus, one is not justified in relying on 
another's performance of an immoral promise (to kill one's enemy, for 
example), even if one has every reason to believe that the promise will 
be kept, and even if one alters one's position substantially because of it. 
Insofar as the act relied upon is immoral, one's own reliance on that 
act is morally unjustified. Hence, one cannot complain of an unfair 
surprise when the would-be killer reneges on his promise.86 
Hence, in most cases, the offender herself will not have altered her position in a manner that will 
make her worse off if she is not punished. 
Insofar as criminal prosecutors and civil plaintiffs justifiably believe that a justified offender 
will be punished or civilly sanctioned, their prosecution of such an offender will leave them worse 
off if the offender is not punished. While surprising public prosecutors may seem less unfair than 
inefficient, surprising private litigants smacks of substantial unfairness. If the law promises to 
sanction justified defendants, and if private litigants spend substantial amounts of time and 
money to bring suit against such defendants as a result of that promise, they will surely find 
themselves substantially worse off if that promise is breached by judges. Hence, the reliance 
interests of plaintiffs, and to a lesser degree of criminal prosecutors, might provide judges with a 
reason to impose civil sanctions or criminal punishment on justified offenders. 
Members of the public who reasonably believe that justified offenders will be punished may 
rightly suppose that such punishment will deter the justified from disobeying the law. They may 
therefore fail to take precautions that they would otherwise take if they anticipated justified 
disobedience. They might coast through green lights without looking for drivers who might be 
justified in running opposing red lights - for they might rightly suppose that such drivers would 
be deterred from doing what they would be justified in doing. 
Yet if this argument provides a reason for judges to think that members of the public might 
have changed their positions for the worse as a result of the expectation that justified offenders 
will be punished, it seemingly also provides a reason for would-be offenders to obey the law. 
That is, if members of the public expect that others will obey the law because they will be pun-
ished even if they disobey it justifiably, then those who contemplate disobedience must factor in 
this expectation as a reason to obey the law. If they do so accurately, and if the balance of 
reasons for action still favors disobedience, then it would seem that judges should not punish 
such offenders for thwarting public expectations, because the citizen's calculation of public reli-
ance will exhaust a judge's calculation of that reliance. Were one to resist this by arguing that 
acquittals will reduce the degree to which justified offenders will take seriously the public's expec-
tation that they will obey the law out of fear of punishment, one would smuggle in assumptions 
about error. One would suppose that justified offenders will come to make errors - but if they 
did, they would cease to be justified. Hence, while civilly disobedient offenders and public and 
private prosecutors may entertain reliance interests that are of unique concern to judges, mem-
bers of the public probably do not. 
86. Consider, as a second example, the reliance claim at stake in the famous case of Mac-
Pherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916). Buick believed that it would not be 
held liable for injuries caused to consumers as a result of defects in the manufacturing of its 
automobiles. It justifiably believed this, because the law had upheld privity of contract in prod-
uct liability cases, thus allowing auto manufacturers to be sued only by distributors (who were 
rarely injured by defects in the cars that they sold to consumers). Buick priced its cars on the 
assumption that it would not be held liable to remote purchasers, and so changed its position to 
its potential detriment. But Buick's use of the privity doctrine to escape responsibility to those 
injured by its negligence was morally reprehensible. Buick, after all, had both a moral and a legal 
duty to build safe automobiles, and the privily limitation on which it relied to escape liability was 
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Just as reliance on the performance of a promise will not constitute 
justified reliance if the promise is an immoral one, so reliance on the 
punishment of the justified will not constitute justified reliance if such 
punishment is itse1f unjustified. But whether it is justifiable to punish 
the justified is precisely the question to which reliance was supposed to 
provide an answer. Those who have supposed that there are role-rela-
tive reasons to punish the justified cannot, without circularity, main-
tain that justified reliance is one of them - at least not until they have 
found others that vindicate the morality of punishing the justified so 
that reliance on that punishment is in fact morally justified. 
Thus, while an appeal to justified reliance is virtually a knee-jerk 
reaction for many lawyers and legal theorists who are called upon to 
advance a reason to think that judges should follow the rules, it is 
crucial to see that this reaction should be tempered by the recognition 
both that justified reliance may be difficult to make out and that justi-
fied reliance depends on arguments other than reliance to make it jus-
tified. If, however, there are arguments other than reliance that justify 
the punishment of the justified, then reliance on that punishment will 
itse1f be justified (so long as the other conditions for such reliance are 
satisfied). Thus, one need not conclude that justified reliance does not 
provide at least a prima facie reason to punish the justified - for it 
does provide such a reason if there are (also) other reasons to punish 
the justified. 
b. The argument from industry. Those who would defend role-
relative morality might circumvent the charge of circularity in the pre-
vious section by arguing that, even if individuals unjustly rely on the 
punishment of justified offenders, that reliance nevertheless provides a 
reason (though not one of fairness) for judges to administer such pun-
ishment: namely, unjustified reliance produces efforts that in some cir-
cumstances ought not to be wasted. 
Consider a case that does not involve the issue of punishing the 
justified, but that clearly demonstrates the moral force of the argument 
from industry. In Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill 87 the Tennessee 
Valley Authority (TVA) received millions of dollars from the House 
Appropriations Committee to build the Tellicoe Dam. Upon discover-
ing that the dam would render extinct a species of three-inch fish 
known as "snail darters," the TVA consulted with the House Appro-
priations Committee to determine whether the project was barred by 
only a limitation on the legal remedies available to consumers to redress breaches of Buick's 
duty. Hence, Buick was not unfairly surprised when Justice Cardozo concluded that privity 
would not bar a suit by a remote purchaser. 
87. 437 U.S. 153 (1978). 
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the Endangered Species Act. Having received assurances from the 
Committee that the Act did not prevent construction of the dam, the 
TVA completed the project. In subsequent litigation, this reliance by 
the TVA on the Committee's statutory interpretation was deemed un-
justified, for the Committee was neither a c'ourt charged with statutory 
construction nor a legislative body capable of modifying the terms of 
the Endangered Species Act. Nevertheless, it was thought that the 
industry and expense which such reliance engendered should not be 
casually wasted. Thus, the Supreme Court came in for heavy criticism 
when it subsequently enjoined the operation of the dam, the critics 
charging that the Court failed to attribute sufficient weight to the mul-
timillion dollar waste that would occur as a result of its decision. 
In the context of the present discussion, the argument from indus-
try would appear to provide a role-relative reason for punishing the 
justified in circumstances in which individuals rely upon that punish-
ment (however unjustifiably) and invest resources that will go to waste 
in the event 'that such punishment is not administered. Consider the 
following case of just such reliance. In United States v. Kirby, 88 a 
county sheriff was prosecuted under a federal statute that made it a 
crime to "obstruct or retard the passage of the mail, or of any driver or 
carrier"89 after he carried out a warrant to arrest an on-duty federal 
mail carrier suspected of murder. The federal prosector in this case 
unjustifiably relied upon the Court to enforce the letter of the law over 
its spirit, and thus invested prosecutorial resources in the expectation 
that a justified offender would be punished. 9o 
Because those who would seek a source of role-relative morality 
need only establish that there are some reasons for action unique to 
judges, it might be enough to point to the waste of resources that ac-
company instances of unjustified reliance and argue that such a waste, 
while not a weighty reason for punishing the justified, is nevertheless 
some reason for punishing them.91 But if unjustified reliance is the 
sole source of role-relative morality, role-relative morality is suffi-
ciently weak to cause us little concern. Even if unjustified reliance 
constitutes a role-relative reason for action, it is unlikely to justify the 
punishment of the justified, for it is unlikely to weigh more heavily 
88. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 482 (1868). 
89. 74 U.S. at 483 (quoting 4 Stat. 104 (1825)). 
90. He was not. As the Court concluded: "All laws should receive a sensible construction. 
General terms should be so limited in their application as not to lead to injustice, oppression, or 
an absurd consequence." 74 U.S. at 486. 
91. Such an argument might lead its proponents to the seemingly absurd conclusion that, 
other things being equal, a judge should decide in favor of the litigant who spent the most re· 
sources to litigate the case before the court. 
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than the value of acquitting those who do the right thing.92 
c. The argument from coordination. The protection of reliance 
interests is often thought important on grounds other than fairness or 
efficiency. Insofar as coordination solutions require individual reli-
ance on the cooperation of others, the collective goods that they pro-
duce may depend upon the protection of such reliance interests. That 
is, if the advantages of coordination can be achieved only if citizens 
comply with coordinating conventions (like the rules of the road) and 
do not default on cooperative solutions to prisoner's dilemmas (such 
as those established by tax laws, environmental protection laws, and 
criminal laws), and if citizens will comply with such conventions only 
if they can rely on others's compliance with such conventions, then 
judges may have a reason to punish those who break laws that serve 
coordinating functions as a means of protecting important reliance 
interests. 
But does this reason for punishment differ from any of those rea-
sons that a citizen has to comply with the law in the first place? If not, 
then the argument from coordination cannot justify the punishment of 
the justified. Eo ipso, the justified offender has accurately assessed the 
importance of preserving the relevant coordination solutions and the 
degree to which her disobedience will affect the salience of those solu-
tions. Her decision to break the law is justified precisely because she 
has given due weight to the value of others' reliance on her obedience 
and correctly calculated that that value is outweighed by the values 
accomplished by disobedience. For the judge to be justified in punish-
ing the justified offender, the value of the reliance interests involved, or 
the importance of the coordinative schemes protected, must be greater 
for the judge than for the citizen. 
There are tempting reasons to suppose that calculations concern-
ing reliance interests do vary between citizens and judges. For a citi-
zen calculates the reliance of others on his obedience, while a judge 
calculates the reliance of others on her obedience. Because the latter 
seems likely to be greater than the former, the argument from coordi-
nation seems to provide a plausible source of differential reasons for 
action. 
i. Prisoner's dilemmas. Consider first the reliance interests at 
stake in cases involving prisoner's dilemmas. Prisoner's dilemmas 
arise in circumstances in which individuals would be best off if they 
could default from cooperative ventures without causing others to do 
92. See Moore, supra note 76, at 386-88. 
2246 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 90:2203 
the same. 93 Thus, for instance, an individual would be best off if he 
alone could avoid paying taxes, union dues, and cable television 
pledges, for he would then be able to enjoy the public goods made 
possible through others' contributions without himself contributing to 
their support.94 Because all individuals are similarly inclined, collec-
tive goods are fragile accomplishments. They can be sustained only if 
each individual can rely on (almost) all other individuals not to free 
ride on his cooperative efforts or contributions. 
Those who defend role-relative morality point to the fact that indi-
viduals frequently appear fully justified in free riding on the coopera-
tive efforts of others, notwithstanding the fact that such efforts depend 
on the abs~nce of such free riding. That is, citizens appear justified in 
refusing to cooperate when they rightly believe that their refusal will 
not substantially affect the cooperative efforts of others or the collec-
tive goods that such efforts accomplished. This will be the case when 
the effect of an individual's contribution to a cooperative scheme is 
small, the impact of her default is negligible, and the gain from such a 
default is great. When union dues would be better spent on individual 
acts of charity, cable television pledges would be better spent on food 
and clothing for one's children, and the time devoted to voting would 
be better spent on virtually anything, individuals are justified in failing 
to pay fees or vote, so long as they rightly calculate that their individ-
ual failures will not substantially contribute to the dissolution of the 
union, the bankruptcy of the cable company, or the collapse of 
democracy. 95 
Many believe that the primary purpose of law is to provide cooper-
ative strategies by which to achieve collective goods and, when neces-
sary, to induce compliance with those strategies by means of 
sanctions.96 Such sanctions accomplish two ends. First, the threat of 
93. See GAUTHIER, supra note 7, at 79·82; PETER SINGER, THE EXPANDING CIRCLE 45-48 
(1981); EDNA ULLMANN-MARGALIT, THE EMERGENCE OF NORMS 25-26 (1977); David P. 
Gauthier, Morality and Advantage, in MORALITY AND RATIONAL SELF-INTEREST, supra note 7, 
at 166, 170-71. 
94. Prisoner's dilemmas can function positively in circumstances in which cooperation is 
dangerous. For an illuminating discussion of the advantages of noncooperation in the area of 
antitrust law, see ULLMANN-MARGALIT, supra note 93, at 44-45. 
95. [I]t is a melodramatic exaggeration to suppose that every breach of law endangers, by 
however small a degree, the survival of the government, or of law and order. Many acts of 
trespass, breaches of contract, violations of copyright, and so on, regrettable as some of 
them may be on other grounds, have no implications one way or another for the stability of 
the government and the law. 
RAz, MORALITY, supra note 36, at 102. 
96. This is the argument to which John Finnis has devoted his entire book, Natural Law and 
Natural Rights. See FINNIS, supra note 11. In advancing the claim that the essential function of 
law is a coordinative one, Finnis follows St. Thomas Aquinas. See THOMAS AQUINAS, The 
Summa Tlteologica, in 2 BASIC WRmNGS OF SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS 225, 744-45, 750-52 
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punishment provides individuals with a new reason for action that or-
dinarily tips the balance of reasons for action in favor of cooperation. 97 
Second, this guarantees that the individual can rely on the fact that 
she will not be one of the sole contributors to a scheme predominately 
enjoyed by free riders. The ability to rely on the cooperation of others 
thus makes the individual's own cooperation rational. 
Were judges to refuse to punish justified offenders, they would de-
stroy the incentives that make collective goods possible. Individuals 
would cease to calculate the pain of punishment among the reasons for 
compliance; absent that factor, the rational course of conduct would 
be a noncooperative one. Hence, judges have weighty reasons to pun-
ish those who, absent punishment, would have weighty reasons to re-
fuse to follow the law in situations that constitute prisoner's dilemmas. 
That is, the argument from coordination appears to justify the punish-
ment of justified offenders in cases in which that punishment is re-
quired to solve a prisoner's dilemma. 
ii. Coordination problems. Now consider the reliance interests at 
stake in cases involving coordination problems rather then prisoner's 
dilemmas. Coordination problems arise when individuals seek to co-
operate (rather than to free ride on the cooperation of others) but are 
unable to settle on a means of doing so. 98 Classic examples include 
(Anton C. Pegis ed., 1945); see also John M. Finnis, Law as Co-ordination, 2 RATIO JURIS 97 
(1989); Chaim Gans, The Normativity of Law and Its Co-ordinative Function, 16 ISRAEL L. REv. 
333 (1981); Leslie Green, Law, Co-ordination and the Common Good, 3 OXFORD J. LEGAL 
STUD. 299 (1983). 
97. RAz, MORALITY, supra note 36, at 50-51; SINGER, supra note 93, at 46; Hurd, supra note 
43, at 1019-21. 
There is a large and well-known literature devoted to vindicating the claim that morality 
itself provides sufficient reason for cooperation in prisoner's dilemma situations. See, e.g., 
GAUTHIER, supra note 7, at 8-10, 113-56; SINGER, supra note 93, at 47. 
98. For a deeper appreciation of the nature of coordination problems, see DAVID K. LEWIS, 
CoNVENTION: A PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY (1969); THOMAS C. SCHELLING, MICROMOTIVES 
AND MACROBEHAVIOR (1978); THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CoNFLICT 89-99 
(1960); ULLMANN-MARGALIT, supra note 93, at 18-73. For discussions of coordination 
problems that are more specifically jurisprudential, see FINNIS, supra note 11, at 231-59; RAz, 
supra note 3, at 64, 159; RAz, MORALITY, supra note 36, at 49-50; Lon L. Fuller, Human Inter-
action and the Law, 14 AM. J. JURISPRUDENCE 1 (1969); Gans, supra note 96; Green, supra note 
96; Hurd, supra note 43, at 1016-19; Gerald J. Postema, Coordination and Convention at the 
Foundations of Law, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 165 (1982); Joseph Raz, Authority and Consent, 67 VA. 
L. REv. 103 (1981). 
On most accounts, coordination problems are not the product of human error. Even individ-
uals who possess superb practical rationality may find themselves in circumstances that demand 
coordination with others but provide no salient means by which to coordinate. This is because 
coordination problems result from a plurality of equally moral and equally practicable coordina-
tive solutions. As Aristotle put it, a natural rule of justice is one "which everywhere has the 
same force and does not exist by people's thinking this or that .... " A conventional or "legal 
rule" is a rule "which is originally indifferent, but when it has been laid down is not indiffer-
ent .... " ARISTOTLE, supra note l, at 1790-91. Only if one were prepared to defend a rigorous 
right-answer thesis - a thesis that held that morality provided a right answer to every normative 
question (including whether persons should drive on the right or the left, shake hands with their 
2248 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 90:2203 
instances in which individuals share a desire to avoid a collision but 
lack a convention that will coordinate their actions so as to eliminate 
the risk of that collision. 
The solution to a coordination problem depends upon widespread 
recognition of a single, salient cooperative strategy. 99 While the law 
provides such strategies in many circumstances that demand coordina-
tion, the salience of those strategies may depend in large part on their 
judicial enforcement.100 This is true for two reasons. First, judges are 
generally a salient source of information about the law. Hence, citi-
zens who seek to coordinate their efforts with others will look to 
judges for information concerning the coordination solutions that have 
been provided by law, for they justifiably expect that others will do 
likewise. Second, because the law will provide a solution to a particu-
lar coordination problem only if people in fact abide by the law (as 
opposed to some other coordinating convention), and people are more 
likely to abide by the law if they are punished for noncompliance, citi-
zens will look to judges for evidence that they are punishing noncom-
right or their left hand, place their forks on the right or the left, etc.) - could one maintain that 
coordination problems result from persons' erroneously failing to see the singularly right course 
of conduct that morality prescribes in those circumstances. 
99. David Lewis explains: 
Some combinations of the agents' chosen actions are equilibria: combinations in which 
each agent has done as well as he can given the actions of the other agents. In an equilib-
rium combination, no one agent could have produced an outcome more to his liking by 
acting differently, unless some of the others' actions also had been different. 
LEWIS, supra note 98, at 8. Gerald Postema elaborates: 
Solutions to coordination problems are based on each party's exploiting mutually con-
cordant expectations ..•. Since what I do depends on what you will do, in the ideal case I 
attempt to replicate your practical reasoning to determine what you will do. And since I 
know that what you want to do depends on what I do, I must, in replicating your reasoning, 
determine what you expect me to do. And since you are engaged in the same process with 
regard to me, to replicate your reasoning I must replicate your attempt to replicate mine, 
and so forth. Given this framework for the nesting of expectations, all that is needed to 
break the deadlock of a coordination problem is some fact about one of the equilibria which 
isolates it from the others and which is obvious to both of us and known by us both to be 
obvious to the other. Thus successful coordination requires the parties to locate some sali-
ent fact about one of the equilibria that makes it stand out, that is, to read the same message 
in the common situation, and with that message converge on a solution. 
Postema, supra note 98, at 174; see also Green, supra note 96, at 301-02 (discussing development 
of coordinative equilibria). 
100. Paul Weiler has advanced the argument that judicial rule-following is also crucial to 
fostering the sort of coordination necessary for private settlement of legal disputes. 
Since the vast majority of tort actions, criminal prosecutions, and so on are privately negoti-
ated and settled, and the continuance of this practice is absolutely essential to staving off the 
breakdown of the judicial system, we cannot afford to do anything which lessens the inci-
dence of such private settlements. The theory is that the best way to ration the costly pro-
cess of adjudication is to allow private individuals to decide rationally that the likely gains 
are outweighed by the likely costs. Only if there is a substantially accurate awareness of the 
standards the courts will use will such prediction and negotiation be rational. 
Paul Weiler, Legal Values and Judicial Decision Making, 1970 CAN. BAR REV. 11 (1970). 
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pliance, for the fact of such punishment confirms the law's role as the 
dominant or salient coordination convention. 
Of course, citizens can themselves affect the salience of a particular 
coordinative strategy. Their failure to comply with a particular coor-
dination solution will make that solution less salient, for it will make it 
the case that others cannot as readily rely on it as a solution, and thus, 
it will provide an impetus to seek other bases of coordination. But 
there are two reasons to suspect that individual departures from le-
gally established coordination conventions will not affect the salience 
of those conventions as dramatically as will the judicial refusal to en-
force them. First, individual departures are unlikely to achieve wide-
spread recognition, and hence, they are unlikely to shake the faith of 
the majority in the salience of a particular coordinative strategy. Sec-
ond, coordination solutions, unlike solutions to prisoner's dilemmas, 
do not provide incentives to default. If most people drive on the right 
side of the road, it is in the individual's (self-) interest to do so as well. 
Knowledge of the fact that coordination solutions are in everyone's 
best interests provides individuals with a reason to interpret an actor's 
noncooperation as a product of ignorance, irrationality, or emergency. 
Unless they have a reason to .suspect that a substantial number of 
others will alter their course of conduct by virtue of the (ignorant, 
irrational or imperiled) actor's noncompliance, they have no reason to 
think that that actor's noncooperation makes a widely recognized co-
operative strategy less salient. 
There thus appear reasons to suppose that the reliance interests at 
stake in situations that pose coordination problems vary between citi-
zens and judges. A citizen may rightly calculate that running a red 
light in the middle of the night will not substantially affect the practice 
of stopping for red lights, but a judge may rightly calculate that her 
acquittal of that citizen will quite substantially affect that practice. In-
sofar as citizens look to the judicial enforcement of the rules of the 
road as evidence that others will abide by those rules, an acquittal may 
cause citizens to think that others will alter their behavior. And this 
by itself will make it rational for them to alter their behavior accord-
ingly. An acquittal may thus have a domino effect that forces citizens 
to look beyond the law for alternative coordination schemes by which 
to reduce traffic injuries at intersections. Insofar as the failure of a 
judge to punish an offender is likely to affect the salience of a coordina-
tion solution upon which others depend, while the failure of the citizen 
to abide by such a solution is not, a judge will have a more weighty 
reason to abide by the decision rule requiring the punishment of a dis-
obedient citizen than that citizen will have to abide by the conduct 
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rule that assures coordination. The argument from coordination thus 
appears to support role-relative morality. 
We should, however, be hesitant about this conclusion. For the 
argument from coordination threatens to collapse into the argument 
from example by smuggling in assumptions about the propensity for 
error on the part of citizens. That is, the argument seems to suggest 
that a judge should punish justified offenders so as to affirm the sali-
ence of a convention for those who might mistakenly take an acquittal 
to be grounds for thinking that a particular convention should no 
longer be trusted. Morally perfect reasoners, on the other hand, could 
be expected to see an exception to a conventional rule for what it is, 
namely, an exception. Such an exception ought not to shake their 
faith in the salience of a particular coordination rule, so long as they 
have no reason to suspect that that exception will become the rule. 
Hence, in a world devoid of error judges could afford to recognize 
such exceptions by acquitting justified offenders without fear that they 
would promote unjustified departures from genuinely salient coordina-
tion solutions. 
But herein lies the rub. Recognition of exceptions to coordination 
solutions only creates new coordination problems that demand solu-
tions. Even if citizens, by virtue of being capable moral reasoners, 
were not induced to abandon coordinative strategies by virtue of the 
judicial recognition of justified departures from those strategies, they 
would nevertheless require means by which to coordinate with justi-
fied offenders. And if there were second-order conventions that al-
lowed citizens to coordinate their conduct with justified offenders of 
first-order conventions, judges would have to recognize exceptions to 
those second-order conventions in cases in which individuals justifia-
bly departed from those second-order conventions. Such exceptions 
would create, once again, coordination problems for those seeking to 
coordinate their conduct with second-order justified offenders, thus 
necessitating third-order conventions. The potential for regress looms 
large. 
To appreciate the regress, consider the following. Traffic lights 
currently provide first-order coordination solutions for drivers who 
meet one another at intersections. There are, however, recognized in-
stances in which individuals are justified in violating traffic signals. 
Ambulance drivers, police officers, and firefighters often have reasons 
to run red lights that exceed the reasons to stop at them. Recognizing 
this fact, and recognizing that such a fact creates a new coordination 
problem for those who seek to coordinate their actions with the justi-
fied violations of such officials, a second-order coordination solution 
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has been created by the use of flashing lights and sirens. Such devices 
signal a violation of the first-order convention and hence solve the sec-
ond-order coordination problem that recognition of such potential vio-
lations creates. 
Now imagine the following case. An ambulance transporting an 
individual who is injured but in stable condition approaches an inter-
section with lights :flashing and sirens blaring. An unmarked private 
car transporting an individual who is near death approaches the same 
intersection at the same speed. Both drivers confront red lights. If 
they simultaneously run their red lights, they will collide with each 
other. And because the private car is unmarked, it may well be hit by 
those who are seeking to comply with the second-order convention 
that requires them to yield to the ambulance. (This admittedly takes a 
complex intersection, so we should suppose that this takes place in 
New Jersey.) The driver of the car rightly supposes that he has reason 
to violate the first-order convention that requires him to stop at the 
red light. He also rightly guesses that it is more important for him to 
get his patient to the hospital before the ambulance driver gets her 
patient to the hospital. He thus rightly supposes that he has reason to 
violate the second-order convention that requires him to yield to the 
ambulance. He takes seriously the fact that there is no convention 
that governs this situation, and that neither the ambulance driver nor 
other private drivers will recognize the justifiability of this violation so 
as to yield to it. He nevertheless rightly calculates that the life at stake 
justifies the risk of a collision. 
Were a judge to acquit the driver of the car and thereby carve out 
an explicit exception to the second-order convention that now governs 
the justified violation of first-order traffic conventions, the judge would 
create the need for a third-order convention that would enable ambu-
lance drivers and other citizens to yield to individuals who justifiably 
violate both the first-order and second-order conventions. And this 
convention would plainly have its justified violations, which, if judi-
cially recognized, would lead to the need for a fourth-order conven-
tion, and so on, ad infinitum. 
Those who defend role-relative morality would be justified, prima 
facie, in supposing that this regress could be curbed (albeit not wholly 
eliminated) by the punishment of justified offenders. The punishment 
of justified offenders would provide such offenders with a new and 
weighty reason to comply with recognized first-order (or in rare cases, 
second-order) conventions. Knowledge of this fact by others would 
return their confidence in the general salience of the first-order con-
ventions that make coordination possible. 
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If the acquittal of justified offenders generates a regress that defeats 
coordination altogether, then judges seemingly have a reason to pun-
ish justified offenders. For coordination is necessary in order to 
achieve certain collective goods, and such coordination is only possible 
if judicial decrees provide salient courses of conduct. If judicial de-
crees are susceptible to a recursive set of exceptions, then they will not 
provide salient courses of conduct. Hence, the judicial promulgation 
of a coordination strategy must be exceptionless for it to do its task, 
and it is seemingly exceptionless only if justified offenders are 
punished. 
3. The Protection of Equality 
The third and final rule-of-law value to which those seeking a prin-
cipled foundation of role-relative morality might tum is that of equal-
ity. Equality requires the similar treatment of those who are identical 
in morally relevant respects. Conversely, it permits (and perhaps re-
quires) the differential treatment of those who are not identical in mor-
ally relevant respects. IOI 
There exists a long-standing controversy over the question of 
whether equality functions as an independent value at all, I02 and I do 
not propose to add footnote fodder to that debate. Suffice it to say 
that, if equality does function as a genuine value, then it provides a 
reason to treat present cases like past cases, even when those past cases 
were dealt with unjustly or erroneously. Similarly, it provides area-
101. For the classic statements of these requirements of the principle of equality, see ARIS· 
TOTLE, supra note 1, at 1785-86; ARISTOTLE, The Politics, in 2 THE COMPLETE WORKS OP 
ARISTOTLE, supra note 1, at 2031-33, 2035-36 (Benjamin Jowett, trans.); PLATO, Laws, in THE 
COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF PLATO 1225, 1336-37 (A.E. Taylor trans., Edith Hamilton & Hunt· 
ington Cairns eds., 1961); PLATO, The Republic, in THE CoLLECTED DIALOGUES OF PLATO, 
supra, at 575, 786. See generally PETER WESTEN, SPEAKING OF EQUALITY 32-33, 181-229 
(1990). 
102. Some have argued that the principle of equality is, or can be, grossly unjust. See Larry 
Alexander, Constrained by Precedent, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 1 (1989); William K. Frankena, The 
Concept of Social Justice, in SOCIAL JUSTICE 1, 17 (Richard B. Brandt ed., 1962); Phillip Mon ta· 
gue, Comparative and Noncomparative Justice, 30 PHIL. Q. 131, 133 (1980). Others have argued 
that it is merely empty. Its requirements "possess both more truth and less content than is 
sometimes supposed: more truth because they not only happen to be true but are necessarily 
true; less content because, being necessarily true, they add nothing to what we already know." 
WESTEN, supra note 101, at 186 (referring to Aristotle's statements regarding equality); see KEN· 
NETH CAUTHEN, THE PASSION FOR EQUALITY 5 (1987); HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF 
LAW AND STATE 439 (1945); W. VON LEYDEN, ARISTOTLE ON EQUALITY AND JUSTICE: His 
PoLmCAL ARGUMENT 5 (1985); Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 
537 (1982). 
Fred Schauer has convincingly advanced the surprising argument that, if equality is a value, 
rule-based decisionmaking jeopardizes rather than protects it. "When rule-based decision-mak· 
ing prevails, what increases is the incidence of cases in which relevantly different cases are treated 
similarly, and not the incidence of cases in which like cases arc treated alike." SCHAUER, supra 
note 35, at 137. 
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son to treat present cases like future cases if one can predict the treat-
ment that will be administered in those future cases, even if that 
treatment is now, and will be then, unjust or ill-conceived. 
To the extent that equality is a value at all, it does not seem to be a 
value that is of exclusive concern to those occupying judicial roles. If 
parents let their son drive the family car on his sixteenth birthday, the 
value of equality speaks in favor of allowing their daughter to drive the 
car when she turns sixteen, even if they have realized, in the interim, 
that the decision in the son's case was an unwise one. Moreover, the 
value of protecting equality may properly enter into a citizen's practi-
cal deliberations concerning whether to break the law. If a bartender 
knows that other bartenders will follow the law that prohibits them 
from serving alcohol after 2 a.m., then the value of equality speaks in 
favor of refusing to serve alcohol after that hour, for doing so would 
give an unequal advantage to that bartender's small set of patrons. 
Notwithstanding the fact that equality concerns may enter into the 
balance of reasons that determines what is right for a citizen to do, 
many suppose that their weight is greater when they enter into the 
balance of reasons that determines what is right for a judge to do. 
Thus, for example, many find intuitive the claim that a judge should 
seek comparative rather than substantive proportionality in sentenc-
ing, 103 even if the judge considers the severity of the established pun-
ishment substantively disproportionate to the severity of the offense. 
The demand for comparative proportionality, or numerically equal 
punishment in like cases, creates a complex coordination problem for 
judges. If giving the same sentence that is given by others is more 
important than giving a sentence considered substantively propor-
tional, then judges need a means of coordinating their sentencing deci-
sions. Both common law precedents and legislatively enacted decision 
rules fit the bill, for they provide judges with salient means of ensuring 
103. I follow both Plato and Aristotle in defining substantive proportionality as punishment 
proportional to desert, and comparative proportionality as numerically identical punishment. 
See ARISTOTLE, supra note 101, at 2067; ARISTOTLE, Eudemian Ethics, in 2 THE COMPLETE 
WORKS OF ARISTOTLE, supra note l, at 1922, 1967-68 (J. Solomon, trans.); PLATO, Laws, supra 
note 101, at 1337. While Plato insisted that substantive proportionality was "the very award of 
Zeus," PLATO, Laws, supra note 101, at 1337, insofar as it is necessarily just, while comparative 
proportionality is only contingently just, Aristotle insisted that rectificatory justice is constituted 
by comparative proportionality. See ARISTOTLE, supra note l, at 1785. 
Modem sympathy for Aristotle's position often derives from the recognition that substantive 
proportionality is, at best, difficult to assess, and, at worst, arbitrary. Does mail fraud merit three 
years of imprisonment? Seven years? Nine years? Is two weeks of jail time proportional to the 
offense of indecent exposure, or two years? Perhaps the most that judges should aspire to is 
comparative proportionality, at least in cases in which the punishment that is comparative does 
not depart from the seemingly wide range of possible proportionately just punishments. 
For a good discussion of the distinction between equality and proportionality, see WESTEN, 
supra note 101, at S-7. 
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the equal treatment of litigants. Insofar as judges can be confident 
that other judges follow the law, they can be confident that the law 
provides them with accurate information about how cases similar to 
their own were adjudicated in the past and how they will be adjudi-
cated in the future. It thus provides them with a reason to think that 
their own obedience will ensure the equal treatment of like cases. 
If the value of protecting equality provides a weighty reason for 
judges to achieve comparative proportionality in punishment, and if 
comparative proportionality can be accomplished only by faithful ad-
herence to the law, then judges have a reason to abide by the law that 
citizens do not. But does this fact provide a role-relative reason to 
punish the justified? After all, insofar as justified offenders are not 
morally culpable, they are morally dissimilar to unjustified offenders. 
Hence, concerns for equality would appear to favor dissimilar 
treatment. 
Yet, if justified offenders were not treated differently in the past 
than were unjustified offenders or are not likely to be treated differ-
ently in the future, then a judge has a reason to impose comparable 
punishments on justified and unjustified offenders alike. Insofar as 
judges recognize that they can collectively accomplish comparative 
proportionality only if they coordinate their individual actions 
through obedience to the law, and insofar as the law instructs them to 
punish all offenders who satisfy the conditions of legal culpability and 
who are not justified or excused on legally recognized grounds, 104 
judges have evidence both that other judges probably punished justi-
fied and unjustified offenders comparably in the past and that other 
judges will probably punish justified and unjustified offenders compa-
rably in the future. The value of equality will thus seemingly provide a 
role-relative moral reason for a judge to punish justified offenders. 
It is important to recognize that this argument does not smuggle in 
presuppositions about the need to protect against errors, and hence it 
functions, at least prima facie, as a principled argument for role-rela-
tive morality. It rests on the claim that, even if judges were perfect 
reasoners, they would still require a salient source of coordination, for 
morality makes equal punishment more important than substantively 
correct punishment. Once one judge expects others to follow the law 
so as to accomplish the equal treatment of like cases, and thus employs 
the law as a means of determining the appropriate punishment in a 
particular case, all other judges have a reason to do likewise. While 
the law's failure to distinguish the punishment due to justified and un-
104. See supra notes 24-35 and accompanying text. 
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justified offenders may itself be in error, the first judge's compliance 
with that law may not be erroneous if the law provides the only salient 
source of coordination and if coordination is indeed more important 
than substantive justice. Thereafter, the justifiability of punishing the 
justified increases as the number of cases in which justified offenders 
are punished multiplies. 
Let us now pause to take stock of the argument thus far. Our task 
in this Part has been to determine whether there are at least prima 
facie reasons to embrace perspectivalism and abandon the punishment 
principle. If there are, then we have reason to think that the dilemma 
with which we began is solved, for morality will itself demand that we 
punish the justified so as to preserve morally valuable systemic 
commitments. 
We began our analysis by canvassing the bases upon which con-
cerns about moral error might provide judges with reasons to punish 
justified private offenses and institution designers with reasons to pun-
ish justified judicial offenses. We saw that error might provide a prag-
matic reason to punish the justified but that it cannot provide a 
principled reason to do so. We then turned to the question of whether 
there are principled reasons for punishing the justified that are 
uniquely applicable to those within judicial roles. We saw that the 
protection of reliance interests and the preservation of equality appear 
to serve as more weighty concerns for judges than for citizens and 
therefore that, in some circumstances, the balance of reasons for judi-
cial action might justify the punishment of a citizen for whom the bal-
ance of reasons justified disobedience. We now turn to the question of 
whether there are principled reasons for punishing the justified that 
are uniquely applicable to those who design and preserve legal institu-
tions (such as the role of the judiciary). If such reasons exist, then, 
even if judges are justified in refusing to punish justifiably disobedient 
citizens, institution designers may be justified in punishing judges for 
such refusals. 
C. The Values of Democracy and the Separation of Powers: 
Principled Foundations for Constitutional Perspectivalism 
Fred Schauer has maintained that the standpoint of the designer of 
a decisionmaking environment is quite different from the standpoint of 
a decisionmaker within that environment.105 If this is the case, then 
we must distinguish judicial perspectivalism from what I shall call 
105. Frederick Schauer, Rules and the Rule of Law, 14 HARV. J.L. & Pua. POLY. 645, 691 
(1991). 
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constitutional perspectivalism. Constitutional perspectivalism is the 
thesis that those who design and protect the decisionmaking institu-
tions of the state - including judicial institutions - occupy a role 
that is characterized by reasons for action inapplicable to those in 
other roles. 
The constitutional role is a nebulous one, because unlike the judi-
cial role it no longer has a distinct set of occupants. In the absence of 
the Framers of the Constitution, the task has fallen to those who peri-
odically step out of their other roles for the purposes of creating, eval-
uating, or policing decisionmaking systems that are essentially self-
executing. Thus, the constitutional perspective is sometimes occupied 
by legislators, sometimes by appellate court judges and justices, some-
times by political activists, and sometimes by lawyers, legal scholars, 
and philosophers. But even if no one ever assumed the constitutional 
perspective, it would remain of philosophical interest. Insofar as such 
a perspective is available, and insofar as it generates reasons to disci-
pline or impeach individuals who do the right thing from a different 
perspective, it raises the dilemma with which we began. The punish-
ment principle is jeopardized in theory, even if there is no one to aban-
don it in practice. If its theoretical rejection is based on principled 
rather than pragmatic grounds, it must be admitted that morality is 
inherently paradoxical, for it licenses the punishment of those who act 
morally. 
The task of this section is to explore the viability of constitutional 
perspectivalism. We shall seek prima facie reasons to think that those 
who do or could assume the constitutional perspective might be justi-
fied in punishing judges who are justified in acquitting justified 
offenders. 
1. The Classic Arguments for Structural Pluralism 
The discussion in Part II and the arguments advanced in the previ-
ous two sections of this Part combine to suggest that, while judicial 
obedience to the law may serve important values, there may neverthe-
less be circumstances in which judges should set aside the law and act 
in accord with their own best judgments. The recognition that judges 
may be compelled by the demands of practical reason to substitute 
their own judgments for those of the legislature flies in the face of our 
understanding of the principle of democracy and its concomitant de-
mand for the separation of powers. For that principle has tradition-
ally been thought to prohibit judges from setting aside legislatively 
enacted rules in the name of background moral considerations. Gov-
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ernment by the people gives way to dictatorship by an elite if unelected 
judges can rewrite democratic legislation. 
There is a vast literature devoted to defending structural pluralism. 
For our purposes, it is useful to think of this literature as embodying 
two alternative theories of the importance of democracy. 106 On one 
theory, democratic decisionmaking constitutes our most reliable 
means of achieving right results. As between competing sources of 
rules, democratic institutions are more likely to achieve rules that 
square with the balance of reasons for governmental action than are 
other institutions. Democratic institutions should therefore be ac-
corded the power to make rules, while other institutions should be 
restricted to the lesser tasks of interpreting, implementing, and enforc-
ing those rules. I shall call this first sort of theory an instrumentalist 
one, for its claim is that we should value democracy only to the extent 
that it achieves right results. In the event that democratic results fail 
to cohere with the balance of reasons for action, they lack any value at 
all. On this theory, we value democracy only because we value truth. 
On the second sort of theory, democratic decisionmaking is intrin-
sically good. While it may fail to accomplish results that accord with 
the balance of reasons for action, it nonetheless instantiates certain 
values that other decisionmaking procedures do not. Insofar as living 
by wrong rules that reflect these values is morally preferable to living 
by right rules that do not, democracy is valuable even when it pro-
duces wrong rules. Hence, undemocratic institutions (like the judici-
ary) should not set aside the decisions of democratic institutions even 
when it is apparent that these decisions fail to reflect the balance of 
reasons for legislative action. To do so thwarts more important values 
than truth. I shall call this sort of theory an intemalist theory, for its 
claim is that democratic decisionmaking is internally or inherently 
valuable. 
In what follows, I shall canvass some of the classic instrumentalist 
and internalist arguments that have been made on behalf of democracy 
and the separation of powers. I shall demonstrate that each of these 
arguments provides a reason to punish disobedient judges only insofar 
as it provides a reason to think that judges who depart from legisla-
tively enacted rules also depart from the balance of reasons for judicial 
action. That is, I shall show that each argument furnishes a basis for 
supposing that disobedient judges are unjustified offenders, and hence 
deserving of punishment. But I shall further demonstrate that, be-
106. I follow John Arthur's taxonomy of "instrumental" and "internal" theories of democ-
racy. DEMOCRACY: THEORY AND PRACTICE xi (John Arthur ed., 1992) [hereinafter 
DEMOCRACY). 
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cause none of the classic arguments provides an exclusionary reason 
for judicial deference to the legislature, none of the arguments can ex-
clude the possibility that judges might bejustified in disobeying legisla-
tive rules. The most that they can provide is an additional reason for 
judges to comply with legislative rules. In the event that judges rightly 
conclude that the reasons for obedience furnished by these classic ar-
guments are outweighed by reasons for disobedience, these arguments 
will license disobedience. 
If I am right, these classic theories of democracy and the separa-
tion of powers cannot, themselves, justify the punishment of the justi-
fied. But they might well provide reasons to think that the argument 
from error, considered in section A of this Part, is applicable. If the 
classic arguments for democracy and the separation of powers provide 
reasons to think that judicial disobedience is more often in error than 
not, then they provide grounds for thinking that the acquittal of justi-
fied judicial offenders may trigger more unjustified judicial disobedi-
ence than justified judicial disobedience. These arguments might 
therefore ground an argument from error that would provide those 
who assume the constitutional perspective with a role-relative reason 
to punish judges who are justified in acquitting justifiably disobedient 
citizens. But as I have already argued, such a reason would constitute 
only a pragmatic basis for punishing justified judicial offenders. It will 
remain to be established, at the end ofthis section, whether any princi-
pled reasons remain to think that system designers might be justified 
in punishing justifiably disobedient judges. 
a. Instrumentalist theories of democracy. According to the in-
strumentalist, the reasons for legislative action exhaust the reasons for 
judicial action. That is, the fact that the legislature reached a particu-
lar decision is not itself a reason for judicial compliance with that deci-
sion; it is not itself something valuable that must be added to the 
balance of reasons for judicial obedience. Judges should obey legisla-
tive enactments only because those enactments are more likely to con-
form to an antecedently existing balance of reasons for governmental 
action than are their own judgments.1°7 
i. The argument from metaethical relativism. John Ely has in-
sisted that courts are incapable of deciphering better answers to social 
controversies than are legislatures, because there is no source for such 
answers beyond that provided by the results of democratic legislation. 
"[O]ur society does not, rightly does not, accept the notion of a discov-
107. Instrumentalist theories of democracy thus accord legislation only theoretical authority. 
See supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
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erable and objectively valid set of moral principles, at least not a set 
that could plausibly serve to overturn the decisions of our elected rep-
resentatives." 108 In a similar vein, Robert Bork has argued that, when 
judges are called upon to decide cases according to moral principles, 
they have no means of deciding such cases "other than by reference to 
some system of moral or ethical values that has no objective or intrin-
sic validity of its own and about which men can and do differ."109 
Thus, the only principled means by which to resolve disputes is by 
reference to a source other than a judge's moral principles. When the 
Constitution is silent, judges act morally only if they conform their 
decisions to the will of the majority as expressed in democratically 
enacted legislation.110 
At the heart of Ely's and Bork's claims is the metaethical thesis 
that morality is relative to the beliefs of a majority. 111 That is, what 
constitutes morality. is whatever the majority of individuals within a 
community believes moral.1 12 From this thesis, Ely and Bork take 
themselves to be in a position to argue that democratic outcomes con-
stitute what is morally true about how persons should act. Any judge 
who arrives at a view contrary to the legislature's is necessarily in er-
ror. And nothing short of blind deference to the legislature can pre-
vent such error. 
Even if metaethical conventionalism is defensible, however, 113 it 
does not support the claim that democratic results are constitutive of 
what is moral. Because a group of representatives may fail to capture 
the majority's beliefs when they vote for legislation, legislative results 
may depart from what the majority would in fact prefer. Legislation 
108. JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 54 (1980); see Hurd, supra note 23, at 1446 
n.121. 
109. Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 
1, 10 (1971). 
110. Id. at 11. 
111. See Hurd, supra note 23, at 1445-51. 
112. See ROBERT L. ARRINGTON, RATIONALISM, REALISM, AND RELATIVISM: PERSPEC-
TIVES lN CONTEMPORARY MORAL EPISfEMOLOGY 192-99 (1989); WALTER T. STACE, THE 
CONCEPT OF MORALS (1937); EDWARD WEsrERMARCK, ETHICAL RELATIVITY (1932); BER-
NARD WILLIAMS, MORALITY: AN INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS 20 (1972); DAVID B. WONG, 
MORAL RELATIVITY 23 (1984); Philippa Foot, Moral Relativism, in RELATIVISM: COGNITIYE 
AND MORAL 152, 161 (Jack W. Meiland & Michael Krausz eds., 1982); Gilbert Hannan, Rela-
tivistic Ethics: Morality as Politics, in 3 MIDWEST STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY 109, 120 (Peter A. 
French et al. eds., 1980); Gilbert Hannan, Moral Relativism Defended, 84 PHIL. REv. 3, 4 
(1975); John Ladd, The Issue of Relativism, in ETHICAL RELATIVISM 107, 124-26 (John Ladd 
ed., 1973); Bernard Williams, The Truth in Relativism, 15 PROCEEDINGS OF ARISTOTELIAN 
SocY. 215, 215 (1974-75). 
113. I have argued elsewhere that the beliefs or preferences of a majority cannot constitute 
moral facts concerning the rightness or wrongness of particular actions. If I am right, then the 
beliefs of the majority concerning how judges ought to decide particular cases cannot constitute 
moral facts that provide reasons to so decide cases. Hurd, supra note 23, at 1459-506. 
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thus cannot constitute majority sentiment; rather, it can only reflect it. 
As such, legislation can be, at most, good evidence of what the con-
ventionalist considers moral. Accordingly, even the conventionalist 
must admit that it is possible for a judge to be right in concluding that 
morality demands a departure from legislative decisions (for a judge 
may accurately assess majority opinion while a legislature may not). 114 
While the truth of metaethical relativism would fail to establish 
that judicial departures from legislation are necessarily erroneous, it 
would nevertheless vindicate the claim that legislation is practically 
conclusive evidence of what is moral. It would therefore provide a 
reason to think that judicial departures from legislative rules are prob-
ably more frequently wrong than right. Yet, if a judge discovers a 
genuine discrepancy between democratic results and majority senti-
ment, the argument provides no basis for insisting that the judge ought 
nevertheless to abide by the democratic results. Hence, the argument 
provides neither an exclusionary reason for judges to comply with 
democratic results nor a basis for punishing the judge when she com-
plies with majority sentiment rather than with democratic legislation. 
It provides, at most, a reason to think that judicial disobedience results 
more frequently from judicial error than judicial accuracy and thus 
that institution designers might be justified in punishing all acts of 
judicial disobedience as a means of reducing a disproportionate 
amount of unjustified judicial disobedience. But this argument for 
punishment is a version of the argument from error discussed in sec-
tion III.A, and it thus provides only a pragmatic reason to punish 
justified judicial off enders. 
ii. The argument from utility. Many theorists have found it 
tempting to equate the utilitarian argument for democracy with the 
argument advanced by the relativist. 115 But we should resist such a 
114. Conventionalists might admit that legislation enacted through a process of representa-
tive democracy can, at most, evidence moral facts (i.e., the beliefs of the majority). But they 
might argue that legislation enacted by direct democracy (by which all citizens vote for or against 
all proposed enactments) is constitutive of what is moral - for it truly is the majority opinion. 
They thus might conclude that judicial departures from legislative decisions born of referenda or 
initiatives are necessarily in error. 
Such a claim would again be false. The outcome of a vote taken by all members of a commu-
nity cannot be thought by a conventionalist to do anything more than evidence the fact that the 
majority believes a particular social arrangement to be moral. It is the belief of a majority - not 
the manifestation of that belief in a vote - that counts as the moral fact of the matter. Because 
voting errors can be made and beliefs can change, a judge might rightly find legislation to be in 
error. 
115. See, e.g .• JOHN c. GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 12, 19 (Roland 
Gray ed., 2d ed. 1921); ROBERT S. SUMMERS, INSTRUMENTALISM AND AMERICAN LEGAL 
THEORY 43-44, 48-49 (1982); Herman Oliphant, Current Discussions of Legal Methodology, 7 
A.B.A. J. 241 (1921); see also Martin P. Golding, Realism and Functionalism in the Legal 
Thought of Felix S. Cohen, 66 CoRNELL L. REv. 1032 (1981) (discussing Cohen's derivation of 
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temptation. While relativism draws its intuitive strength from 
metaethical skepticism, utilitarianism draws its strength from 
metaethical realism. Its claim is that utility should be maximized 
whether the majority believes that it should or not: hence, majority 
sentiment is not constitutive of the content of morality.116 
James Mill (John Stuart Mill's father) most famously articulated 
the utilitarian's reason to accord democratic results instrumental 
value. His argument runs as follows. First, "the concern of Govern-
ment ... is to increase to the utmost the pleasures, and diminish to the 
utmost the pains, which men derive from one another .... " 117 Sec-
ond, individuals themselves are the best judges of what brings them 
pleasure and pain. That the majority prefers some course of conduct 
is thus compelling evidence that this course of conduct will in fact 
reflect what the utilitarian takes to be moral - "the greatest happiness 
of the greatest number."118 Finally, because democracy enables the 
will of the majority to trump the will of the minority, it accomplishes, 
on utilitarian grounds, maximally good results. Thus, according to 
Mill, committed utilitarians should favor democracy because it pro-
vides the optimal means of tabulating the preferences that are to be 
maximized under a utilitarian theory of morality. One is more likely 
to achieve maximal utility by abiding by the will of the majority than 
by abiding by any other decision procedure. 
Because most utilitarians, including James Mill, do not think that 
individuals are infallible in their judgments about what will bring them 
pleasure and reduce their pain, 119 they must admit the theoretical pos-
sibility of instances in which others may assess an individual's prefer-
utilitarianism from relativism); Hurd, supra note 23, at 1439-4-0 (discussing why derivation of 
utilitarianism from relativism is confused); Michael S. Moore, The Need for a Theory of Legal 
Theories: Assessing Pragmatic Instrumentalism, 69 CoRNELL L. REv. 988, 990 (1984) (reviewing 
SUMMERS, supra) (critiquing Summers' conflation of relativism and utilitarianism). 
116. To claim that judges ought to maximize the satisfaction of preferences requires one of 
two claims: Either one must maintain that there is at least one objective (nonrelativized) moral 
maxim that governs adjudication - the maxim that preferences should be satisfied - or one 
must combine the claim that all moral maxims are relative to subjective beliefs with the empirical 
claim that everyone shares the belief that preferences should be satisfied. Because relativists are 
typically relativists because they find the empirical persistence of profound moral disagreement 
to be convincing evidence that there are no objective maxims, it is extraordinarily difficult for 
them to advance the latter claim. Those who derive utilitarianism from relativism thus appear 
committed to the former self-contradictory claim. 
117. James Mill, Essay on Government, in DEMOCRACY, supra note 106, at 43, 44. 
118. Id. at 43. 
119. Though typically not thought to be a utilitarian of the Millian sort, Rousseau captured 
this common utilitarian assumption when he said: "Our will is always for our own good, but we 
do not always see what that is; the people is never corrupted, but it is often deceived, and on such 
occasions only does it seem to will what is bad." JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU, The Social Con-
tract, in THE SOCIAL CoNTRACT AND DISCOURSES 1, 26 (G.D.H. Cole trans., 1950). See MILL, 
supra note 5, at 252. 
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ences more accurately than the individual herself. But this concession 
opens the door to the possibility that in certain, albeit rare, instances, 
individuals may judge what is in the interests of a majority more accu-
rately than the majority itself. In such cases, the individual does the 
right thing by setting aside the will of the majority in favor of the 
maximal happiness of the majority. Insofar as a judge does precisely 
this when she justifiably disobeys a legislative rule that requires the 
punishment of a justified offender (who eo ipso also rightly recognized 
that the interests of the majority favored disobedience of a legislatively 
enacted conduct rule), the utilitarian cannot complain about judges 
who justifiably acquit justifiably disobedient citizens. 
Utilitarianism would generate an exclusionary reason for judges to 
obey legislative rules that fail to cohere with a majority's true prefer-
ences only if it assumed the form of rule utilitarianism, and only if a 
rule barring all acts of judicial disobedience would produce more util-
ity than would some alternative rule. Because there are well-known 
reasons to suspect that rule utilitarianism contradicts utilitarianism, 120 
there are reasons to suppose that utilitarians cannot generate rules that 
provide judges with exclusionary reasons to decide cases in ways that 
fail to maximize utility. The most that they can generate are rules of 
thumb. They can justifiably enforce these rules against judges who 
rightly calculate that such rules should be disobeyed only if they cal-
culate that the punishment of the justified is necessary to deter a dis-
proportionate amount of unjustified disobedience. Absent erroneous 
judicial disobedience, this rationale for punishing the justified would 
be unavailable. As such, utilitarianism, if defensible, can at most pro-
vide a pragmatic reason to punish justified judicial offenders. 
uz. The argument from institutional competence. Even if one re-
jects utilitarianism, and thus rejects Mill's view that democracy yields 
right results because it accurately reflects what will provide for the 
greatest happiness of the greatest number, one might nevertheless sup-
pose that judges were ill-equipped to second-guess legislative deci-
sions. That is, one might plausibly think that on any moral theory, 
not just that of utilitarianism, the institutional constraints imposed on 
judges prevented them from making accurate moral assessments. 
There is a well-rehearsed set of considerations that vindicates the 
suspicion that judges are institutionally ill-situated to make accurate, 
all-things-considered moral decisions. 121 Judges are insulated from 
120. For his now-famous argument that rule utilitarianism must give way to act utilitarian-
ism in order to be genuinely utilitarian, see LYONS, supra note 5. 
121. For further discussion of these considerations, see BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NA-
TURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 113 (1921); RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 
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the political arena and therefore out of touch with the concerns of 
those whom law is to serve - concerns that on any moral theory are 
likely to be evidential of what is moral, if not constitutive of it. Their 
appointment and lengthy tenure in office renders them unaccountable 
to those whom their decisions affect. Their understanding of the social 
choices with which their decisions must cohere is limited by the acci-
dental manner in which those choices are presented on their adjudica-
tive agenda. The constraints placed on their factfinding facilities by 
hectic court schedules and restrictive rules of evidence preclude them 
from the sort of debate and discussion that freely informs the decisions 
of legislators. The requirement that they limit their considerations to 
those issues that arise in the course of adjudicating particular disputes 
precludes their orderly investigation of all the factors that speak to the 
pursuit of a social policy. Courts are therefore systemically impover-
ished in their ability to amass the information relevant to all the things 
that they ought to consider when called upon to make all-things-con-
sidered moral judgments. 
Legislators, on the other hand, are not so impoverished. As a 
group they represent, at least better than does a single judge, the inter-
ests of those whom law affects. As such, they are in touch with and 
can make known the needs and concerns that ought to inform legal 
decisionmaking. Their short tenure keeps them accountable to those 
they represent and thus keeps their representation genuine. They pos-
sess extensive factfinding resources, virtually unlimited time for debate 
and discussion, and an open calendar as to the issues that they may 
consider and the order in which they may consider them. The institu-
tional process by which legislators formulate and enact social policies 
prevents individuals from accomplishing legislative results that are 
calculated only to advance personal interests.122 As a result of these 
factors, legislators are, as a group, more likely to make accurate judg-
ments about the social policies that ought to be pursued. 
It is clear that these observations provide a reason to punish diso-
bedient judges only if their disobedience fails to reflect the balance of 
reasons for action. Insofar as these observations should prompt judges 
to recognize the asymmetry of information that exists between them-
selves and legislators, they should prompt judges to defer to legislative 
22-28 (1977); SARTORIUS, supra note 16, at 175-76; Moore, supra note 76, at 314-15; Harry H. 
Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double Standards: Some Notes on Adjudica-
tion, 83 YALE L.J. 221 (1973); see also Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 221 (1916) 
(Holmes, J., dissenting) (claiming that judicial legislation must be "confined from molar to mo-
lecular motions"). 
122. For further discussion of these legislative "strengths," see Hurd, Sovereignty in Silence, 
supra note 43, at 1010-15. 
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judgments in instances of doubt. If the considerations of institutional 
competence that make such deference advisable also ensure that 
judges will probably fail to appreciate the asymmetry of information 
that exists between themselves and legislators, these considerations 
provide compelling reasons to think that judicial disobedience of legis-
lative rules will, in most cases, constitute error. But when judicial de-
partures from legislative rules are not erroneous, considerations of 
institutional competence only provide a reason for surprise; they do 
not provide a reason for punishment. The most that considerations of 
institutional competence may provide in such cases is a reason to think 
that other judges are likely to err. If institution designers must punish 
justifiably disobedient judges in order to inculcate an appropriate de-
gree of deference on the part of judges who would be unjustified in 
disobeying legislation, then institution designers may have a role-rela-
tive reason to punish justified judicial offenders. But such a reason is, 
again, only pragmatic. In the absence of judicial errors concerning 
how much deference is due to legislative judgments, considerations of 
institutional competence fail to provide institution designers with any 
reason to punish justifiably disobedient judges. 
iv. The fear of tyranny. It has been commonly said that to dele-
gate decisionmaking powers to a minority is to invite tyranny. In 
Lord Acton's famous words, "power corrupts, and absolute power 
corrupts absolutely." It is for this reason that classical writers main-
tained that "[a]ll the difficult questions of Government relate to the 
means of restraining those, in whose hands are lodged the powers nec-
essary for the protection of all, from making bad use of it."t23 
Alexander Hamilton's famous solution to these difficult questions 
was twofold: (1) to separate legislative, executive, and judicial powers 
so that each might check and balance the powers of the others, and 
(2) to invest the legislative powers in a democratic body that inter-
nally checks the ability of individuals to pursue self-interested ends. 
Because each governmental branch requires for its purposes the pow-
ers accorded to the others, each governmental branch is constrained 
by the others in its ability to achieve its own ends. And because each 
individual in a democratic legislature requires for her purposes the 
powers accorded to other individuals, each individual is constrained 
by others in her ability to act self-interestedly. Under Hamilton's 
scheme, structural pluralism is the answer to the threat of tyranny. 
The executive not only dispenses the honors but holds the sword of the 
community. The legislature not only commands the purse but prescribes 
the rules by which the duties and rights of every citizen are to be regu-
123. Mill, supra note 117, at 44. 
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lated. The judiciary, on the contrary, has no influence over either the 
sword or the purse; no direction either of the strength or of the wealth of 
the society; and can take no active resolution whatever. It may truly be 
said to have neither FORCE nor WILL but merely judgment; and must 
ultimately depend upon the aid of the executive arm even for the efficacy 
of its judgments. 124 
Yet the arguments so far advanced in this article have failed to 
suggest that there is a principled basis upon which judges can be con-
strained from substituting their will for that of the legislature in in-
stances in which they rightly conclude that the legislature is in error. 
Does this not invite tyranny by a minority? Hamilton certainly 
thought so: 
It can be of no weight to say that the courts, on the pretense of a 
repugnancy, may substitute their own pleasure to the constitutional in-
tentions of the legislature. . . . The courts must declare the sense of the 
law; and if they should be disposed to exercise WILL instead of JUDG-
MENT, the consequences would equally be the substitution of their plea-
sure to that of the legislative body. The observation, if it proved 
anything, would prove that there ought to be no judges distinct from 
that body.125 
Hamilton's willingness to abolish the judicial branch before tolerating 
judicial disobedience rests squarely on the presupposition that, if 
judges are licensed to break the law when they deem it in error, they 
will declare it to be in error when doing so advances their own inter-
ests. They will assume a ''pretense of repugnancy" in instances in 
which no repugnancy in fact exists. In short, they will abuse their 
power. 
Recognition of this fact provides a reason to be suspicious of judi-
cial disobedience, for it provides a reason to suppose that such disobe-
dience is motivated more by self-interest than by a concern for what is 
genuinely in the best interests of the community. It provides a reason 
to think that judicial decisions that depart from legislative decisions 
also depart from the real balance of reasons for action. But despite 
Hamilton's hope, the fear of tyranny provides no reason to punish a 
judge who has accurately assessed that the balance of reasons for ac-
tion favors disobedience. At most, it provides a reason to think that, if 
such a judge is not punished, others will be tempted to disguise their 
unjustified disobedience as justified disobedience - to advance disin-
genuous reasons for disobedience in the hope that they will escape 
punishment for acts that serve self-interest rather than morality. This 
reason to punish justified judicial offenders is probably, as a pragmatic 
124. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
125. Id. at 468-69. 
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matter, a good one. But contrary to what many defenders of struc-
tural pluralism might have thought, it is not a principled one. Absent 
temptations toward tyranny, it provides no reason to think that those 
who assume the constitutional perspective would be justified in pun-
ishing justified judicial off enders. 
Each of the arguments canvassed so far portrays the value of de-
mocracy in instrumentalist terms. Each supposes that democracy is 
important because it produces decisions that are more likely to be ac-
curate than are the decisions that other decisionmakers reach. Be-
cause all of these arguments value accuracy over democracy, none 
provides a reason to punish a judge who accurately concludes that a 
democratic legislature is wrong in requiring the punishment of a justi-
fied private offender. The most that these arguments provide are rea-
sons to think that any given act of judicial disobedience is more likely 
than not in error. They may therefore furnish the foundations for an 
argument from error that licenses the punishment of the justified as a 
means of curbing unjustified disobedience. 
b. lntemalist theories of democracy. According to the internalist, 
democratic decisionmaking is intrinsically valuable. Thus, the fact 
that a democratic legislature has reached a particular decision func-
tions as an additional reason for judges to comply with that decision. 
When legislation has been passed on a particular subject, judges have a 
reason for action that the legislature did not have: the fact that a dem-
ocratic body has spoken. 126 This fact must be added to the antece-
dently existing reasons for obedience (which were applicable to the 
legislature's decision) and weighed against the antecedently existing 
reasons for an alternative course of conduct (which were also applica-
ble to the legislature's decision). If the inherent value of democracy 
provides a weighty reason for obedience, it may tip the balance of rea-
sons for judicial action in favor of an action that would have been 
grievously erroneous on the antecedently existing balance of reasons 
for action. Hence, the internal value of democracy may make it right 
for judges to enforce a law that it was wrong for the legislature to 
enact. 
l The argument from participation. Carole Pateman has argued 
that democracy is important because political participation fosters im-
portant qualities of personal character. 127 Following Rousseau and 
126. Those who advance an internalist theory of democracy are committed to the thesis that 
laws enacted by a democratic legislature possess influential authority. See supra note 42 and 
accompanying text. Such laws create new first-order content-independent reasons for acting !IS 
the legislature commands that must be added to the balance of antecedent reasons for so acting. 
See supra note 38. 
127. See CAROLE PATEMAN, PARTICIPATION AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY 22-44 (1970). 
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John Stuart Mill, Pateman argues that there is an "interrelationship 
and connection between individuals, their qualities and psychological 
characteristics, and types of institutions; . . . that responsible social 
and political action depends largely on the sort of institutions within 
which the individual has, politically, to act." 128 Her argument pro-
ceeds as follows. First, as Mill put it, " 'the general mental advance-
ment of the community, including under that phrase advancement in 
intellect, in virtue, and in practical activity and efficiency,' " depends 
on self-determination.129 Second, while a benevolent despot might 
better achieve decisions that are in the greatest interest of the commu-
nity, such a governor thwarts self-determination, and thus prevents 
citizens from developing character traits that are crucial to their intel-
lectual and moral development. 13° Finally, because democracy alone 
provides for self-determination, democracy alone guarantees intellec-
tual advancement and the attainment of moral virtue. As Pateman 
puts this conclusion: 
[T]he justification for a democratic system in the participatory theory of 
democracy rests primarily on the human results that accrue from the 
participatory process. One might characterise the participatory model as 
one where maximum input (participation) is required and where output 
includes not just policies (decisions) but also the development of the so-
cial and political capacities of each individual, so that there is "feed-
back" from output to input.13 I 
Pateman's participatory theory provides a reason to think that de-
mocracy is internally valuable. If valid, it provides judges (and pre-
sumably citizens) with a new reason to comply with democratic results 
- a reason over and above the reasons for compliance that existed 
prior to the democratic decision to demand such compliance. If a 
course of conduct is valuable just because it has been democratically 
willed, then a judge who fails to add the fact of democratic enactment 
to the reasons to pursue that course of conduct fails to assess accu-
rately the balance of reasons for action. If her ensuing decision to 
disobey the law would have been different had she added the value of 
democratic participation to the reasons for obedience, than the judge 
ought to be punished, for her disobedience is unjustified. 
While Pateman's argument provides a reason to think that democ-
racy is valuable, it does not provide a reason to think that the results 
128. Id. at 29. 
129. Id. at 28-29 (quoting JOHN s. MILL, Representative Government, in UTILITARIANISM, 
ON LIBERTY AND CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 171, 195 {H.B. Ac-
ton ed., 1972) (1861)). 
130. Id. at 29. 
131. Id. at 43. 
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of democracy should be considered exclusionary. Pateman would ad-
mit that if democracy failed to advance individual virtue, moral ac-
tion, and civic-mindedness, it would lack anything other than 
instrumental value. And one might plausibly argue that a democracy 
will fail to advance morality unless and until the individuals who par-
ticipate in it are themselves, to some degree, moral. Democracies are, 
at least in principle, capable of producing gravely immoral results, and 
it is unclear how moral virtue might be fostered in a system that re-
quires deeply immoral conduct. While one might argue that immoral-
ity is unsustaining132 and that the democratic legislation of gravely 
immoral policies will trigger the democratic change of those policies, it 
appears equally plausible that immorality breeds immoral character 
traits that make such change unlikely. 133 Hence, it might be the case 
that for democracy to foster virtue, it must require a certain amount of 
moral conduct, or it must not, at least, require gravely immoral con-
duct. Thus, practical reason will compel a judge confronted with 
gravely immoral legislation to weigh the value of participation against 
the immorality of the legislative decisions that result from that partici-
pation. If the judge concludes that those results will foster greater vice 
than virtue, the participatory theory of democracy will itself require 
that she set those results aside. 
Once again, then, the value of democracy fails to provide a princi-
pled reason to think that judges should be punished for genuinely jus-
tified disobedience. As always, the fear that the systemic acquittal of 
justifiably disobedient judges will foster unjustified judicial disobedi-
ence serves as a reason to punish justified judicial offenders. But such 
a reason is a pragmatic one premised on the fear of disproportionate 
judicial error. 
ii. The argument from autonomy. The argument from autonomy 
rests on the claim that autonomy is inherently valuable, and, hence, 
that a decisionmaking process that sums autonomous choices is inher-
ently valuable. Because democracy performs precisely this function of 
summing autonomous choices, its results are valuable just because 
they are democratic. This argument is closely aligned with the argu-
ment from participation, and, under some constructions, it appears to' 
collapse into that argument. But it differs from that argument when 
132. As Fuller supposed, "coherence and goodness have more affinity than coherence nnd 
evil." Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law: A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. 
REV. 630, 636 (1958). 
133. As Mill maintained, "[c]apacity for the nobler feelings is in most natures a very tender 
plant, easily killed not only by hostile influences, but by mere want of sustenance .••• " MILL, 
supra note 5, at 252. "[W)ill, like all other parts of our constitution, is amenable to habit , ••• " 
Id. at 281. 
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constructed as follows. Participation theorists value political partici-
pation only because they value its results. If a benevolent despot could 
advance individual virtue and civic-mindedness to a greater degree 
than democracy, participation theorists would no longer find demo-
cratic participation valuable. Autonomy theorists, on the other hand, 
value autonomy for its own sake. That is, autonomy is not to be 
equated with moral virtue (even if it is intimately connected to it), and 
hence, even if the exercise of autonomy fails to advance intellectual 
and moral virtue, it may nevertheless be valuable. Thus, even if de-
mocracy produces results that do not contribute to the social develop-
ment of citizens, its exercise may still serve as a source of value. There 
are at least two versions of the argument from autonomy - a strong 
one and a weak one. 
(A.) The strong version. The strong version of the argument from 
autonomy runs as follows. First, for an action to have moral worth at 
all, the actor must autonomously chose it. That is, autonomy is a nec-
essary condition for the moral worth of an action (albeit not a suffi-
cient one). Only if an individual's act is both voluntary (in the sense 
that it is not coerced by others) and intentional (in the sense that it is 
the product of deliberation and choice) does that act have moral value. 
Under this conception, for example, a financial contribution to others 
will have moral value - and will thus constitute an act of charity -
only if it is a product of individual choice. If coerced by others, the act 
will lack moral worth. It will function like a tax, rather than a gift; it 
will have good consequences, but it will not be a good act. 
Second, compliance with the law has moral worth only if the law 
itself is a product of the individual's choice. That is, laws constitute 
pressure from others - such that compliance with them lacks moral 
value -· unless the individual has autonomously endorsed their 
enactment. 
Third, individuals within a community autonomously endorse the 
laws that govern their conduct only if they have meaningfully partici-
pated in the democratic enactment of those laws. There is a vast liter-
ature devoted to what counts as meaningful participation, and because 
I have dwelt on this literature elsewhere, 134 I do not propose to devote 
any time to it here. It is enough to recognize that, if one meaningfully 
participates in a democracy merely by living within a territory that is 
ruled democratically, then the rules enacted by the government of that 
territory count as autonomously chosen rules. 135 If the election of rep-
134. See Hurd, supra note 22, at 1657-61. 
135. Residency constituted a sufficient condition of participation for Locke. See JOHN 
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resentatives is required for meaningful participation, then laws that 
are enacted by representative democracy count as autonomously cho-
sen laws. If casting a ballot is required for meaningful participation, 
then only laws that are enacted by direct democracy (by referendum 
or initiative) count as autonomously chosen laws. And if casting a 
ballot in favor of the law is required for meaningful participation, then 
only laws for which one voted in a direct democracy count as autono-
mously chosen laws. 136 
Fourth, to the extent that judges disobey democratic enactments 
and implement their own judgments concerning what citizens ought to 
do, they deprive citizens of the moral worth of their actions. By en-
forcing laws that differ from those chosen democratically, they coerce 
citizens to act, thereby defeating the possibility of moral action by 
citizens. 
Finally, institution designers have a moral reason to punish judges 
who substitute their own judgments concerning what citizens ought to 
do for those collectively made by citizens themselves. If morality 
makes autonomous choice a condition of right action, and if only dem-
ocratically enacted laws are autonomously chosen, then judges cannot 
substitute their own judgments for democratic judgments without ren-
dering it impossible for citizens to act morally. 
If this version of the argument from autonomy were defensible, 
then the value of democracy would be effectively exclusionary. Judges 
could never justifiably disobey democratically enacted laws. If judges 
could not increase moral conduct by substituting their own judgments 
for those of a democracy, the separation of powers would be inviolate. 
Judges would be forced to recognize that even though it might have 
been morally better for the legislature to have chosen a different law 
- for the balance of reasons for action in fact favors the pursuit of a 
different social policy - a judicial substitution of that policy could not 
accomplish morally better results, for its very imposition would de-
prive it of its worth. Hence, judicial disobedience of legislative rules 
would never be justified. 
There are at least two reasons to think that this version of the ar-
gument from autonomy must fail. The first is that it is self-defeating; 
the second is that it is false. The argument is self-defeating because, if 
autonomous choice is a condition of moral action, individuals could 
LOCKE, Second Treatise of Government, in Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 365·66 (Peter 
Laslett ed., 2d ed. 1967) (1714). 
136. The anarchist Robert Paul Wolff has defended this very stringent condition. See ROB· 
ERT P. WOLFF, IN DEFENSE OF ANARCHISM 12-14 (1970); Robert P. Wolff, In Defense of An-
archism, in Is LAW DEAD? 110 (Eugene V. Rostow ed., 1971). 
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not rationally choose to give themselves laws without threatening the 
moral worth of their own actions. If they act according to their laws 
when absent those laws they would not so act, their actions lack moral 
worth. If they act according to their laws when absent those laws they 
would act in just the same way, then their laws do no work, and the 
process of their enactment appears irrational. Thus, on the strong 
view, the democratic enactment of action-guiding rules would be 
either immoral or irrational. 
The strong version of the argument from autonomy appears false 
because, even though some acts appear to lose their moral worth if the 
actors who perform them have not autonomously chosen to do so, 
many acts (and omissions) do not appear to lose their value just be-
cause the actor would not choose to perform them without pressure 
from others. While charity may cease to be charity if it is coerced, 
truth-telling still constitutes honesty if coerced. Thus, in many in-
stances, one may not deprive others of the moral worth of their actions 
by pressuring them to act against their will; on the contrary, one may 
guarantee their moral action when they might otherwise (autono-
mously) jeopardize it. As such, the strong version of the argument 
from participation appears too strong, for it fails to take account of the 
fact that many acts appear to have moral worth even when they are 
not autonomously chosen. 
(B.) The weak version. A more plausible version of the argument 
from autonomy can be constructed with the help of the theory of au-
tonomy developed by Joseph Raz. According to Raz, lives that are 
autonomously led have greater moral worth than those that are not: 
It is the thought that what we are is, in significant respects, what we 
become through successive choices during our lives, that our lives are a 
continuous process of self-creation .... 
. . . We regard the fact that a life was autonomous as adding value to 
it. We think of our own lives and the lives of others as better for having 
been developed autonomously.137 
If lives are better for being autonomously chosen, then the acts that 
comprise those lives must be better for being autonomously chosen. 
Thus, the individual who chooses to save a drowning child without the 
promise of financial reward or the threat of punishment does an act 
that has greater moral worth than the act of the individual who saves 
the child because of some threat by others. This suggests, as a first 
step in the weak argument from autonomy, that the autonomy with 
137. Joseph Raz, Liberalism, Skepticism, and Democracy, 74 IOWA L. REV. 761, 781 (1989). 
See generally RAz, MORALITY, supra note 36, at 369-99. 
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which a decision is made adds moral value to that decision, although it 
is not a necessary condition of the moral worth of that decision. 
Second, a decision that in fact coheres with the balance of reasons 
for action, but is not autonomously made, might have less moral 
worth than a decision that fails to cohere with the balance of reasons 
for action but is autonomously made. Thus, the choice to contribute 
to a softball team might have greater moral worth than the choice to 
contribute to AIDS research if the former is made autonomously 
while the latter is exacted through threat of sanction. 
Third, insofar as democracy tabulates autonomous choices, demo-
cratic results represent choices of maximal autonomy. Therefore, 
democratic choices possess substantial moral worth. Fourth, even 
when democratic results fail to cohere with the balance of reasons for 
action, the value that attaches to those results by virtue of their being 
chosen by a majority may be sufficient, in many instances, to outweigh 
the value of a choice that in fact coheres with the antecedently existing 
balance of reasons for action. In those instances, judges ought to defer 
to the will of the legislature and refrain from substituting what would 
in fact be a better policy if the legislature had not enacted the law that 
it did. 
Like the argument from participation, this argument provides 
judges with a reason to obey democratically enacted rules that should 
be added to the antecedently existing reasons to do what the rules re-
quire. But insofar as this argument rests on Raz's understanding of 
the value of autonomy, it does not purport to be exclusionary. As Raz 
argues: 
[W]e value autonomous choices only if they are choices of what is valua-
ble and worthy of choice. Those who freely choose the immoral, igno-
ble, or worthless we judge more harshly precisely because their choice 
was free .... This shows that autonomy does not always lead to the well-
being of the autonomous person. It can make his life worse if it leads 
him to embrace immoral or ignoble pursuits. Autonomy contributes to 
one's well-being only if it leads one to engage in valuable activities and 
pursuits.138 
For Raz, the value of autonomy is asymmetrical. Moral acts chosen 
autonomously have more worth than moral acts performed acciden-
tally or as a result of coercion. But immoral acts chosen autono-
mously have no moral worth at all and are thus worth less than moral 
acts performed accidentally or because of coercion.139 
If Raz is right about the asymmetrical value of autonomy, then 
138. Raz, supra note 137, at 781-82. · 
139. To think otherwise is to think that autonomy is a sufficient condition of moral worth, 
even if it is not a necessary condition. 
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practical reason will require that judges assess the morality of demo-
cratic results. In the event that they are "immoral, ignoble, or worth-
less," the judge will be compelled to set them aside and substitute a 
course of conduct that coheres with the balance of reasons for action. 
Compliance with the judicial substitution will then have some moral 
worth, albeit not the degree of worth that it would have if autono-
mously chosen. Thus, if a judge rightly concludes that democratic leg-
islation requiring the punishment of a disobedient citizen is immoral, 
ignoble, or worthless, the weak version of the argument from auton-
omy licenses the judge· to break the law and acquit the offender. 
Yet again, the only justification that a system designer would have 
to punish such a judge would be that such punishment was necessary 
to deter others from breaking the law in instances in which the law is 
not immoral, ignoble, or worthless. If those who assume the constitu-
tional perspective have reason to believe that judges will fail to give 
due weight to democratic choices that do not suffer from these faults, 
and if they have reason to believe that only the wholesale punishment 
of all judicial offenders will prevent such errors, then the argument 
from error will provide them with a role-relative reason to punish the 
justified. But, as before, this reason will be a pragmatic one, not a 
principled one. 
Both the instrumental and the internal arguments for democracy 
and the separation of powers fail to provide principled reasons to pun-
ish justified judicial offenders. At most, they provide those who as-
sume the constitutional perspective with conditions that trigger the 
error-based argument from opportunity discussed in section III.A. 
That argument can now be understood as follows: 
(1) Judges are compelled by the demands of practical reason to 
assess and act on the balance of reasons for action as they see it. 
Hence, whenever judges conclude that legislation conflicts with the 
balance of reasons for action - including in that balance the reasons 
for obedience provided by concerns for error, self-interested bias, the 
rule-of-law values, and the inherent values of democracy - judges 
should break the law. 
(2) But judges will make errors about how much they will make 
errors. And judges will be self-interestedly biased about how much 
they are self-interestedly biased. If judges attempt to decide cases ac-
cording to what is best, all things considered, then they will frequently 
ignore or improperly weigh relevant reasons for and against action. 
Thus, judges would do better if they could escape the demands of 
practical reason and blindly obey the law, even when the law demands 
things (such as the punishment of justified offenders) that are, and ap-
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pear to them to be, gravely immoral. Judges therefore face a 
predicament. 
(3) Only institution designers can resolve this predicament. By 
parsing out matters of policy to the legislature, and by restricting 
judges, on pain of punishment, to the constitutional review and appli-
cation of those policies, institution designers can reduce moral error. 
The threat of punishment will provide the judiciary with a subjective 
reason to defer to the decisions of the legislature - a reason that in 
most instances will be sufficiently weighty to tip the balance of reasons 
for action in favor of complying with the legislature's judgments. In-
sofar as the opportunities to prevent immoral consequences provide 
actors with reasons for action, and insofar as the power of punishment 
provides institution designers with a unique ability to prevent immoral 
consequences, institution designers have a prima facie, role-relative 
reason to punish judges who justifiably fail to punish justifiably disobe-
dient citizens. 
Yet, while the fear of judicial incompetence and tyranny may pro-
vide compelling pragmatic reasons for punishing judges who are in-
deed justified in breaking legislatively enacted laws, it remains to be 
determined whether there are any principled reasons for such punish-
ment. If judges were not susceptible to error or corruption, would 
there still be reasons to punish them for not punishing justified offend-
ers? Would those who assume the constitutional perspective still have 
role-relative reasons to enforce the separation of powers? 
2. The Rule-of-Law Values Revisited 
When contemplating the punishment or impeachment of a particu-
lar justified judicial offender, those who occupy the constitutional per-
spective are forced to take on the judicial perspective as well. For to 
subject a judge's conduct to scrutiny when punishment is at stake is to 
judge a judge. The rule-of-law values discussed in section 111.B of this 
Part will therefore enter the balance of reasons that determines the 
justifiability of decisions made by institution designers. Thus, if judges 
(as well as other officials or citizens) justifiably rely on the punishment 
of justified judicial offenders, or depend upon their punishment as a 
means of preserving the coordination necessary to achieve collective 
goods such as justice, or require their punishment so as to preserve 
equality among judges, then constitutional actors have at least prima 
facie reasons of a principled sort to punish justified judicial offenders. 
If reliance and equality are concerns for institution designers, they 
may provide principled reasons for punishing judges who have justifia-
bly determined that reliance and equality are insufficient reasons to 
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punish justifiably disobedient citizens. They may, that is, function as 
principled foundations for constitutional perspectivalism. If these 
rule-of-law values do vindicate a morality relative to the constitutional 
role, then they force us to conclude, once more, that morality is inher-
ently paradoxical, for it requires the punishment of those who do the 
right thing in refusing to punish those who do the right thing. 
I do not propose to consider further the extent to which the rule-
of-law values provide a principled basis for constitutional perspectival-
ism~ Instead, let me tum to a consideration that appears to provide a 
principled account of role-relative morality unique to the constitu-
tional perspective. 
3. The Argument from Institutional Efficiency 
Schauer maintains that even if judges made error-free determina-
tions, institution designers would nevertheless have reasons to en-
courage them to follow legislatively enacted rules when adherence to 
those rules would render the process of adjudication more efficient. 
When judges in courts of law are channelled by relatively precise rules 
into deciding cases on the basis of a comparatively small number of eas-
ily identified factors (Was the defendant driving faster than 55 miles per 
hour?; Did the plaintiff become ill after consuming a product manufac-
tured by the defendant?), the entire proceeding is streamlined, requiring 
less time and evidence than would have been necessary under a more 
rule-free procedure in which a wider range of factors was open for con-
sideration (Was the defendant driving safely? Was the plaintiff's illness 
caused by the defendant's negligence?). A rule-based system is conse-
quently able to process more cases, operate with less expenditure of 
human resources, and, insofar as rule-based simplicity fosters greater 
predictability as well, keep a larger number of events from being for-
mally adjudicated at all. 140 
Schauer insists that we should take care "to treat efficiency as a 
value independent of the value of simplified procedures in diminishing 
the number of decision-maker errors."141 That is, concern for effi-
ciency need not collapse into concern for judicial error. This conclu-
sion is true, but it takes some work to see why. It would be clearly 
true if legislative and judicial decisionmaking produced identical re-
sults. Then a system designer would have a reason to allocate deci-
sionmaking power to the legislature if that institution could achieve 
those results at less expense than could the judiciary. Legislative and 
judicial results would be identical in two sets of circumstances: (1) if 
legislatively enacted rules perfectly reflected moral rules (so that they 
140. SCHAUER, supra note 35, at 147. 
141. Id. 
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always determined a decision that accorded with a judge's accurate 
assessment of the balance of reasons for action), and conversely {2) if 
the total number of instances in which legislatively enacted rules de-
parted from moral rules were identical in number and weight to the 
total number of instances in which judges failed to assess accurately 
the balance of reasons for action. 
Neither of these sets of circumstances obtains in the cases that con-
cern us. Consider the first possible set of circumstances. If legisla-
tively enacted rules never departed from the rules of morality, then 
there would never be circumstances in which a citizen would be justi-
fied in disobeying legislatively enacted conduct rules, and there would 
never be instances in which a judge would be justified in disobeying 
legislatively enacted decision rules that require the punishment of citi-
zens who break legislatively enacted conduct rules. That is, the prob-
lem of justifiably punishing the justified would not arise. 
Consider now the second possible reason for identical legislative 
and judicial results. If legislative decisionmaking inevitably produced 
the same number of errors as judicial decisionmaking, then error 
would indeed drop out as a reason to prefer one decisionmaking insti-
tution to the other. Because institution designers would have reasons 
to think that the legislature can reach certain decisions (about matters 
of policy, for example) more cheaply than can the judiciary (given an 
identical error factor), efficiency would appear to give institution de-
signers a reason to prefer legislative decisionmaking. That is, if judi-
cial disobedience could not accomplish a cumulative increase in 
morally right results, institution designers would have a principled 
reason to punish judicial disobedience. Punishment would deter 
judges from investing resources in attempts to discover whether legis-
latively enacted rules are in error when those attempts generate as 
many errors at greater cost as does the blind application of those 
sometimes erroneous legislative rules. 
But while efficiency might decide between decisionmaking systems 
that produce errors identical in weight and number, this conclusion 
falls short of providing us with a reason to think that judges should 
punish justified judicial offenders in circumstances in which judges are 
assumed to make no mistakes. The question for our purposes is 
whether efficiency provides a reason to punish judges for breaking leg-
islatively enacted rules when such judicial disobedience in fact reflects 
the accurate determination that the legislature's rules are over- or un-
derinclusive. Put more bluntly, does efficiency provide a role-relative 
reason to punish genuinely justified judicial offenders? 
For institution designers to be justified on grounds of efficiency in 
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punishing a judge who justifiably acquitted a justified offender, the 
judge would have to have miscalculated the proper amount of judicial 
resources to expend in deciding to acquit such an offender. Take a 
specific case. If a judge was justified in acquitting a woman after she 
killed her abusive husband, then eo ipso the judge both accurately de-
termined that the law of homicide was overinclusive in her case (or the 
law of self-defense underinclusive) and accurately calculated that the 
arguments from error coupled with the rule-of-law values and the val-
ues inherent in democracy fell short of providing sufficient reasons to 
punish her for her disobedience. For institution designers to be justi-
fied in punishing such a judge on grounds of efficiency, they would 
have to be correct in concluding that the resources spent by this judge 
exceeded those that should have been spent to reach an accurate deci-
sion in such a case. That is, they would have to be right in calculating 
that the judge spent an unjustified amount of time calculating whether 
the rule in the case was over- or underinclusive and whether the argu-
ments from error, the rule-of-law values, and the values inherent in 
democracy licensed such an acquittal. 
But if institution designers rightly concluded that this judge over-
calculated the likelihood of error, would this not be a reason to think 
that the judge made a mistake? For if the costs involved in deciding 
that the battered wife should be acquitted exceeded the costs of pun-
ishing such an offender, then, other things being equal, is it not the 
case that the judge should have followed the legislatively enacted deci-
sion rule that required her to impose punishment? Efficiency provides 
a role-relative reason for institution designers to punish disobedient 
judges only if it provides judges either with no reason, or with a less 
weighty reason, to punish disobedient citizens. 
There are, I think, prima facie grounds to suppose that efficiency 
provides institution designers with more of a reason to punish disobe-
dient judges than it provides judges with a reason to punish disobedi-
ent citizens. This is because scarce resources create a prisoner's 
dilemma for judges. From the judicial perspective, the costs to a citi-
zen of unjustified punishment are likely to trump the costs involved 
with the sort of protracted litigation required to evaluate whether the 
applicable legislative rules are either over- or underinclusive in the citi-
zen's case. Thus, in any given case in which a citizen's punishment is 
at stake, the balance of reasons will probably favor a judge's discovery 
and application of the background moral considerations that moti-
vated the legislative enactment of relevant rules, rather than a blind 
application of those rules themselves. 
If all judges in all cases second-guessed legislative decisions, how-
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ever, the process of justice would grind to virtual halt, and accurate 
decisions would be achieved at the cost of prolonged and involved liti-
gation. Insofar as it may be more important to process many cases at 
the cost of a few errors than to process a few cases without error, 
judges might accomplish better results if they abandoned their attempt 
to accomplish error-free adjudication (even in cases involving the po-
tential punishment of a justified offender) and blindly applied rules 
they knew to be over- and underinclusive. 
But just as it appears irrational for a citizen to vote, because the 
incremental value of casting a single ballot is likely to be outweighed 
by the value of doing work for charity, so it appears irrational for a 
judge to refrain from second guessing legislative decisions, because the 
systemic inefficiency that such a recalculation is likely to produce is 
small in comparison to the costs to a citizen of applying an overinclu-
sive rule (even when those costs are discounted by the probability that 
the rule to be applied is not in fact overinclusive). Thus, even if judges 
recognize that the viability of the judicial system rests on the collective 
willingness of judges to apply legislatively enacted rules without recal-
culating the likelihood that those rules are in error, the demands of 
practical reason will nevertheless compel judges to recalculate the like-
lihood of legislative error in any case in which they suspect that the 
costs of such error will outweigh the incremental inefficiency that their 
recalculation will produce. 
f 
Just as the punishment of citizens who justifiably disobey the law 
may rescue citizens from prisoner's dilemmas that threaten collective 
goods, so the punishment of judges who disobey the law may rescue 
them from the prisoner's dilemma that threatens the administration of 
justice. If the universal recalculation of legislation would contribute to 
the collapse of the judicial system, and if system designers can prevent 
that collapse by punishing judges who insist on recalculating legisla-
tion, system designers have at least a prima facie reason to punish 
judges who second guess the legislature. Insofar as the blind applica-
tion of legislatively enacted rules strikes the morally appropriate bal-
ance between rightly decided and wrongly decided cases, system 
designers will have a prima facie reason to punish judges every time 
judges second guess legislation, even when judges are justified in so 
doing because the rule involved is in fact over- or underinclusive. 
Hence, the concern for efficiency would seem to provide a role-relative 
reason for system designers to punish justified judicial offenders. 
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IV. SEIZING THE SECOND HORN: A DEFENSE OF THE 
CORRESPONDENCE THESIS 
2279 
In the previous Part, I canvassed the reasons for thinking that in-
stitutional roles provide actors with unique reasons for action - rea-
sons that might tip the balance of reasons for judicial action in favor of 
punishing a justifiably disobedient citizen, or reasons that might tip 
the balance of reasons for constitutional action in favor of disciplining 
a justifiably disobedient judge. If such arguments are persuasive, then 
we must conclude that the correspondence thesis is false: the justifia-
bility of an action does not determine the justifiability of permitting or 
punishing the action. A citizen might be justified in breaking the law, 
but a judge might be justified in punishing him for his disobedience. 
Alternatively, a judge might be justified in breaking the law and ac-
quitting a justifiably disobedient citizen; but a system designer might 
be justified in disciplining her for her judicial disobedience. 
If the correspondence thesis is false, then the appropriate means of 
resolving the dilemma with which we began is by abandoning the pun-
ishment principle. We should admit once and for all that individuals 
should sometimes be blamed for acting in ways that are morally 
blameless, and punished for behaving precisely as they should behave. 
Such a solution has the virtue of preserving the integrity of our sys-
temic values. If judges are morally licensed to punish justifiably diso-
bedient citizens when liberty, equality, and cooperatively achieved 
public goods are in jeopardy, then we need not fear that recognition of 
the moral justifiability of certain acts of disobedience will threaten the 
rule of law. And if constitutional actors are morally licensed to disci-
pline justifiably disobedient judges when democracy and the separa-
tion of powers are at stake, then we need not fear that judges will 
exercise powers institutionally reserved for the legislature in ways that 
will adversely affect our commitment to structural pluralism. 
But while the punishment of the justified will protect institutional 
values, it will also encourage actors to do what they are not in fact 
justified in doing. It will prompt citizens to obey unjust laws that 
ought to be disobeyed, and it will compel judges to enforce unjust laws 
that ought to be overturned or ignored. While these results may be of 
institutional virtue, they violate personal virtue. The punishment of 
the justified creates personal dilemmas: in some instances, individuals 
must act immorally to be treated as if they acted morally, and they 
must suffer the institutional blame associated with immorality if they 
choose to act morally. 
Yet this paradoxical "solution" must be accepted only if the corre-
spondence thesis is false, and the correspondence thesis is false only if 
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the reasons for action explored in the previous Part are in fact role-
relative. While the arguments advanced in the previous Part provide 
prima facie reasons to think that concerns about error, the rule oflaw, 
and the separation of powers are not concerns that equally affect the 
balance of reasons for private, judicial, and constitutional action, there 
are grounds to think that these arguments rest on one or more confu-
sions. In what follows, I shall try to articulate the nature of these 
confusions. If I am right, dissolving these confusions restores the via-
bility of the correspondence thesis and vindicates the punishment prin-
ciple. We must thus seek an alternative solution to the dilemma with 
which we began. 
A. Consequentialism and the Correspondence Thesis 
1. Rightmaking Consequences for Consequentialism 
Consequentialists who are inclined to embrace role-relative moral-
ity, and thereby abandon the correspondence thesis, must defend the 
claim that the consequences of judicial action are not consequences 
that enter into the balance of reasons for private action and that the 
consequences of constitutional action are not consequences that enter 
into the balance of reasons for judicial action. This claim should 
trouble most consequentialists because the consequences of judicial ac-
tion in a case involving a disobedient citizen are consequences that 
would not occur but for the citizen's disobedience; and the conse-
quences of constitutional action in a case involving a disobedient judge 
are consequences that would not occur but for the judge's disobedi-
ence. That is, a citizen's disobedience is a cause-in-fact (or but-for 
cause) of any adverse effects on the rule oflaw or any disproportionate 
increase of erroneous acts of disobedience on the part of other citizens 
that occur by virtue of a judge's decision to acquit that citizen. And a 
judge's decision to acquit such a citizen is a cause-in-fact (or but-for 
cause) of any adverse effects on the separation of powers or any dis-
proportionate increase of erroneous acts of disobedience on the part of 
other judges that occur by virtue of a system designer's refusal to disci-
pline that judge. Thus, for consequentialists to defend the truth of 
role-relative morality, they must have grounds for maintaining that 
some consequences that would not occur but for a citizen's actions are 
consequences that do not affect the consequential calculus that deter-
mines the rightness or wrongness of that citizen's conduct. Similarly, 
some consequences that would not occur but for a judge's decision are 
consequences that do not enter into the balance of consequences that 
determines the rightness or willingness of that decision. In short, con-
sequentialists who reject the correspondence thesis must preserve the 
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central consequentialist thesis that an action is right only if it produces 
more good consequences than bad, 142 while maintaining that some bad 
consequences should not be included in the calculation that deter-
mines the rightness of some actions. 
Three possible approaches might appear available to those conse-
quentialists who do not take this project to be impossible on its face. 
First, consequentialists might attempt to limit the consequences that 
determine the rightness of actions to those that are proximately caused 
by actions. Second, consequentialists might try to limit the conse-
quences that determine the rightness of actions to those that an actor 
can reasonably anticipate or predict. Third, consequentialists might 
seek to assign weights to rightmaking consequences according to their 
relative probability at the time of action, thereby making some conse-
quences more likely for some actors than for others, and thus more 
weighty reasons for action for some actors than for others. As I shall 
argue, none of these strategies succeeds. The first depends upon a 
metaphysically indefensible conception of causation; the second and 
third confuse the conditions of right action with the conditions of 
culpability. 
a. Proximate cause limitations on rightmaking consequences. 
Consequentialists might attempt to limit the consequences that serve 
as reasons for and against an action to those that proximately result 
from that action. They might then argue that the role-relative reasons 
for judicial action described in the previous Part are not reasons for 
action for citizens because they do not represent values proximately 
affected by private conduct. Similarly, the role-relative reasons for 
constitutional action discussed earlier are not reasons for action for 
judges because they do not represent values proximately affected by 
judicial conduct. 
To make out these claims, consequentialists would have to argue 
that judicial action severs the causal chain between a citizen's disobe-
dience and any increase in the number of erroneous acts of disobedi-
ence by other citizens or any adverse effects on the rule of law. 
Similarly, they would have to claim that constitutional action severs 
the causal chain between a judge's disobedient acquittal of a disobedi-
ent citizen and any increase in the number of erroneous acts of disobe-
dience by other judges or any adverse effects on the separation of 
powers. In short, judicial and constitutional decisions function as the 
sort of voluntary intervening acts that make the prior acts of others 
non-proximate to any subsequent systemic consequences. 
142. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
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This argument draws on the intuition that currently grounds our 
general refusal to hold individuals legally liable for consequences that 
they do not proximately cause. Its implicit claim is that our legal rule 
reflects a deeper moral truth - that consequences that we do not 
proximately cause are consequences that do not bear on the rightness 
or wrongness of our conduct. 
Notwithstanding the intuitive appeal of such an argument, it pro-
vides an untenable foundation for a consequentialist vindication of 
role-relative morality. Most significantly, its defensibility rests on the 
ability to make the notion of proximate causation metaphysically plau-
sible, not just morally plausible. That is, it requires one to defend the 
claim that voluntary, intentional human acts literally sever causal 
chains.143 The arsonist who voluntarily throws a match on a gasoline 
spill fully intending its subsequent explosion not only does an act that 
releases those who contributed to the spill from moral responsibility 
for the fire but renders their acts causally inert. 144 The judge who 
voluntarily and intentionally breaks the law by acquitting a disobedi-
ent citizen not only does an act that releases the citizen from moral 
responsibility for subsequent errors by others or subsequent adverse 
affects on rule-of-law values, but renders that citizen's disobedience 
causally impotent. Only if the argument is advanced as a metaphysi-
cal one, not a moral one, can the consequentialist argue that voluntary 
acts of judges and system designers release prior actors from causal 
responsibility, and not just moral responsibility, for all subsequent sys-
temic consequences. 
143. [A] voluntary act, or a conjunction of events amounting to a coincidence, operates as 
a limit in the sense that events subsequent to these are not attributed to the antecedent 
action or event as its consequence even though they would not have happened without it. 
Often such a limiting action or coincidence is thought of and described as "intervening": 
and lawyers speak of them as "superseding" or "extraneous" causes "breaking the chain of 
causation." 
H.L.A. HART & TONY HONORE, CAUSATION IN THE LAW 71 (2d ed. 1985). 
According to Hart and Honore, a voluntary action capable of breaking the chain of causation 
is an action that is intentional, uncoerced, and performed with knowledge of its likely conse-
quences. Id. at 76-77. A coincidental conjunction of events capable of breaking the chain of 
causation occurs "whenever the conjunction of two or more events in certain spatial or temporal 
relations (1) is very unlikely by ordinary standards and (2) is for some reason significant or 
important, provided (3) that they occur without human contrivance and (4) are independent of 
each other." Id. at 78. 
144. As Hart and Honore describe it: 
A throws a lighted cigarette into the bracken which catches fire. Just as the flames are about 
to flicker out, B, who is not acting in concert with A, deliberately pours petrol on them. The 
fire spreads and burns down the forest. A's action, whether or not he intended the forest 
fire, was not the cause of the fire: B's was . 
. . . Such an intervention displaces the prior action's title to be called the cause and, in 
the persistent metaphors found in the law, it "reduces" the earlier action and its immediate 
effects to the level of "mere circumstances" or "part of the history". 
Id. at 74. 
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H.L.A. Hart and Tony Honore have insisted that such a theory of 
proximate causation can indeed be defended as a theory of causation, 
and not just as a theory of moral responsibility.145 Motivated in part 
by a desire to make consequentialism defensible, they have sought a 
means of answering the reductio ad absurdum that consequentialist 
theories have been thought to generate. That reductio can be put as 
follows: If the rightness or wrongness of any act is determined by the 
balance of its good and bad consequences, and if any act can have a 
virtually infinite set of consequences, then (1) the morality of virtually 
all acts is and will remain unsettled (the metaphysical implication), 
and (2) individuals must calculate an incalculable number of potential 
consequences in order to reach justified moral decisions (the epistemic 
implication).146 For example, insofar as the assassination of Arch 
Duke Ferdinand of Austria triggered the First World War, and insofar 
as that War continues to have wide-ranging effects today, the morality 
of that assassination remains, by this reductio, indeterminate, and its 
practical rationality impossible to assess. 
As Hart and Honore recognize, the reductio draws its force from 
the claim that an act is a cause of all consequences that would not 
145. Continuing their discussion of the case of the arsonist, Hart and Honore argue: 
If A and B both intended to set the forest on fire, and this destruction is accepted as some-
thing wrong or wicked, their moral wickedness, judged by the criteria of intention, is the 
same. Yet the causal judgment differentiates between them. If their moral guilt is judged by 
the outcome, this judgment though it would differentiate between them cannot be the source 
of the causal judgment; for it presupposes it. The difference just is that B has caused the 
harm and A has not. 
Id. at 74 (emphasis added). 
It is important to note that, while Hart and Honore explicitly distinguish their theory of 
causal responsibility from a theory of moral responsibility, they do not distinguish their thesis as 
a metaphysical one as distinct from a conceptual one. They, like the ordinary language philoso-
phers of their day, equate metaphysical and conceptual analysis. Yet, insofar as they explicitly 
declare that their analysis is not limited to the linguistic issue of how English speakers ordinarily 
employ the term "causation," id. at 69-70, they explicitly take conceptual analysis to be more 
than an analysis of the pragmatics of utterance. For this reason, I follow others in describing 
their theory of causation as a metaphysical one. See Sanford H. Kadish, Complicity, Cause and 
Blame: A Study in the Interpretation of Doctrine, 73 CAL. L. REv. 323, 334-35 & n.11 (1985). 
But see Judith J. Thompson, Causality and Rights: Some Preliminaries, 63 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 
471, 473 (1987). 
146. Moral philosophers have insisted ..• that the consequences of human action are 
"infinite": this they have urged as an objection against the Utilitarian doctrine that the 
rightness of a morally right action depends on whether its consequences are better than 
those of any alternative action in the circumstances. "We should have to trace as far as 
possible the consequences not only for the persons affected directly but also for those indi-
rectly affected and to these no limit can be set." Hence, so the argument runs, we cannot 
either inductively establish the Utilitarian doctrine that right acts are "optimific" or use it in 
particular cases to discover what is right. 
HART & HONORE, supra note 143, at 69 (quoting Ross, supra note 22, at 36) (footnote omitted). 
Thus, as Fumerton has maintained, "[s]ince the consequences of our actions go on and on (far 
beyond any point we can foresee), one can certainly sympathize with the actual consequence 
generic utilitarian, Moore, when he despaired of ever knowing what we ought to do." 
FUMERTON, supra note 3, at 105 (citing GEORGE E. MOORE, PRINCIPIA ETHICA (1903)). 
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have occurred but for that act. 147 If this claim is defeasible, so too is 
the reductio that threatens the coherence of consequentialism. Such a 
claim is defeasible if the only causes of an event are proximate causes. 
On Hart and Honore's theory, acts cease to be proximate and, hence, 
cease to be causes at all, when they are displaced either by the volun-
tary, intentional acts of another or by a coincidental conjunction of 
natural events.148 On this analysis, one who spills gasoline is in no 
way a cause of a subsequent fire that is started by an arsonist who 
drops a match on the spill or by an unprecedented and unforeseeable 
bolt of lightning that strikes the spill. 
Yet it is difficult to claim that such a theory of proximate causation 
is anything more than a thesis about the justified parameters of moral 
responsibility. Voluntary, intentional human acts and coincidental 
conjunctions of natural events would both have to be uncaused causes 
in order to sever causal chains so as to render causally inert many acts 
and events that are but-for causes of subsequent consequences. Be-
cause we have good reasons to think that there are no uncaused causes 
and that, even if there were, intentional human acts and statistically 
infrequent occurrences would not be among them, there appears little 
promise to the suggestion that a proper theory of (proximate) causa-
tion could adequately ground a consequentialist defense of role-rela-
tive morality. 
This conclusion resurrects the reductio that implies that conse-
quentialists are committed to the thesis that because even the most 
trivial actions have an infinite set of consequences, the morality of vir-
tually all actions is indeterminate, and the practical rationality of vir-
tually all actions is incalculable. At first blush, consequentialists 
would seem to have two alternative means of resisting this reductio. 
They might deny that such a thesis commits them to absurdity, or 
they might seek an alternative means of limiting the consequences that 
enter into the balance of reasons that determines right action. As I 
will argue in the next sections, only the first option is genuinely avail-
able. The reductio is not a reductio ad absurdum, because consequen-
tialists need not conclude that the moral indeterminacy of actions 
precludes the practical rationality of those actions. They need not 
think a defense of moral indeterminacy commits them to the claim 
that acts cannot be deemed practically rational absent an ability to 
147. HART & HONORE, supra note 143, at 68-69. 
148. See supra note 143. As Hart and Honore argue, these factors function as" 'new actions' 
(novus actus) or 'new causes,' 'superseding,' 'extraneous,' 'intervening forces' •••. " \Vhen "'the 
chain of causation' is broken" the initiating action is " 'no longer operative,' 'having worn out,' 
functus officio." Hart & Honore, supra note 143, at 74 (citing Davis v. Swan Motor Co., 2 K.B. 
291, 318 (1947)). 
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assess all their consequences. Because consequentialists can plausibly 
maintain that practical rationality requires only that actors act on the 
balance of consequences reasonably available to them, they can defend 
the determinacy of practical rationality while simultaneously embrac-
ing the indeterminacy of morality. 149 And once the thesis of moral 
indeterminacy is divorced from a thesis about practical rationality, it 
should not be particularly troublesome. Indeed, it is vindicated by our 
affirmative answers to counterfactuals of the following sort: If those 
who assassinated Arch Dulce Ferdinand could have foreseen that their 
assassination would trigger World War I, and if they could have fore-
seen that World War I would result in Hitler's rise to power and his 
subsequent execution of six million people, should they have consid-
ered these consequences as reasons against the assassination? Because 
it would be the case that, if persons possessed crystal balls that al-
lowed them to foresee all the consequences of their actions, we would 
consider their actions morally blameworthy if, over the long run, they 
did more harm than good, we must conclude that all consequences of 
actions bear upon the balance of reasons that determines the rightness 
of those actions. 150 Therefore, our only concern with moral indetermi-
nacy can be an epistemic one - not a metaphysical one. That the 
morality of actions may be indefinitely indeterminate is not itself a 
concern; rather, its recognition simply makes clear the degree of prac-
tical uncertainty with which we must make moral decisions. Absent a 
crystal ball, practical rationality requires substantial guesswork. The 
morality of our actions (though not their epistemic justifiability) will 
inevitably rest on what will seem to us to be luck. 
b. Epistemic limitations on rightmaking consequences. Conse-
quentialists who are unhappy with the suggestion that morality is a 
matter of luck might seek alternative limitations on rightmaking con-
sequences. First, they might insist that it is unnecessary to construe 
proximateness limitations metaphysically, rather than morally. Indi-
viduals should be held responsible only for those consequences that 
they proximately cause, but those consequences should be thought a 
function of the limits of moral responsibility, not of the metaphysics of 
causation. Because actors cannot prevent what they cannot foresee, it 
is morally unfair to hold them responsible for consequences of their 
actions that could not be reasonably anticipated. Hence, right action 
149. See G.E. MOORE, PRINCIPIA ETHICA 150-59 (reprinted 1956) (1903) (arguing that 
practical rationality consists of considering alternatives thought of while right action may consist 
of an alternative that is not, and perhaps could not be thought ot). 
150. As G.E. Moore put it, "[T]he assertion 'I am morally bound to perform this action' is 
identical with the assertion 'This action will produce the greatest possible amount of good in the 
Universe' .... " Id. at 147. 
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should be defined as action that maximizes foreseeable good conse-
quences or minimizes foreseeable bad consequences. Under this defi-
nition, the set of an actor's reasons for action is epistemically limited. 
The rightness of an individual's action is a function of the conse-
quences that he can reasonably foresee at the time of action, and con-
sequences are reasonably foreseeable if the costs in time, talent, 
diligence, and resources required to appreciate their relative 
probability are less than the costs of the consequences occurring dis-
counted by their probability. 
Because a citizen who contemplates disobedience is poorly situated 
to judge whether the adjudication of her case will have adverse effects 
on others' allegiance to the law or on the systemic protection of lib-
erty, equality, and reliance interests, investing significant resources to 
research the likelihood of such adverse consequences is probably un-
reasonable. To assess accurately the likelihood of such consequences, 
citizens would, in effect, be forced to acquire the expertise of a judge. 
Similarly, because a judge who contemplates the acquittal of a disobe-
dient citizen is ill-equipped to judge whether the evaluation of her dis-
obedience by system designers will have adverse effects on the 
obedience of other judges or on the separation of powers, investing 
judicial resources to research the likelihood of those adverse conse-
quences is probably unreasonable. For again, to calculate such conse-
quences, the judge would have to acquire the knowledge and skills of a 
system designer. Thus, the consequences that ensue from the adjudi-
cation of their disobedience should not be thought to affect the right-
ness of citizens' and judges' disobedience, because citizens and judges 
are epistemically constrained in their abilities to foresee those 
consequences. 
According to this argument, the consequences that provide a judge 
with reasons for action do not provide a citizen with reasons for ac-
tion, because, even though they would not occur but for the citizen's 
(disobedient) action, they are not consequences that the citizen can 
reasonably predict. Moreover, the consequences that provide the sys-
tem designer with reasons for action do not provide the judge with 
reasons for action because, even though they would not occur but for 
the judge's (disobedient) action, they are not consequences that the 
judge can reasonably assess. Morality is role-relative, for different 
roles provide actors with different predictive powers. Thus, the conse-
quences that enter into the balance of reasons that determines right 
action within those roles vary substantially. It might therefore be 
right for one actor to do what it is right for another to prevent or 
punish. 
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If successful, this argument would enable consequentialists to de-
fend role-relative morality without embracing a metaphysically sus-
pect theory of causation. But, while this argument escapes the 
problem that beset the previous attempt to limit rightmaking conse-
quences, it trades one metaphysical confusion for another: instead of 
confusing the metaphysics of causation, it confuses the metaphysics of 
right action. By identifying the conditions of right action with those 
of culpability, it purports to vindicate perspectivalism as a thesis about 
right action. In fact, it merely establishes the relatively obvious fact 
that perspectivalism is true as a thesis about culpability, while leaving 
open the truth of the correspondence thesis as a thesis about right 
action. 
Recall the distinction drawn in Part I between right action and 
culpable action. 151 An actor acts nonculpably if she justifiably believes 
her actions to be right. Her actions are actually right, however, only if 
they conform to the objective criteria of our best normative theory. A 
citizen might well be incapable of predicting that bis disobedience will 
prompt a judge to issue a decision that adversely affects liberty, equal-
ity, and cooperatively achieved collective goods. As such, the citizen 
might act nonculpably when he acts in disregard of the possibility of 
such consequences. But if bis act in fact brings about more bad conse-
quences than good consequences, then bis act is wrong, albeit 
nonculpable. Thus, the consequences that are epistemically available 
only to the judge may nevertheless be rightmaking for the citizen. 
Similarly, a judge may well be incapable of anticipating that the evalu-
ation of her disobedience will undermine the separation of powers. As 
such, she may be nonculpable in failing to consider such consequences 
when deciding to disobey the law. But ifher disobedience indeed leads 
a system designer to act in ways that threaten structural pluralism, 
then it may produce more bad consequences than good consequences. 
Her disobedience may thus be wrong, albeit nonculpable. The sys-
temic consequences that serve as epistemically available reasons for 
action for the system designer may nevertheless be rightmaking, albeit 
epistemically unavailable, for the judge. 
Those who resist this analysis might invoke one of two rejoinders 
that purport to provide reasons to collapse the distinction between 
right action and culpability. The first attempts to demonstrate that 
absurd results follow from divorcing right action from culpability, for 
such a divorce allows for the oxymoronic possibility of culpable right 
action. 152 This argument runs as follows. Suppose that the year is 
151. See supra text accompanying notes 3-12. 
152. For one version of this argument, see FUMERTON, supra note 3, at 102. 
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1930 and the place is Germany. A gunman goes to a local vegetable 
market where he opens fire, randomly spraying a large crowd of peo-
ple with bullets. Miraculously, the only shopper he shoots is the 
young Adolf Hitler - a man altogether unknown to the gunman. 
Suppose that the gunman acted out of revenge for being fired by a 
local merchant. He thus acted culpably, for he believed his action to 
be wrong, or at least unjustifiably believed it to be right. But if culpa-
bility is distinguished from right action, and if right action is defined 
consequentially, his action was right, at least on many versions of con-
sequentialism. By virtue of saving millions of lives, the gunman maxi-
mized happiness, preference-satisfaction, virtue, the protection of 
rights, and so forth, because the millions of people saved from Hitler's 
forthcoming "final solution" were afforded happiness, virtue, and the 
exercise of rights that would otherwise have been lost to them. Thus, 
we must say that the gunman did the right thing. 
But is this not an absurd thing to say? Is it not the case that this 
scenario presents a clear counterexample to the claim that our theory 
of right action should be divorced from epistemic considerations about 
the justifiability of an actor's beliefs?153 I think not. The claim that 
the gunman did the right thing only sounds absurd because we let our 
intuitions about culpability, our presuppositions about the appropriate 
conditions of punishment, and our equivocal use of the term right, 
swamp our judgment.154 The gunman was clearly culpable, and on 
most theories of punishment, culpable action is a sufficient condition 
of punishment. But to see that the gunman in fact did the right act, it 
is useful to ask whether he should have done the same thing if he 
arrived in 1930 as a time traveler, knowing that Hitler was in the 
crowd, that Hitler would be successful in implementing his so-called 
"final solution," and that he could kill Hitler without harm to anyone 
else. Under such circumstances, the consequentialist would have to 
maintain that the right thing for him to do would be to shoot Hitler. 
153. As Fumerton argues: 
Because the counterfactual conditionals that define rationality or reasons to act, on [this] 
view[], ignore the actual epistemic situation of the agent, it would seem to follow that it is 
possible for conduct to be rational despite the fact that the agent had no reason to believe 
that its consequences would be better (valued more) than those of its alternatives - indeed, 
despite the fact that the agent had every reason to believe that the consequences would be 
far worse. If I were to know all of the information that bears on some decision, I might well 
act in ways that in fact I have every reason to believe would be disastrous. But surely we 
want to make the rational/right course of action for me to take a function of my epistemic 
situation. 
Id. at 102-03. 
154. Fumerton succumbs to this confusion just because he fails to distinguish between ra-
tional (that is, epistemically justified) action and right action. See id. He is surely right to make 
rational action a function of an actor's epistemic situation, but he is wrong to equate rational 
action with right action and thus to make right action a function of an actor's epistemic situation. 
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Because this is precisely what the gunman in our original hypothetical 
did, we must conclude that he did the right thing. But because he did 
it accidentally, he receives no credit for doing the right thing; indeed, 
because he in fact thought (or should have thought, given the evidence 
available to him) that he was doing the wrong thing, he acted culpably 
and deserves punishment. The concept of culpable right action is no 
more confused than the concept of nonculpable wrong action. Hence, 
the possibility of culpable right action gives us no reason to reject the 
distinction between right action and nonculpable action. 
The second move that consequentialists might make in order to 
defend the claim that the conditions of right action should not be sepa-
rated from the conditions of nonculpable action draws on the claim 
that, as a pragmatic matter, the moral evaluation of others turns solely 
on their culpability. Because the most that we can ask of people is that 
they act nonculpably, it is pragmatically pointless to work out a theory 
of right action as distinct from a theory of culpability. Because people 
lack the hindsight of a time-traveler at the time that they act, they lack 
complete knowledge of the consequences of their actions. The best 
that they can do, then, is to make educated guesses about those conse-
quences. What sense does it make to speak of right action when the 
most that people can aspire to is nonculpable action? Is it not a mere 
academic exercise (in the pejorative sense) to lay down the conditions 
of right action when those conditions are at best accidentally 
achieved? The moral theorist should concentrate on specifying the 
conditions of culpability, and leave the conditions of right action to 
God.155 
If the development of a theory of right action is pointless, then the 
truth of the correspondence thesis as a thesis of right action is irrele-
vant. We should concentrate on constructing a theory of culpability, 
and as a thesis of culpability the correspondence thesis is plainly false. 
Such an argument constitutes a clever strategy for those who seek to 
reject the correspondence thesis. It vindicates perspectivalism as a 
thesis about the conditions of culpability, and then maintains that the 
conditions of culpability exhaust the subject matter of (useful) moral 
theory. It thus admits the possible truth of the correspondence thesis 
as a thesis about right action but declares that truth irrelevant. 
Tempting as this fallback position might be, however, it too is un-
tenable. The conditions of culpability cannot be specified without pos-
sessing an independent theory of right action. Thus the truth of the 
155. Elements of this second argument run through Fumerton's defense of an epistemically 
bounded theory of right action. See, e.g., id. at 107-08. 
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correspondence thesis as a thesis about the conditions of right action is 
far from pie in the sky. Under the critic's own theory, culpability is a 
function of belief. An actor acts nonculpably if she reasonably believes 
her actions to be right. But to know whether her beliefs are reason-
able, we must know how close they come to being true. We must thus 
have a theory of whether her actions are in fact right. Only then can 
we judge whether the evidence that she employed in formulating her 
beliefs, and the inferences that she made in arriving at her beliefs, were 
reasonable. We are able to say that the time-traveler acted 
nonculpably precisely because we think that Hitler should have been 
shot (at least if we are employing a consequentialist normative theory), 
for the fact that Hitler should have been shot makes the time-traveler's 
belief that he should shoot him reasonable. Likewise, we conclude 
that the original gunman's actions were unreasonable precisely be-
cause he did not know that he would shoot only Hitler. He lacked 
evidence from which to conclude that he would do the right thing; 
hence, he did the right thing culpably. 
Similarly, only if we possess a theory of right action can we judge 
whether disobedient citizens and judges have acted nonculpably. That 
is, only if we know the conditions under which the law should be bro-
ken can we judge whether a citizen or judge reasonably believed that it 
should be broken. If the correspondence thesis is true of the condi-
tions of justified punishment, it is significantly true. It holds that, if a 
citizen's act of disobedience was right, then the right thing for a judge 
to do is to acquit the citizen. Hence, the reasonableness of a judge's 
belief concerning how best to decide the citizen's case must be mea-
sured by the degree to which it approaches this truth. Similarly, if a 
judge is right to punish a citizen for a particular act of disobedience, 
then that act of disobedience is wrong. Hence, the reasonableness of 
the citizen's belief concerning whether he should break the law must 
be measured by the degree to which it approaches this truth. While 
reasonable belief can depart from true belief, true belief is the goal and 
measure of reasonable belief. Anyone concerned with the conditions 
of culpable action must thus admit the necessity of constructing the 
best possible theory of the conditions of right action. If the correspon-
dence thesis is part of our best theory of the conditions of right action, 
it bears directly on the project of constructing the conditions of 
culpability. 
c. Probability limitations on rightmaking consequences. In light 
of the above analysis, consequentialists must admit that the reasons for 
action described in the previous Part as role-relative are in fact reasons 
for action for all actors; the fact that they are neither proximately af-
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fected by all actors nor epistemically available to all actors is irrelevant 
to their being rightmaking for all actors. Yet consequentialists might 
argue that this admission does not defeat perspectivalism. If the 
weight assigned to these reasons for action can differ as between citi-
zens and judges, then the balance of reasons that determines right ac-
tion for citizens and judges can differ. While the values that comprise 
the reasons for action for citizens and judges are identical, their weight 
may be sufficiently different to justify a judge in punishing a justifiably 
disobedient citizen. The same, of course, can be said of the possibility 
that a system designer will be justified in punishing a justifiably disobe-
dient judge. 
Why would we think that the weight of systemic concerns might 
vary as between citizens, judges, and institution designers? The conse-
quentialist's answer must be that these systemic concerns differ in 
weight because the probability of different actors affecting them differs 
in value. When the citizen decides to disobey the law, practical ration-
ality dictates that the weight assigned to systemic values be discounted 
by the probability that the citizen will not be caught or, if caught, that 
she will not be punished. Only if she is caught, tried, and acquitted 
will her disobedience result in adverse effects on liberty, equality, and 
reliance interests; only if her judge is caught, tried, and acquitted will 
the citizen's disobedience result in adverse effects on the separation of 
powers. Because the probability that a citizen's disobedience will af-
fect rule-of-law values is likely to be substantially less than 1.0, and the 
probability that such disobedience will affect the separation of powers 
is likely to be even less than that, rule-of-law values and constitutional 
values are appropriately assigned relatively little weight in the balance 
of reasons for and against private disobedience. 
However, at the time the judge acts the citizen has in fact been 
caught and tried. The probability that an acquittal will affect rule-of-
law values is thus substantially closer to 1.0, and the probability that 
the judge's disobedient acquittal of such a citizen will be detected, 
evaluated, and approved is significantly increased, so the probability 
that judicial disobedience will affect constitutional values is greater 
than was the probability that the citizen's private disobedience would 
affect those values. Thus, rule-of-law values and constitutional values 
must be assigned greater weight in the balance of reasons for and 
against judicial disobedience. By the time that constitutional actors 
are called upon to review a judge's disobedience, the probability of 
affecting both rule-of-law values and the separation of powers is quite 
close to 1.0. Hence, those values assume substantial weight in the bal-
ance of reasons for and against punishing the judge. Thus, by virtue of 
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the fact that the disobedience of different actors will affect systemic 
values with different degrees of probability, systemic values function as 
reasons for action that possess different weight for different actors. 
The differential weight of systemic values may thus make it right for a 
citizen to disobey the law but wrong for a judge to do so by acquitting 
the citizen; alternatively, it may make it right for a judge to disobey 
the law but wrong for system designers to ignore that disobedience. 
If defensible, this argument defeats the correspondence thesis. It 
admits that systemic values are not themselves role-relative, but it pro-
vides reasons to think that their weight is. It thus carves out the possi-
bility that the justified might be justifiably punished and so provides a 
basis for thinking that our original dilemma should be solved by aban-
doning the punishment principle rather than revising our systemic 
convictions. Yet this argument succeeds only by smuggling epistemic 
considerations into the analysis of right action. The argument thus 
ultimately fails for the same reason that the previous argument failed 
in its more explicit attempt to limit right action by epistemic con-
straints. There can be little doubt that, at the time actors act, the 
consequences of their actions must be assessed according to the rela-
tive probability of their occurrence. But this is because actors lack 
perfect knowledge of precisely what those consequences will be. They 
are epistemically constrained in their ability to identify the conse-
quences that will actually occur from among the consequences that 
they think may occur. They are thus practically compelled to consider 
all possible consequences of conduct epistemically available to them, 
discounting those consequences by the relative degree to which they 
have occurred in similar circumstances in the past. 
Assuming the truth of physical determinism, however, certain con-
sequences are destined to follow from an action, while others are not. 
Thus, at the time of action, the actual consequences that will occur 
possess a probability of 1.0, while the consequences that will not occur 
possess a probability of 0.0. The citizen who is caught, tried, and ac-
quitted for disobedience at a cost to certain systemic values was thus 
antecedently destined to affect those values. While she might have 
been wholly unable to know of the possibility of causing such conse-
quences or to assign a probability of 1.0 to these consequences even if 
their possibility was known, these consequences nevertheless enter the 
balance of reasons that determines the rightness of her action (as op-
posed to the culpability with which the action was performed) without 
any discount at all. For, on a consequentialist conception of right ac-
tion, it is the actual consequences of an action that determine the 
rightness of the action. Because the actual consequences of action in 
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fact have an antecedent probability of 1.0, they do not differ in their 
weight as rightmaking reasons for action. The actual probability of 
affecting systemic values is thus identical for citizens, judges, and sys-
tem designers, even though these different actors assess that 
probability differently by virtue of their different epistemic situations. 
2. The Truth of the Correspondence Thesis 
It is now time to examine our position. I have argued that conse-
quentialists cannot defend role-relative morality by limiting the conse-
quences that function as reasons for action to those that are 
proximately caused by an actor or to those that are epistemically avail-
able to an actor. To invoke proximate cause limitations confuses the 
metaphysics of causation. To employ epistemic limitations confuses 
the metaphysics of right action. If these conclusions are right, then 
the consequentialist must admit that all consequences of an action 
enter into the balance of reasons that determines the rightness of that 
action. Thus, if the systemic consequences of a judge's decision are 
also consequences of the actions performed by the citizen whose case 
the judge decides, then those systemic consequences are part of the set 
of consequences that determines the rightness of the citizen's actions. 
Sirpilarly, if the institutional consequences of a system designer's deci-
sion are also consequences of the adjudicatory result reached by the 
judge whose case is evaluated by the system designer, then those insti-
tutional consequences are among the consequences that determine the 
rightness of the judge's decision and the rightness of the citizen's deci-
sion that caused the judge's decision. 
It is crucial to see what follows from this analysis. While a citi-
zen's disobedience might not be as visible as a judge's and hence might 
not itself generate a disproportionate amount of unjustified disobedi-
ence on the part of others, the fact that a judge's subsequent acquittal 
of such a citizen is a consequence of the citizen's disobedience makes it 
the case that the disproportionate amount of unjustified disobedience 
that the judge's highly visible disobedience generates is in fact a conse-
quence of the citizen's disobedience. As such, that consequence not 
only affects the rightness of the judge's acquittal; it also enters into the 
balance of reasons that determines the rightness of the citizen's origi-
nal disobedience. Similarly, while a citizen's refusal to cooperate with 
a legally established cooperative strategy to a prisoner's dilemma will 
not itself lead to the dissolution of that strategy (and the subsequent 
loss of an important collective good), the fact that a judge's subsequent 
acquittal of that citizen is a consequence of that citizen's disobedience 
makes it the case that any adverse effects on the cooperative strategy 
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generated by the judge's disobedience are consequences of the citizen's 
disobedience. As such, those adverse effects enter into the balance of 
reasons that determines the rightness of the citizen's disobedience to 
begin with; they do not just enter into the balance of reasons that de-
termines the rightness of the judge's disobedience. The same sort of 
analysis establishes that the institutional effects of constitutional deci-
sions are consequences that affect not only the rightness of constitu-
tional decisions but also the rightness of judicial decisions and the 
rightness of private decisions. While the disobedience of a citizen, and 
the acquittal of that citizen by a judge, are acts that are by themselves 
unlikely to affect the efficient separation of governmental powers, the 
fact that a system designer's subsequent decision to ignore such diso-
bedience is a consequence of both the citizen's disobedience and the 
judge's disobedience makes it the case that any adverse effects of such 
a decision on structural pluralism are consequences of both the citi-
zen's disobedience and the judge's disobedience. Those institutional 
consequences therefore affect the rightness of both the citizen's con-
duct and the judge's conduct, as well as the system designer's conduct. 
Thus, none of the reasons characterized in the previous Part as 
role-relative are in fact role-relative on a consequentialist understand-
ing of morality. The rule-of-law values of liberty, equality, and reli-
ance are reasons for action for citizens as well as for judges, and the 
institutional values of structural pluralism are reasons for action for 
citizens and judges as well as for system designers. While some actors 
may be epistemically ill-situated to evaluate the degree to which their 
actions will affect these values, the consequential effects of their ac-
tions on these values nevertheless enter into the determination of the 
rightness of their actions. 
We are now in a position to advance on behalf of the consequen-
tialist a tentative and partial answer to the original puzzle. Actors are 
justified in disobeying the law only if the consequences of their actions, 
including all those systemic consequences that they cannot predict or 
accurately weigh, favor disobedience. If the consequences of their dis-
obedience, including all those systemic consequences that are epistemi-
cally unavailable to them, are worse than the consequences of their 
obedience, then they are wrongdoers who are not in fact justified in 
disobeying the law. 
This more sophisticated understanding of what it means to be jus-
tifiably disobedient according to a consequentialist account of right 
action lends enormous plausibility to the correspondence thesis. To 
appreciate this fact, consider again the case of the battered wife who 
violates the law by preemptively killing her abusive husband after he 
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threatens her life and the lives of her children. Suppose that the conse-
quences of her disobedience, including the adverse systemic conse-
quences caused by her acquittal and the acquittal of her judge 
(including all adverse effects on the obedience of others, the rule-of-
law values, and the separation of powers), are not as bad as the conse-
quences of her obedience. Under such circumstances, the wife's diso-
bedient action is the right action; and it is right not just for her, but for 
her judge and her judge's judge. The balance of reasons that deter-
mines the rightness of her disobedience is identical to the balance of 
reasons that determines the rightness of their disobedience. Hence, if 
her disobedience is right, then their disobedience must be right. Her 
judge does the right thing in acquitting her, and her judge's judge does 
the right thing in acquitting him, because included in the calculus that 
makes her act right is the fact that an acquittal of her by her judge, 
and an acquittal of her judge by a system designer, will not dispropor-
tionately encourage unjustified acts of disobedience on the part of 
other citizens or judges and will not unduly affect the rule of law or 
the separation of powers. The rightness of her act thus determines 
both the rightness of a judge's decision to acquit her and the rightness 
of a system designer's decision to acquit her judge. 
The correspondence thesis thus appears to be vindicated: the 
rightness of a citizen's disobedience determines the rightness of not 
punishing that citizen, and the rightness of a judge's disobedience de-
termines the rightness of not disciplining that judge. On a consequen-
tialist account of right action, it appears that the justified cannot be 
justifiably punished. 
Yet, notwithstanding the truth of the correspondence thesis in the 
sort of case that I have described, it is hasty to conclude that a sophis-
ticated understanding of consequentialism renders the correspondence 
thesis necessarily true. It appears that there is a special set of limiting 
cases that confounds our ability to generalize the truth of the corre-
spondence thesis to all cases involving codependent actions. 
3. Limiting Cases: Self-Referential Rightmaking Consequences 
While the above scenario illustrates the plausibility of the corre-
spondence thesis for consequentialism, there appear to be some special 
cases that limit its generalizability. Unlike their predecessors, these 
cases do not appear to be generated by conceptual confusions about 
the metaphysics of causation or the metaphysics of right action. They 
thus provide a compelling basis for thinking that consequentialism can 
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incorporate perspectivalism. ts6 
Suppose the acquittal of a battered wife for the murder of her abus-
ing husband will substantially increase the number of instances in 
which other women will invoke this "solution" in circumstances in 
which it is quite unjustified (e.g., when murder is simpler or more lu-
crative than divorce). Suppose further that such an acquittal will have 
significant adverse effects on liberty, equality, and certain coopera-
tively achieved collective goods. Together, these bad consequences 
outweigh the good consequences that come of her action. While the 
killing will save three innocent lives, others who copycat the killing in 
unjustified circumstances will take more than three innocent lives. 
While the killing will relieve the psychological torment of the battered 
wife and her childre~, it will trigger a disproportionate amount of 
anguish on the part of those whose loved ones are killed unjustifiably, 
and it will engender a disproportionate amount of insecurity among 
those who fear that they or those they love will be the targets of future 
unjustified killings. According to the analysis in the previous section, 
the battered wife's disobedient action is unjustified: the consequences 
that function as reasons for and against action favor the decision not 
to kill her husband. 
But suppose that her punishment would alleviate most of the ad-
verse systemic effects of her killing - so many, indeed, that her act 
would then produce more good consequences than bad consequences. 
Her punishment would deter other women from killing their husbands 
in circumstances in which such killings would be unjustified, and it 
would protect rule-of-law values that would otherwise be adversely af-
fected. Under such circumstances, it appears that her punishment 
would make her action right. It would make it the case that she saved 
three innocent lives without causally contributing to the loss of a 
greater number of innocent lives. 
Such a case is deeply puzzling. In the absence of punishment, the 
battered wife does the wrong thing to save her own life and the lives of 
her children, for by so doing she causes others to take more than three 
innocent lives. Thus, an acquittal makes her a wrongdoer. It treats as 
blameless a person who is morally blameworthy - a person whose 
punishment would not constitute punishment of the justified. Yet if 
punished, she is a rightdoer, for her punishment has the happy conse-
quence of making right an act that is otherwise wrong. But, by virtue 
of making her conduct right, her punishment treats as blameworthy a 
156. I owe my recognition of the significance of these limiting cases to lengthy discussions 
with Larry Alexander. For his excellent analysis of these sorts of cases, see Alexander, Pursuing 
the Good, supra note 20. 
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person who is now morally blameless. For the price of punishment, 
this actor saves three lives without causing the sort of bad conse-
quences that would make her a wrongdoer deserving of punishment! 
By demonstrating the conceptual possibility of actions that are 
morally justified if and only if punished, this scenario poses a powerful 
counterexample to the truth of the correspondence thesis as a conse-
quentialist thesis about the conditions of punishment. Given the self-
referential nature of the consequences involved, the rightness of a citi-
zen's action does not determine the rightness of not punishing that 
action. Indeed, the rightness of the citizen's action depends upon its 
punishment. 
Because this case does not smuggle in considerations of culpability 
or considerations of proximate causation, it cannot be dismissed with 
previous cases as conceptually confused. But there is a set of reasons 
to think that such a case is quite special - so special in fact that its 
possibility need not defeat the general viability of the correspondence 
thesis for consequentialism. 
First, while the conceptual possibility of self-referential conse-
quences defeats the claim that the correspondence thesis is necessarily 
true as a thesis about the conditions of punishment, it does not defeat 
the claim that the correspondence thesis is necessarily true as a thesis 
about the conditions of preventative or permissive actions. Cases in-
volving preventative or permissive actions do not permit self-referen-
tial consequences. Hence, the correspondence thesis as it was 
originally stated remains necessarily true for consequentialism. 
Recall that, as originally stated, the correspondence thesis held 
that the rightness of an action determines the rightness of permitting 
that action. Cases involving self-referential consequences do not affect 
the truth of this original thesis. As the previous subsections have 
made clear, if it is right for an individual to do an act, then, on a 
consequentialist theory of right action, that act must produce more 
good consequences than bad consequences, all consequences consid-
ered. An act that prevents a right act prevents not only its bad conse-
quences but also its good consequences. Thus, if the good 
consequences of the act outweigh its bad consequences, a preventative 
act fails to maximize good consequences. Hence, if an act is i;ight, its 
prevention must be wrong. 
Those who doubt that an act and its prevention cannot be self-
referential might toy with the following sort of counterexample. Sup-
pose that a preventative act would tum a completed act into a mere 
attempt. Is it not possible that the attempt would be right but that its 
completion would be wrong and, hence, that the prevention of its com-
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pletion would be right? Consider the case in which a nation builds a 
nuclear bomb as a means of deterring another nation from waging war 
against it. Suppose that those who control the bomb would not be 
justified in deploying it (because, for example, it would annihilate far 
more civilians in enemy territory than would be lost domestically 
should war be declared by the enemy nation). But suppose further 
that, in the event of escalating violence, the only way to convince the 
enemy nation that the bomb will be used is by commencing the proce-
dures that will deploy the bomb. Is it not both right for one individual 
to act so as to deploy the bomb and right for another individual to 
prevent the successful completion of that task? 
While this scenario appears to make self-referential the rightness of 
an act and the rightness of its prevention, it fails to defeat the truth of 
the correspondence thesis. If an attempt is right, then anyone who 
thwarts the attempt at the stage at which it is but an attempt acts 
wrongly. If the completion of that attempt is wrong, then the at-
tempter acts wrongly when he does not abort the attempt so as to 
prevent its completion. Hence, another's prevention of his attempt at 
that point will be right. In both cases, the rightness of an act deter-
mines the wrongness of its prevention, and the wrongness of an act 
determines the rightness of its prevention. The correspondence thesis 
thus looks airtight in any case that involves an act and its prevention 
or permission. 
But punishment is special. While an act of punishment prevents 
future acts of just the sort for which the actor is punished, it does not 
prevent that actor's past act. Thus, unlike an act of prevention, an act 
of punishment has the capacity both to preserve the good conse-
quences of the punished act and to prevent at least some of its bad 
consequences. Thus, punishment of a battered wife who has preemp-
tively killed her husband does not take away the good consequences of 
that act (i.e., the lives saved). It also does not take away a number of 
its ·bad consequences (i.e., the loss of the husband's life, the grief of the 
children, the emotional trauma of the wife). But it does take away, or 
at least reduce, the bad consequences that the act has on future actors 
and on systemic values (i.e., its precedential effect on others who 
would kill in unjustified circumstances, and its adverse effects on lib-
erty, equality, and cooperatively achieved collective goods). If punish-
ment reduces the bad consequences of such an act to the point at 
which the good consequences of the act outweigh its remaining bad 
consequences, then punishment can make that act right. 
Does this conclusion force us to confine the correspondence thesis 
to acts of prevention and permission? As a conceptual matter, yes. 
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But this admission need not defeat the consequentialist's defense of the 
thesis as contingently true of punishment. There are empirical reasons 
to think both that the correspondence thesis is contingently true in the 
vast majority of cases involving punishment and that it could and 
should be made true in all remaining cases. 
First, as an empirical matter, the class of cases in which punish-
ment can make an otherwise wrong act right appears very small. It 
includes only those cases in which most of the bad consequences of a 
disobedient act result from the institutional adjudication of that act, 
i.e., cases in which citizens would be justified in breaking the law were 
it not for the fact that their disobedience will cause judicial publication 
of their actions. For only in such cases do judges have the ability to 
affect the bad consequences of citizens' private acts. That is, only 
when a judge will be causally responsible for the disproportionate 
number of bad consequences of a citizen's disobedience will she have 
the power to alleviate those bad consequences so that the citizen's ac-
tions produce a disproportionate number of good consequences. 
Second, there are reasons to think that this small class of cases 
would dwindle to zero over the long run if judges refused to punish 
persons in these cases. If judges consistently refused to punish bat-
tered wives who killed their abusing husbands to save their own lives, 
sufficient decisions would be amassed to make clear both the condi-
tions under which spousal killings are justified and the conditions 
under which spousal killings are unjustified. With the multiplication 
of such cases, the number of erroneous killings would dwindle to the 
point at which otherwise justified killings would not trigger a dispro-
portionate number of unjustified killings. From that point forward, 
more innocent lives would be saved than lost by acquitting battered 
wives who killed their husbands as a necessary means of saving their 
own lives. Thus, from that point forward, punishment would deter 
more justified killings than unjustified ones. So long as more innocent 
lives are saved after this point than are lost prior to this point, the 
right thing for judges to do is to acquit battered wives prior to this 
point. Put simplistically, while the first acquittal of a battered wife 
who saves three lives by killing an abusive husband may trigger ten 
unjustified killings, the second is likely to trigger fewer unjustified kill-
ings, for it makes more clear the conditions under which killings are 
justified and unjustified. And the third is likely to trigger still fewer 
unjustified killings, as are the fourth and the fifth. At the point at 
which an acquittal triggers fewer unjustified killings than justified kill-
ings, battered wives no longer act wrongly (in the absence of punish-
ment) in killing their abusive husbands to save their lives. From that 
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point forward, acquittals will encourage more right action than wrong 
action while relieving right actors of the harm of punishment. Hence, 
so long as there will be more cases after that point than prior to that 
point, the right thing for judges to do is to acquit disobedient actors 
prior to that point. 
Thus, just as all consequences enter into the balance of conse-
quences that determines the rightness of a citizen's disobedience, so all 
consequences enter into the balance of consequences that determines 
the rightness of a judge's act of punishment. If an acquittal will in the 
long run maximize good consequences, then the right thing for a judge 
to do is to issue an acquittal. And in cases in which a citizen's action 
is deemed wrong because of its bad systemic consequences, her acquit-
tal is probably right: Her acquittal, coupled with the successive ac-
quittals of those like her that will follow out of deference to the value 
of equality, will reduce over the long run the bad systemic conse-
quences of actions like hers. At some point, those actions will become 
right, because their good consequences will outweigh their bad sys-
temic consequences. With the multiplication of such cases, the earlier 
acts of disobedient citizens are made right. And the rightness of those 
earlier acts makes it right that the citizens who performed them were 
acquitted. 
This argument does not make the correspondence thesis necessarily 
true as a consequentialist thesis about the conditions of justified pun-
ishment. It merely suggests that it is contingently true as a consequen-
tialist thesis about the conditions of justified punishment. It remains 
possible to construct cases in which the consequences of certain pri-
vate acts and the consequences of their punishment remain perma-
nently self-referential. In such cases, the correspondence thesis will 
remain false. But such cases are likely to be the product of academic 
fancy. So long as we think that the law can guide persons to act 
rightly, we have reason to think that persons should be acquitted when 
their actions are made wrong only by the fact that the law lacks the 
clarity to succeed perfectly at this task. 
It thus appears legitimate to take the correspondence thesis to be 
part of our best consequentialist theory of the conditions of right ac-
tion. It follows that a consequentialist morality is not, in principle, 
paradoxical, for it neither requires nor permits the punishment of the 
morally justified. If this is the case, then the dilemma with which we 
began our discussion cannot be resolved by abandoning the punish-
ment principle. 
Before we make reference to how consequentialists might best 
solve that dilemma, it is important to determine whether the corre-
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spondence thesis is also part of our best deontological theory of right 
action. If it is, then deontologists must join consequentialists in their 
search for a means of squaring our systemic values with a commitment 
to the punishment principle. If, on the other hand, the correspon-
dence thesis is not part of our best deontological theory, then de-
ontologists will not be committed to preserving the punishment 
principle. The jurisprudential question of whether to punish the justi-
fied in order to preserve the rule of law and the separation of powers 
will then have to await the resolution of the normative dispute be-
tween consequentialists and deontologists. 
B. Deontology and the Correspondence Thesis 
Recall that deontologists deny the consequentialist claim that the 
rightness of an act consists in its maximization of good conse-
quences.157 They locate the goodness of an act not in its consequences 
but in the act itself. According to deontologists, some act-types are 
intrinsically right and other act-types are intrinsically wrong. Moral 
action consists in complying with agent-relative maxims that categori-
cally prohibit or require the performance of certain acts. Individuals 
do not act rightly in violating the conditions of right action so as to 
maximize the instances in which they or others act rightly. If it is 
wrong to kill the innocent, then an agent is prohibited from killing an 
innocent person even if, by so doing, he prevents another agent from 
killing many innocent persons in violation of the agent-relative prohi-
bition directed at her. If it is right to tell the truth, then an actor does 
wrong to lie even if the lie will bring about substantially more acts of 
truth-telling by others. And if it is wrong to punish persons who 
nonculpably do the right thing, then it is wrong to punish the justified 
even if doing so will dramatically reduce the instances in which the 
justified are punished. 
In Part I, I suggested that any plausible deontological theory 
would comply with the correspondence thesis, at least when construed 
in its original form as a thesis about the conditions of preventative and 
permissive actions. But this is not because the thesis in its original 
form is necessarily true of deontology. While denial of the correspon-
dence thesis as a thesis solely about the conditions of preventative and 
permissive acts constitutes self-contradiction by a consequentialist, it 
need not constitute self-contradiction by a deontologist. It may not be 
logically possible for a deontological system to contain contradictory 
maxims (maxims that simultaneously obligate an agent to do act A 
157. See supra text accompanying notes 10-12. 
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and not to do act A). But it is logically possible for a deontological 
system to contain simultaneously binding maxims that, as a practical 
matter, cannot be mutually fulfilled. Hence, in a case of intra personal 
competing maxims, a deontological system might simultaneously obli-
gate a single actor to do act A and act B, where A and B cannot both 
be done in the actor's circumstances. Thus, to recall Sartre's famous 
dilemma, a deontological morality might simultaneously provide a son 
with an agent-relative obligation to care for his mother and an agent-
relative obligation to join the Free French, when he cannot practically 
fulfill both obligations. And, in a case of interpersonal competing 
maxims, a deontological morality might provide one actor with an 
agent-relative obligation (or permission) to do an act while giving an-
other actor an agent-relative obligation (or permission) to prevent that 
act. Thus, it is logically possible for a deontological system to provide 
an actor with an agent-relative permission to kill another if necessary 
to defend her life while providing others with agent-relative obliga-
tions to prevent killings, including those that are done in self-defense. 
It is even logically possible for a deontological system to contain 
self-referential maxims, thus generating the sort of puzzle that I dis-
cussed in the previous section. A citizen might be accorded an agent-
relative permission to act only if she will be punished for so doing. A 
judge might simultaneously be subject to agent-relative obligations to 
punish the unjustified and acquit the justified. Under such a deonto-
logical system, the judge's punishment would make the citizen's action 
right, and so violate the prohibition against punishing the justified. 
But the judge's refusal to punish the citizen would make the citizen's 
action wrong and so violate the obligation to punish the unjustified. 
Under such a deontology, the rightness of one actor's conduct would 
thus make the other actor's conduct wrong. 
I argued in Part I that, while the agent-relativity of competing in-
terpersonal norms prevents them from being contradictory, it does not 
prevent their mutual assertion from being highly untenable. Compet-
ing interpersonal maxims would make us moral gladiators. Our suc-
cessful fulfillment of our moral obligations would thwart the 
successful fulfillment of others' moral obligations, and their successful 
fulfillment of their moral obligations would thwart the successful ful-
fillment of our moral obligations. We would be persistently prevented 
from doing what we are permitted to do, and we would persistently 
prevent others from doing what they are permitted to do. 
If it is the case that a plausible deontological theory would not pit 
actors against one another in moral combat by permitting or obligat-
ing some actors to prevent others from doing what they are permitted 
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or obligated to do, then it is seemingly the case that such a theory 
would not permit or obligate some actors to punish others for doing 
what they are permitted or obligated to do. That is, if a plausible de-
ontological theory reflects the correspondence thesis in its maxims 
concerning preventative and permissive acts, it is reasonable to sup-
pose that it also reflects the correspondence thesis in its maxims con-
cerning acts of punishment. For a system that requires the 
punishment of the justified makes the conditions of right action gladia-
torial. Citizens who have done the right thing must in some cases be 
treated by judges as if they have done the wrong thing. For judges to 
accord citizens moral success in such cases constitutes moral failure 
on the part of those judges. A judge's moral success thus requires her 
to treat morally successful citizens (citizens who have been justifiably 
disobedient) as if they were guilty of moral failures. 
In what follows, I propose to explore the extent to which a plausi-
ble deontological theory is in fact committed to a nongladiatorial con-
ception of the conditions of right action. Specifically, I propose to take 
up four sorts of cases that suggest the simultaneous rightness of com-
peting interpersonal maxims. If deontologists would resist the sugges-
tion in these cases that persons can be obligated to compete for moral 
success, then we have some cause to think that the correspondence 
thesis is naturally compatible with the most plausible deontological 
theory. We thus have reasonable grounds to maintain that among the 
agent-relative obligations that bind actors under a deontological the-
ory is the obligation not to punish the justified. If, on the other hand, 
deontologists would embrace gladiatorial maxims in these cases, then 
we have some reason to think that they may be untroubled by the 
prospect of punishing the justified, at least in cases analogous to these 
test cases. 
1. Sporting Competitions 
The first cases that might give d~ontologists pause in their incorpo-
ration of the correspondence thesis are cases of competitive sport. 158 
Consider, for example, the sport of boxing. Is it not the case that in a 
boxing ring it is right for each boxer to prevent what it is right for the 
other to do? That is, assuming for the moment that the sport of box-
ing is moral, is it not both morally acceptable for one boxer to throw a 
punch and morally acceptable for the other boxer to block that punch? 
It would seem that this is rather the point. But, as a result, it would 
158. I owe the incorporation of this discussion to Samuel Freeman, who fruitfully suggested 
during a colloquium discussion that boxing matches pose prima facie counterexamples to the 
correspondence thesis. 
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seem that the maxims that apply in the boxing ring defy the corre-
spondence thesis, for the rightness of one competitor's action does not 
determine the rightness of the other's permission of that action. And 
the same can be said of the maxims that guide players in other sports: 
in football it is both right for a nose guard to block a punt and right 
for a center to block the nose guard from so doing; in basketball it is 
both right for a guard to shoot and right for an opposing player to 
block the shot. 
Indeed, it would seem that what makes many sports sporting is 
that their rules suspend the correspondence thesis. But this fact, far 
from defeating the truth of the correspondence thesis as a metarule of 
deontological morality, would seem to constitute the exception that 
proves that rule. What is special about sports of the sort I have men-
tioned is that a player's consent to participate in them waives the appli-
cation of maxims that would otherwise apply both to his conduct and 
to that of others. A football player's consent turns what would be a 
brutal battery into an admirable tackle. It thus suspends maxims that 
would otherwise require the sort of peaceful interaction that makes for 
poor spectator sport - maxims that appear to embody the correspon-
dence thesis. Absent consent, deontological norms would surely pro-
hibit the sort of conduct that passes for sport. That is, they would 
surely prohibit others from punching an unconsenting actor, or run-
ning headlong into her, or smashing balls at her face, or jumping up 
and down in front of her to impede her progress. Thus, while compet-
itive sports are competitive precisely because they impose on partici-
pants competitive maxims of action {and so violate the correspondence 
thesis), they do so justifiably only because they do so by the consent of 
the participants. It is the consent of the participants that makes it 
morally acceptable for them to do to each other what they are not 
justified in doing to others. 
Sports thus demonstrate that acts of consent might plausibly sus-
pend the correspondence thesis within a deontological morality. This 
insight has important implications in the context of punishing the dis-
obedient. It suggests that punishment of the justifiably disobedient 
might be justified if, but perhaps only if, the justifiably disobedient 
consent to their own punishment. 
At least three things must be said about this suggestion. First, as 
an empirical matter, it is rarely the case that individuals can be said to 
consent to their own punishment - particularly when they are being 
punished for acts that they are permitted or obligated to perform.1s9 
159. But see supra note 85 (discussing civilly disobedient actors). 
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However, this fact might prompt theorists to claim that justifiably dis-
obedient citizens ought to consent to their punishment and, hence, that 
their failure to do so constitutes practical irrationality. Insofar as fully 
rational, fully informed actors would consent to their own punish-
ment, the punishment of the justified is justified by the hypothetical 
consent of the justified. 
Hypothetical consent is notoriously problematic. We would think 
it outrageous for a court to take seriously the claim of a rapist that 
while his victim did not in fact consent to intercourse, she would have 
consented to it had she been fully rational; hence, his forced penetra-
tion did not constitute a rape. Such a case makes clear that hypotheti-
cal consent lacks just the element that makes an act of consent morally 
significant; namely, consent. If hypothetical consent is a morally 
meaningful construct, it is not because it embodies or reflects consent. 
Rather, it is because it refers to something that is moral and thus it 
captures something to which it would be moral to consent. 
This raises the third and most significant point. Consent should be 
thought to alter the normative environment - to grant permissions, 
confer rights, impose duties, and so forth - only if it is morally justifi-
able for it to do so. To appeal to an individual's consent in the course 
of determining whether her consent should be thought to have such 
power is circular. As Raz has nicely argued: 
Consent ... is an act purporting to change the normative situation. Not 
every act of consent succeeds in doing so, and those that succeed do so 
because they fall under reasons, not themselves created by consent, that 
show why acts of consent should, within certain limits, be a way of creat-
ing rights and duties. We cannot create reasons just by intending to do 
so and expressing that intention in action. Reasons precede the will. 
Though the latter can, within limits, create reasons, it can do so only 
when there is a non-will-based reason why it should.160 
Thus, we must establish, independent of arguments from consent, 
when, and under what circumstances, acts of consent should be 
thought to legitimate the practices consented to. Only then shall we 
be in a position to evaluate the suggestion that a justifiably disobedient 
actor's consent might justify his punishment. 
I do not propose to engage in this quite worthy project of deter-
mining why, and under what conditions, consent should be thought to 
grant permissions, accord rights, or engender duties. As others have 
made clear, there are both instrumental and noninstrumental reasons 
to accord individuals the normative power to alter rights and duties. 
Such a power instrumentally expands liberty by creating institutions 
160. RAz, MORALITY, supra note 36, at 84. 
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that advance useful goals and enable individuals to make long-term 
plans. Such a power is also noninstrumentally constitutive of certain 
sorts of relationships: as Julie Andrews sang it, "Love isn't love till 
you give it away."161 Common to both an instrumental and a nonin-
strumental account of the proper significance of consent, however, is 
the claim that consent makes possible institutions and relations that 
are themselves morally valuable. But consent does not make institu-
tions and relations morally valuable; it only makes morally valuable 
institutions and relations possible. 
Thus, as a condition of establishing that consent should operate to 
legitimate a particular practice, one must establish that that particular 
practice is itself moral or just. We think that we can do that in the 
case of sports (and it is just because many doubt that we succeed in the 
case of boxing that that sport is so morally worrisome). We do not 
think that we can do that in the case of slavery or murder. We there-
fore do not take consent, however knowingly or voluntarily given, to 
legitimate a person's enslavement or murder. Can we establish that 
the punishment of the justified is moral or just? That is precisely the 
question with which we are concerned. 
Just as we discovered that reliance on the punishment of the justi-
fied could not be justified unless the punishment of the justified is inde-
pendently justifiable, so too, consent to the punishment of the justified 
cannot be justified unless the punishment of the justified is indepen-
dently justifiable. We thus cannot use the possibility that justifiably 
disobedient persons would consent to their own punishment to ground 
a claim that their punishment is consistent with a plausible deontol-
ogy. We must continue to seek other reasons to think that deontology 
would permit the punishment of the justified. If we find other reasons 
to suspend the correspondence thesis in cases of punishment, then the 
consent of a justifiably disobedient actor may legitimate a particular 
instance of punishment. It may even make sense to talk about hypo-
thetical consent on the part of justifiably disobedient actors who do 
not give actual consent to their own punishment. But these conclu-
sions will follow only if a plausible deontological theory justifies the 
punishment of the justified. It will only do so if the following cases 
vindicate the suggestion that the maxims for action applicable to citi-
zens, judges, and institution designers can be gladiatorial in content.162 
161. RICHARD RODGERS & OSCAR HAMMERSfEIN II, Reprise of You Are Sixteen, in THE 
SOUND OF MUSIC (1965). 
162. The argument advanced here against the claim that consent might suspend the corre· 
spondence thesis in cases of punishment also applies to the suggestion that promises can suspend 
the correspondence thesis in cases of punishment. It thus precludes one from arguing both that 
the judicial oath of office contains a promise to apply sanctions to justifiably disobedient citizens 
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2. Gladiators and Innocent Shields 
A second set of cases that appears to defy the correspondence the-
sis involves instances in which innocent persons are forced to confront 
one another in life-threatening combat. Consider the true gladiators 
- innocent men coerced to duel until death by threats of immediate 
execution. While the purpose of such confrontation was sporting, the 
sport lacked the consent of the participants. Nevertheless, was it not 
right for each gladiator to attempt to take the life of the other while 
preventing the other from taking his own life? Now consider the more 
contemporary case of the innocent person who is forced to shield a 
culpable criminal in a shoot-out with an innocent police officer. In 
such a case, is it not right for the police officer to defend herself by 
shooting through the innocent shield in order to kill the criminal? 
And is it not simultaneously right for the innocent shield to defend 
herself by shooting the officer (assuming that she can do this, but can-
not shoot the criminal who holds her hostage)? In cases of dueling 
gladiators and innocent human shields, the correspondence thesis ap-
pears false. The maxims of action that apply to the actors involved in 
such cases appear to make it right for one actor to prevent what it is 
right for another actor to do. 
Yet deontologists need not, and many would not, embrace such a 
conclusion. They might plausibly maintain that those who save their 
own (innocent) lives at the cost of other innocent lives are perhaps 
excused, but they are not justified.163 Morality does not contain a self-
ish tipping principle that allows persons to prefer their own innocent 
lives to the innocent lives of others.164 Rather, all individuals are 
bound by an agent-relative obligation not to take an innocent life. In-
sofar as the actors who confront one another in these cases are equally 
innocent, each is obligated not to sacrifice the life of the other to save 
his or her own life. While this may seem to the actors involved to 
require them to be heroes in circumstances in which they find them-
selves incapable of heroism, this is a reason merely to excuse them for 
and that that promise constitutes an agent-relative obligation to do so that conflicts with the 
citizen's agent-relative permission to break the law. On this analysis, whether a judge has the 
power to promise punishment of the justified depends on, and thus cannot be used to establish, 
the morality of punishing the justified. See infra text accompanying notes 176-77. 
163. I owe the articulation of this response to Stephen Morse. 
164. Rejection of a selfish tipping principle follows from the assumption of what Nagel has 
described as "the impersonal standpoint" - the standpoint from which each actor must recog-
nize that "[e]veryone's life matters as much as his does, and his matters no more than anyone 
else's." NAGEL, EQUALITY AND PARTIALITY, supra note 12, at 14; see also NAGEL, THE VIEW 
FROM NOWHERE, supra note 12, at 152-53, 159-63. 
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the innocent deaths that they cause; it is not a reason to think them 
justified in causing those deaths. 
This rejoinder preserves the correspondence thesis by making it 
wrong for innocent actors to preserve their own lives at the cost of 
other innocent lives. In the event that an innocent actor violates his 
obligation not to use deadly force against another innocent actor, he 
loses his innocence. It then becomes right for the other to defend her-
self, for in so doing she is not violating the maxim against taking the 
life of an innocent person. Thus, neither gladiator may initiate combat 
against the other, but if one does, the other acts rightly in defending 
himself. And neither a police officer nor an innocent shield may initi-
ate the use of deadly force against the other, but if one does, the other 
acts rightly in defending herself. The rightness of one actor's conduct 
(in refusing to use deadly force against an innocent person) thus deter-
mines the rightness of the other's permission of that conduct (that is, 
the rightness of not initiating the use of deadly force). And the wrong-
ness of one actor's conduct (in initiating deadly force) determines the 
rightness of the other's prevention of that conduct (that is, the right-
ness of using deadly force in self-defense). 
It thus appears that deontologists need not give up the correspon-
dence thesis when confronted with genuine cases of gladiatorial con-
frontation. They need not think that gladiatorial maxims apply to 
gladiators. 
3. Self-Defense 
Deontologists preserve the correspondence thesis in cases involv-
ing gladiators and human shields by construing such cases as tradi-
tional cases of self-defense: both actors are wrong in such cases to 
initiate combat, but, in the event that one actor does the wrong thing, 
the other does the right thing by employing deadly force in self-de-
fense. Some, however, may doubt that a proper deontological account 
of self-defense reflects the correspondence thesis. They may argue 
that, even in the.classic case of self-defense, in which an innocent vic-
tim confronts a culpable aggressor, right action is defined by compli-
ance with competing maxims. In such cases, actors rightly defend 
themselves only in the sense that they do what they are permitted to 
do. While the correspondence thesis may be true as a thesis about 
obligations, it is false as a thesis about permissions. Hence, while an 
actor may be permitted to defend herself, another actor may be per-
mitted, or obligated, to prevent her from defending herself. 165 Let us 
165. This argument was cleverly advanced during different colloquia discussions by George 
Christie, Samuel Freeman, and Jason Johnston, thus prompting the inclusion of this section. 
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examine three possible motivations for this position, together with 
what I take to be sound reasons for its rejection. 
a. The argument from competing permissions. First, it may be 
tempting to think that, while obligations cannot conflict, permissions 
can. One individual may be permitted to do what another is permitted 
to prevent. But permissions are classically thought to constitute 
rights. If one has a permission to do an act, one has a right to do it.166 
If one has a right to do an act, then others have a duty not to interfere 
with one's performance of that act. 167 Hence, others cannot be per-
mitted to prevent what one has a permission to do. To maintain both 
that permissions are rights and that permissions can conflict is thus 
incoherent. If another has a permission to interfere with one's per-
formance of an act, then that actor has a right that one not interfere 
with her interference. But, if she has a right that one not interfere 
with that act of interference, then one has a duty not to interfere with 
that act. One thus cannot have a right to do the act with which she is 
permitted to interfere, for one cannot have both a right to do an act 
and a duty not to prevent others from preventing one's performance of 
that act. 
b. The argument from Hohfeldian privileges. The second motiva-
tion for abandoning the correspondence thesis as a thesis about per-
missions might derive from a willingness to abandon the claim that 
permissions are best thought of as rights. If, instead, permissions are 
thought of as Hohfeldian privileges or liberties, then permissions could 
seemingly conflict. For if one has a Hohfeldian privilege to do an act, 
it is not the case that others have a duty not to interfere with that act; 
it is merely the case that others have no right that one not do that 
act. 168 But if others simply have no right that one not do the act, they 
may still have a Hohfeldian privilege to prevent one from doing the 
act. 169 Yet if they have such a liberty, then one does not have a right 
166. In this section I am taking permissions to be distinct from what Wesley Hohfeld called 
privileges or liberties. Hohfeld maintained that it is important to keep "the conception of a right 
(or claim) and the conception of a privilege quite distinct .••• " WESLEY N. HoHFELD, Some 
Fundamental Legal Conceptions As Applied in Judicial Reasoning. in FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL 
CoNCEPTIONS As APPLIED IN JUDICIAL REASONING AND OTHER LEGAL EssAYS 23, 39 (Wal-
ter W. Cook ed., 1919). According to Hohfeld, when one has a privilege to do an act it is not the 
case that one has a right to do the act (in the sense that others have a duty not to interfere with 
one's doing the act); it is rather the case that others have no right that one not do the act. Id. at 
35-50. I discuss the understanding of permissions as Hohfeldian privileges in the next section. In 
this section, I am concerned with the more common understanding of permissions as rights. 
Under this conception, permissions count as a combination of both Hohfeldian claim rights and 
Hohfeldian privileges. See id. at 39. 
167. See id. at 36-38. 
168. See id. at 38-39. 
169. See id. at 41. 
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that they not prevent one from doing the act. They thus have no right 
that one not do the act, but one has no right that they not prevent one 
from doing the act. The correspondence thesis appears to be in jeop-
ardy, for the liberty that licenses one's act does not imply an absence 
of a liberty on the part of another actor to prevent that act. 
This argument effectively admits that the correspondence thesis is 
true of obligations and permissions (as those are commonly under-
stood) but denies that it is true of privileges or liberties. There are two 
lexically ordered points to be made in response to this argument. 
First, a deontologist can easily admit the argument. If there are liber-
ties of the Hohfeldian sort, they define arenas of amoral action. Ac-
tors within such arenas are not bound by any maxims of action - they 
are genuinely at liberty. It is not the case that they are obligated to act 
in certain ways, but it is also not the case that they have rights (or 
commonly understood permissions) to act in certain ways (for on this 
argument, a liberty is not a right). Hence, actors operating under 
Hohfeldian liberties are untouched by deontological norms. That 
their actions may conflict is therefore of no normative importance, for 
their actions are of no normative importance. They are the actions of 
those in a state of nature. Because the correspondence thesis is a thesis 
about the conditions of moral action, it is neither troubling nor even 
surprising that it is inapplicable to amoral action. 
Second, insofar as Hohfeldian liberties define amoral actions, they 
do not appear to capture the nature of acts done in self-defense or in 
violation of the law. As a matter of substantive morality, such acts 
appear to be of moral significance. A plausible moral theory may obli-
gate an actor to employ self-defense, permit an actor to employ self-
defense, or obligate an actor not to employ self-defense, but it at least 
speaks to the question of self-defense. Similarly, a plausible moral the-
ory may obligate an actor to disobey the law, permit an actor to diso-
bey the law, or obligate an actor not to disobey the law, but it at least 
speaks to the question of disobedience. Thus, while the correspon-
dence thesis may be inapplicable in cases involving amoral acts (acts 
licensed by liberties), this does not make it inapplicable in cases involv-
ing self-defense or disobedience, for such acts are not amoral. 
c. The argument from permissions to do wrong. The third motiva-
tion for rejecting the correspondence thesis as a thesis about permis-
sions derives from the view that deontological norms of morality are 
exceptionless maxims: for example, "Do not kill." Justifications for 
violating such maxims are agent-relative permissions to do the wrong 
thing: for example, "You are permitted to kill in circumstances of 
self-defense." Such permissions do not remove the wrongness of vio-
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lating moral maxims; they only entitle one to do what it is wrong to do 
(while making it virtuous to do what it is right to do, namely, to abide 
by the maxims in question). On this view, all permissions function like 
the permission that many theorists accord women concerning abor-
tion: women's liberty interests are sufficiently great to permit them to 
make wrong decisions about abortion (for example, to have periodic 
abortions rather than to use birth-control). 17° 
According to this understanding of the content of deontological 
morality, an actor may be permitted to do the wrong thing while 
others are at least permitted, if not obligated, to do the right thing. 
Insofar as it is wrong for an actor to do what he is permitted to do, it 
must be right for others to prevent him from doing that act. 'fP.us, an 
innocent actor whose life is in peril is permitted to kill a culpable ag-
gressor in self-defense; but insofar as this act is wrong, albeit permit-
ted, others are permitted, or perhaps obligated, to prevent it. Hence, 
the correspondence thesis is false: the rightness of an act does not 
determine the rightness of not preventing that act, for an act may be 
right only in the sense of being a permitted wrong, and it can be right 
to prevent a permitted wrong. 
Deontologists might be particularly tempted to advance this analy-
sis because of the payoffs that it might seem to offer in cases involving 
the punishment of citizens who disobey immoral laws. This analysis 
suggests the following. Citizens are subject to the exceptionless 
maxim, "Obey the law." In cases in which the law conflicts with other 
deontological maxims, citizens are permitted to disobey the law. But 
such a permission does not remove the wrongness of their disobedi-
ence. Insofar as such disobedience remains wrong, judges remain obli-
gated to punish it. Hence, the correspondence thesis is false in cases of 
punishment, for the rightness of a disobedient act does not determine 
the rightness of not punishing that act. A disobedient act may be right 
only in the sense of being a permitted wrong, and, as was previously 
suggested, it can be right to punish a permitted wrong. 
There are two responses to those who invoke this argument to de-
fend the morality of preventing or punishing permitted acts. First, the 
argument fails because it is committed to the incoherent conclusion 
that permissions are rights, but that those to whom they apply are 
simultaneously under duties not to interfere with the attempts of 
others to prevent the exercise of those rights. 171 If an actor has a right 
- even a right to do wrong - then others have a duty not to interfere 
170. See, e.g., JUDITH J. THOMSON, A Defense of Abortion, in RIGHTS, RESTITUTION AND 
RISK 1-191 (William Parent ed., 1986). 
171. See supra text accompanying notes 166-67. 
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with the actor's exercise of that right. Thus, even if permissions sim-
ply license wrong acts, rather than make otherwise wrong acts right, 
they generate duties on the part of others that are inconsistent with 
having rights of interference. Thus, the correspondence thesis in its 
original form remains intact: the permission of an act entails the 
rightness of not preventing that act. 
Second, while autonomy rights, such as those of women concern-
ing reproductive decisions, may be plausibly characterized as agent-
relative permissions to do wrong, the justification of self-defense is 
quite implausibly described as an agent-relative permission to do 
wrong. Defending oneself against a culpable aggressor is not the 
wrong thing to do (albeit a permitted thing to do); it is, rather, the 
right thing to do. Thus, acts that prevent self-defense are not acts that 
prevent wrong action; they are acts that prevent right action. Even if 
critics could escape the conclusion that the correspondence thesis ap-
plies even to permissions to do wrong acts, they could not escape the 
correspondence thesis in cases of self-defense. 
The same applies in cases of justified disobedience of the law. In 
such cases, the law conflicts with certain agent-relative obligations and 
permissions. Disobedience cannot constitute a permitted wrong in 
such cases; indeed, it cannot constitute a wrong at all. For such a 
conclusion would commit the deontologist not just to maxims that are 
gladiatorial, but to maxims that are genuinely contradictory. An actor 
would be simultaneously obligated both to obey the law and to disobey 
the law. If the content of deontology is at least constrained by the 
requirement that it not be contradictory, then a deontological theory 
cannot both impose an exceptionless obligation to obey the law and 
require citizens sometimes to break the law. Insofar as it obligates 
citizens to break the law in particular instances, a citizen's fulfillment 
of such an obligation must thus constitute the right thing to do; it 
cannot simply serve as a permitted wrong thing to do. Hence, a 
judge's punishment of such an act cannot be the punishment of a 
wrong (albeit permitted) act; it must be the punishment of a right act. 
And if the remaining cases convince us that deontologists should con-
sider cases of punishment analogous to cases of prevention, then, even 
if critics could escape the correspondence thesis in cases that involve 
permissions to do wrong, they could not escape it in cases that raise 
the punishment of the justifiably disobedient. 
4. Status-Based Relationships and Contractual Roles 
Rather than stymieing the ability of deontologists to defend the 
correspondence thesis, the previous examples have illustrated the via-
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bility of that thesis for a deontological morality. But this happy con-
clusion meets its most compelling counterexamples in cases such as 
the following. Imagine two mothers, each of whom has a small baby 
and neither of whom can swim. They find themselves aboard a sink-
ing ship that has only one life vest. If each mother cannot secure that 
life vest for her own baby, her baby will surely drown. Is it not the 
case that each mot4er does the right thing in attempting to obtain the 
life vest for her own child, even when this amounts to preventing the 
other from saving her child?172 If so, the correspondence thesis is 
false, for the rightness of one mother's actions does not determine the 
rightness of the other mother's permission of those actions. 
This sort of case tests the suggestion that individuals are entitled to 
prefer the welfare of those who are close to them to the welfare of 
strangers. Such a claim is most at home within a deontological moral-
ity. In light of the consequentialist requirement that all persons' inter-
ests be equally considered (such that each counts for one and only 
one), consequentialists have difficulty justifying why one might be 
morally justified in aiding a loved one in circumstances in which the 
interests of strangers are of equal or greater weight. Deontologists, on 
the other hand, would seem to be in a position to maintain that actors 
have agent-relative permissions or obligations to favor the interests of 
loved ones over the interests of strangers. But if the most plausible 
deontological morality contains such agent-relative permissions or ob-
ligations, the correspondence thesis is in jeopardy. For morality might 
then pit us against one another in gladiatorial moral combat. 
It is possible to distinguish at least five deontological views con-
cerning the content of the maxims that apply to actors in circum-
stances of this sort. Some of these views falsify the correspondence 
thesis, while others preserve it. Let us work through these to deter-
mine how likely it is that deontologists will consider themselves com-
pelled to abandon the correspondence thesis in order to vindicate the 
intuitive claim that we may accord preferential treatment to those we 
love. Throughout this discussion we should not lose sight of our ulti-
mate goal: to determine whether the correspondence thesis is implied 
by our most plausible deontological theory, so as to assess whether or 
not our most plausible deontological theory would license the punish-
ment of the justified. 
a. The argument from agent-relative obligations/permissions of 
preference. On the first view, actors are obligated, or at least permit-
172. This example is drawn from NAGEL, EQUALITY AND PARTIALITY, supra note 12, at 
172. 
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ted, to give aid to those with whom they share special relationships as 
opposed to those with whom they share no relationships. Thus, when 
a choice must be made, parents are obligated (or permitted) to aid 
their children, friends are obligated (or permitted) to aid their friends, 
and so forth. This view flatly contradicts the correspondence thesis 
because it makes agent-relative obligations and permissions role-rela-
tive. The role of a mother is in part defined by the obligation (or per-
mission) to administer preferential aid to her own children. The role 
of a lawyer is in part defined by the obligation (or permission) to pro-
vide special services to his clients. 173 Insofar as role-relative obliga-
tions and permissions can conflict, the correspondence thesis is false as 
a thesis about the conditions under which one actor must permit the 
actions of another. Just as in the case of the two mothers who must 
compete for one life jacket, it may be right for an actor in one role to 
prevent what it is right for an actor in another role to do. 
Deontologists who are persuaded that certain roles create agent-
relative obligations (or permissions) to administer preferential treat-
ment may think that they are committed to a slippery slope that forces 
them to admit the possibility that other roles will create other sorts of 
agent-relative obligations and permissions. If mothers have agent-rel-
ative obligations to aid their children, then police officers may have 
agent-relative obligations to apprehend criminals, and judges may 
have agent-relative obligations to punish all citizens who violate the 
law (even those who do so justifiably).174 Yet deontologists need not 
slide down such a slope. 
Deontologists must recognize at least a prima facie distinction be-
tween two different sorts of roles: those that arise by virtue of a per-
son's status (for example, the status of being a mother or a brother) 
and those that arise by virtue of a person's promise or contract (for 
example, a promise to provide security or a contract to perform legal 
services). Deontologists may plausibly believe that the only reason 
that contractual roles create certain agent-relative obligations of pref-
erential aid is because these obligations are part of what persons have 
contracted for in taking on such roles. The agent-relative obligations 
that define such roles are thus special cases of the agent-relative obli-
gation to keep promises. Thus, the agent-relative obligations that de-
fine contractual roles are given by the contracts in question. 175 The 
173. For a defense of the claim that citizenship constitutes a unique role characterized by 
unique rights and duties, see Leslie Green, Law, Legitimacy and Consent, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 
795, 818-25 (1989); see also Hurd, supra note 22, at 1660 n.82 (discussing Green's role-relative 
conception of the duties of citizenship). 
174. See NAGEL, supra note 12, at 151. 
175. But see Green, supra note 173, at 818-25, for a defense of the claim that voluntarily 
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reason that a lawyer has a duty to provide preferential treatment to 
her clients is because she entered into a contract to do so. The reason 
that a husband has an obligation to provide aid to his wife is because 
he promised to do so as part of his marriage oath. Similarly, the rea-
son that roles create other sorts of obligations (besides obligations of 
aid) is because those obligations have been voluntarily undertaken. 
Thus, the reason that a police officer is obligated to apprehend 
criminals is because he entered into an employment contract to do so, 
and the reason that judges must punish all individuals who violate the 
law, including those who do so justifiably, is because they took an oath 
of office that is rightly interpreted to include a promise to do so. 
But if deontologists impose agent-relative obligations on certain ac-
tors just because actors have promised to fulfill those obligations, then 
deontologists must have a theory that specifies the conditions under 
which individuals have the power to contract into certain obligations. 
Just as in the case of consent discussed earlier,176 individuals should be 
accorded the power to promise to do certain actions only if it is nor-
matively justifiable for them to do so. On pain of circularity, the fact 
that an actor has made a promise cannot be a reason to maintain that 
he should fulfill that promise. We must have some reason, independ-
ent of his promise, to think that his promise is binding and, hence, that 
it entails certain role-relative obligations. As in the case of consent, 
there are reasons to think that certain promises make possible morally 
valuable institutions and relations. But the bindingness of a promise, 
like the scope of an actor's consent, depends upon the morality of the 
institutions and relations that it makes possible. 
We have reasons to think that a promise to provide security serv-
ices makes possible morally valuable relations. But we also have rea-
sons to think that such a promise loses its normative power when it is 
made by a contract killer who takes security services to include the 
execution of an employer's political enemies. We have reasons to 
think that a promise to provide legal defense services makes possible 
certain morally valuable relations. But we also have reasons to think 
that defense lawyers properly lack the power to promise to destroy 
incriminating evidence. We have reasons to think that a judge's oath 
of office makes possible certain morally valuable institutions. But do 
we have reasons to think that that oath can include a binding promise 
adopted roles can, and typically do, carry nonvoluntary duties - that is, duties that are not 
themselves subject to individual alteration. See also Serena Stier, Legal Ethics: The Integrity 
Thesis, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 551 (1991), for an excellent discussion of the nonvoluntary duties im-
posed on lawyers by the value of integrity. 
176. See supra text accompanying notes 160-62. 
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to punish the justified? This is, once again, the question we are trying 
to answer. 
Just as deontologists could not use the possibility that justifiably 
disobedient persons would consent to their own punishment as a rea-
son to think that their punishment is consistent with a plausible deon-
tology, so deontologists cannot use the judicial oath of office to 
establish that judges have agent-relative obligations to punish the justi-
fied. Only if deontologists have other reasons to think that the punish-
ment of the justified is itself justified will they have good cause to 
consider judges obligated to punish the justified if their oath of office 
includes such a promise.111 
This discussion makes clear that deontologists must be discrimi-
nating with respect to the sorts of agent-relative obligations that attach 
to particular roles. In cases in which deontologists ascribe agent-rela-
tive obligations to actors solely because those actors have assumed 
those obligations by promise or contract, they must be clear that those 
agent-relative obligations are not obligations just because they have 
been assumed by promise or contract. If, as I suspect, the conditions 
that justify contractually based agent-relative obligations embody the 
correspondence thesis, then actors may not promise to do acts that 
prevent other actors from doing what it is right for them to do. 
Thus, a plausible deontological theory might contain status-based 
agent-relative obligations that violate the correspondence thesis with-
out containing contractually based agent-relative obligations that vio-
late the correspondence thesis. Recognizing this allows deontologists 
to have what they may plausibly consider the best of both worlds. 
They can vindicate our deep-seated conviction that the role of a 
mother includes the obligation to prefer the welfare of her own chil-
dren to the welfare of other children (because they can insist that de-
ontological morality contains certain status-based agent-relative 
obligations that violate the correspondence thesis). But they can deny 
that this commits them to a morality that empowers judges to assume 
contractual obligations to punish the justified (because they can deny 
that deontological morality contains contractually based agent-relative 
obligations that violate the correspondence thesis). 
b. The argument from the denial of agent-relative obligations/per-
missions of preference. Some deontologists may find the above ~nalysis 
altogether unsatisfying. First, they may be unhappy with the implica-
tions of the analysis in the case of the two mothers aboard the sinking 
ship, because it admits that, in such a case, both mothers confront 
177. See supra text accompanying notes 160-62. 
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each other as moral gladiators. Each does right to attempt to save her 
own child, even though this means that the other will fail and her 
child will drown. Second, they may be unhappy with the suggestion 
that they can suspend the correspondence thesis in such cases without 
suspending it in cases that present judges with a decision about 
whether to punish the justified. They may subscribe to one of two 
claims: (1) that actors in contractually based roles also have agent-
relative obligations (or permissions) that are status-based, so that ac-
tors in such roles may be right to prevent what it is right for others to 
do; 178 or (2) that the theory that grounds gladiatorial status-based ob-
ligations will speak in favor of a theory that allows individuals to cre-
ate by contract gladiatorial obligations that make it right to prevent 
others from doing what it is right for them to do. 
To alleviate these concerns, deontologists must reject the claim 
that there can be any agent-relative obligations or permissions that 
violate the correspondence thesis. They must deny that mothers have 
obligations or permissions to aid their own children when doing so will 
prevent others from aiding other children. Such a denial might well be 
deontologically defensible. The discussion concerning gladiators and 
human shields made plausible the view that morality does not contain 
a selfish tipping principle that makes it right to prefer one's own inno-
cent life to the innocent life of another. 179 The same might be said of 
cases in which persons prefer the lives of their loved ones to the lives 
of strangers: neither mother on the sinking ship is right to prefer the 
life of her own child to the life of the other mother's child. If one of 
these mothers finds this conclusion to be too difficult to bear, and so 
seizes the life jacket for her own child, we may find grounds for think-
ing her excused, but she is not justified. Like the gladiator who takes 
up arms or the police officer who shoots through an innocent shield, 
the mother who seizes the life jacket may act understandably, but she 
does not act rightly. 
If this analysis of cases in which persons are tempted to p~ovide 
preferential treatment to loved ones is the better of the two here con-
sidered, then we have grounds to think that the correspondence thesis 
is secure as a thesis about preventative acts. This provides us with a 
further reason to suppose that, as a general matter, roles (of either the 
status-based or contractually based sort) cannot call upon those who 
occupy them to prevent others from doing what it is right for them to 
do. We thus have grounds upon which to maintain that official oaths 
178. See supra note 175 and accompanying text. 
179. See supra notes 163-64 and accompanying text. 
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of office cannot include promises to punish the justified that generate 
agent-relative permissions or obligations to do so. 
Deontologists who remain undecided about which of the above ac-
counts to embrace may continue to seek middle ground from which to 
defend both the claim that morality does not provide role-relative per-
missions or obligations to provide preferential aid to loved ones and 
the claim that morality does not prohibit preferential treatment in all 
cases. Three compromise positions present themselves. 
c. The argument from Hohfeldian liberties of preference. The first 
such compromise stems from the claim that morality runs out in cir-
cumstances in which we find ourselves forced to choose between aid-
ing a loved one and aiding a stranger. In such circumstances, we are 
genuinely at liberty to give preferential treatment to our loved ones, 
for while we have neither an obligation nor a permission to prefer our 
loved ones to strangers, strangers have no right that we not do so. To 
maintain this, one must maintain that such circumstances of third-
party defense are amoral. This was hard to believe in the case of self-
defense, and it seems harder to believe in these cases. However, as I 
argued previously, if these cases of third-party defense suspend the 
correspondence thesis by constituting instances in which agents pos-
sess Hohfeldian liberties, then they do not pose a reason to reject the 
correspondence thesis in cases of punishment. 180 While these cases 
may stand beyond the reach of moral maxims, cases of punishing 
others do not. 
d. The argument from preferential killings versus preferential 
omissions to save. A second compromise might be struck by deontolo-
gists who similarly admit that there are no obligations or permissions 
to prefer the welfare of loved ones to the welfare of strangers, but who 
also argue that, while persons have agent-relative obligations not to 
kill, they do not have agent-relative obligations to save.181 In the case 
of the two mothers aboard the sinking ship, this position would imply 
that neither mother has a right to seize the life jacket if it is already in 
the possession of the other. For to do so would cause the death of that 
180. See supra text accompanying notes 168-69. 
181. For a defense of this position, see FINNIS, supra note 11 at 118-25, 195; MICHAEL 
MOORE, ACT AND CRIME (forthcoming 1992); Epstein, supra note 56, at 198-200; Richard A. 
Epstein, Causation and Corrective Justice, A Reply to Two Critics, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 477 (1979); 
Michael S. Moore, Torture and the Balance of Evils, 23 ISRAEL L. REV. 280, 299-300, 308-12 
(1989). For critiques of this view, see SINGER, supra note 5, at 149-53; PHILLIPA FOOT, The 
Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect in VIRTUES AND VICES AND OTHER 
EssAYS IN MORAL PHILOSOPHY 19, 25-27 (1978); Phillipa Foot, Morality, Action and Outcome, 
in MORALITY AND OBJECTIVITY 23, 24 (Ted Honderich ed., 1985); Richard A. Posner, Epstein's 
Tort Theory: A Critique, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 457, 460 (1979); Ernest J. Weinrib, The Case for a 
Duty to Rescue, 90 YALE L.J. 247 (1980). 
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mother's child and so violate the obligation not to kill. But neither 
mother has an obligation to give up the life jacket if it is already in her 
possession, for to refuse to transfer the life jacket from her own child 
to the other mother's child would simply be to omit to save that child, 
it would not be to kill that child. 
This thesis entails that if neither mother has previous possession of 
the life jacket, then neither mother may take the life jacket at the time 
of crisis. To do so would kill the other mother's child by affirmatively 
causing its death. Hence, if the life jacket is not already in the posses-
sion of one of the two mothers, both mothers do the right thing only if 
each refuses to grab the jacket. While both children will die, they will 
not have been killed; they will simply not have been saved. 
This position preserves the correspondence thesis, for the maxims 
that apply to each mother obligate the other not to interfere with their 
fu1fillment. If one mother possesses the life jacket, the other does right 
not to take it from her. If neither mother possesses the life jacket, each 
does right only if neither takes it. Thus, on this account of the content 
of morality, one actor is never justified in preventing what the other 
actor is justified in doing. If this constitutes the best analysis of these 
sorts of cases, then this analysis, like the second one advanced above, 
provides a basis for thinking that the correspondence thesis should be 
preserved in cases of punishment. 
This position constitutes a compromise between the first two views 
with which we began, for while it denies that there are obligations and 
permissions of preference, it makes room for circumstances in which 
persons can prefer the welfare of their loved ones to the welfare of 
strangers, namely, when their aid to loved ones does not cause harm to 
strangers (though it may constitute a failure to save strangers from 
harm). But this compromise commits its defenders to maintaining 
that, in the original case of the two mothers aboard the sinking ship, 
both of their children should be sacrificed, when one can be saved. 
While deontologists cannot permit consequential calculations to dic-
tate the content of their morality, they may nevertheless find that a 
plausible deontological theory would not contain maxims that commit 
them to such a troubling conclusion. They thus may search further 
for a compromise. 
e. The argument from the intent with which preferential treatment 
is bestowed. The third compromise follows the previous two in admit-
ting that there are no obligations or permissions that make it right to 
prefer loved ones to strangers. It also incorporates the claim that indi-
viduals are obligated not to kill but are not obligated to save. It de-
nies, however, that actors violate the obligation not to kill in 
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circumstances in which they cause death without a direct intent to do 
so.182 If applied to our previous hypothetical, each mother may save 
her own child by seizing the life jacket from the other, or from some 
neutral resting place, for by so doing she does not directly intend the 
death of the other mother's child; she simply knows that that death 
will come about if she is successful. 
This view constitutes a compromise because, like the previous posi-
tion, it denies the existence of obligations or permissions that make it 
right to prefer the welfare of loved ones to that of strangers while carv-
ing out circumstances in which the exercise of such a preference does 
not violate any agent-relative maxims. By licensing the rescue of one 
life when both cannot be saved, this view also escapes the troubling 
conclusion to which the previous compromise position was commit-
ted. If plausible, this position implies that we must abandon the corre-
spondence thesis in cases like that of the two mothers aboard the 
sinking ship because, in such cases, one actor does not do wrong in 
preventing the other from doing what it is right for her to do. 
Yet this argument is guilty of the same confusion that beset previ-
ous consequentialist attempts to limit rightmaking consequences on 
epistemic grounds: it smuggles considerations of culpability into the 
specification of the conditions of right action. Actors who knowingly 
violate moral maxims may indeed be less culpable than actors who 
intentionally violate moral maxims, but before we can engage in this 
discussion we must have some independent understanding of the con-
tent of moral maxims - some theory of right action over which inten-
tions can range. If it is wrong to kill one innocent child to save 
another, then it is wrong to do so negligently, recklessly, knowingly, or 
intentionally - though it may not be as culpable to do so negligently 
as opposed to knowingly, or knowingly as opposed to intentionally. It 
is even wrong to do so innocently - that is, on a reasonable belief that 
it is not wrong, though such a wrong act is wholly nonculpable. 
Thus deontologists cannot avail themselves of this compromise 
without confusing the metaphysics of right action with the conditions 
of culpability. As this compromise violates the correspondence thesis 
precisely because it commits such a confusion, it poses no threat to the 
viability of the correspondence thesis for a plausible deontological 
morality. 
Where does this leave us? We have worked through a series of 
cases that on their face appear to function as counterexamples to the 
182. The Catholic Church takes this position. See H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RE· 
SPONSIBILITY 122-25 (1968). 
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claim that a viable deontological moral theory would embody the cor-
respondence thesis. We have found that with regard to all of these 
cases deontologists can plausibly adopt one of two responses: they can 
deny that the maxims properly applicable to actors in these cases vio-
late the correspondence thesis by being gladiatorial in content, or they 
can admit that the maxims properly applicable to actors in these cases 
violate the correspondence thesis but deny that such a violation serves 
as a precedent for suspending the thesis in cases involving punishment. 
If deontologists can deliver the substantive moral arguments required 
to ground these responses adequately, then we have reason to suppose 
that a plausible deontological theory embraces the correspondence 
thesis - at least in cases that serve as analogues to the cases that raise 
the question of whether or not to punish the justified. 
When coupled with the general conclusion reached in the previous 
section, this result prompts the conclusion that as a matter of our best 
moral theory - be it consequentialist or deontological - the punish-
ment of the justified cannot be justified. We must seek to resolve the 
dilemma with which we began our lengthy discussion by means other 
than abandoning the punishment principle. That is, if the punishment 
principle is in genuine conflict with the rule of law in cases that call 
upon judges to adjudicate justified acts of private disobedience, then 
judges must sacrifice the rule of law. And if the punishment principle 
is in genuine conflict with the separation of powers in cases that call 
upon system designers to adjudicate justified acts of judicial disobedi-
ence, then system designers must sacrifice the separation of powers. 
For morality does not permit the sacrifice of the punishment principle. 
CONCLUSION 
I have argued that our traditional understanding of the jurispru-
dential and political requirements provided by the rule of law and the 
separation of powers is incompatible with the demands of morality. 
According to our traditional conception, the rule of law and the sepa-
ration of powers combine to require judicial deference to legislatively 
enacted rules in cases in which such deference cannot be morally justi-
fied. These principles call upon judges to punish citizens who are mor-
ally justified in breaking the law, and they call upon institution 
designers to punish judges who are morally justified in acquitting justi-
fiably disobedient citizens. Our understanding of the rule of law and 
the separation of powers therefore violates what I have called the pun-
ishment principle - the moral prohibition against punishing actors 
who act morally. 
The dilemma generated by the incompatibility of our fundamental 
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legal, political, and moral principles has been thought by many to be 
superficial. Some have sought to resolve it by defending the claim that 
morality invests the law with practical authority. Such authority 
makes any act of disobedience, private or judicial, morally unjustifi-
able. Hence, judges never punish the justified when punishing the dis-
obedient. I have argued both here and in my past work that this 
solution is no solution at all, because the concept of practical authority 
required to make this a solution is conceptually indefensible. Thus the 
authority of the law cannot make obedience moral in cases in which 
the law departs from the demands of morality. 
Those who have concurred with my view have been compelled to 
admit that so long as the law departs from morality in particular cases, 
individuals will be genuinely justified in departing from the law. They 
have thus been forced to solve the dilemma engendered by our com-
peting principles by abandoning one or more of those principles. 
Their principle of choice has been the punishment principle. In re-
jecting this principle, theorists have sought to demonstrate that moral-
ity licenses the punishment of the justified. In many cases, they argue, 
morality makes it right to punish citizens who are right to disobey the 
law. In those cases in which morality does not make it right to punish 
citizens who are right to disobey the law, it nevertheless makes it right 
to punish judges who refuse to punish such citizens. 
Those who have sought to defend this paradoxical thesis have 
maintained that morality is inherently role-relative. Institutional roles 
generate unique reasons for action - reasons that sometimes make it 
right for actors within those roles to do what actors outside of those 
roles are wrong to do. The reasons for action given by the values in-
herent in the rule of law are unique to those who assume judicial roles. 
In many cases, these role-relative reasons are sufficiently powerful to 
justify judges in punishing citizens who rightly disobey the law in dis-
regard of these reasons for obedience. The reasons given by the values 
inherent in democracy and the separation of powers are unique to 
those who perform the systemic task of maintaining structural plural-
ism. In cases in which the rule-of-law values are insufficient to justify 
a judge in punishing a justifiably disobedient citizen, these role-relative 
reasons are sufficiently powerful to justify the punishment of that 
judge. Insofar as institutional actors have role-relative reasons that 
justify the punishment of the justified, the punishment principle must 
be abandoned. The dilemma is solved, for our jurisprudential and 
political principles do not demand anything that morality prohibits. 
This solution has the virtue of justifying the legal and political sta-
tus quo. It does not call upon us to rethink our commitment to the 
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separation of legislative and adjudicative powers, and it does not de-
mand that we give up the sort of rule-governed adjudication that that 
separation, coupled with the constraints imposed by the rule of law, 
appears to require. It vindicates those who espouse the virtues of judi-
cial restraint and provides a basis for criticizing those who advocate 
judicial activism. 
But it also punishes the justified. And as I have argued herein, an 
appeal to role-relative morality cannot justify the punishment of the 
justified. For morality is not role-relative. On our best consequential-
ist account of morality, all consequences causally generated by an act 
are reasons for action that enter into the balance that determines the 
rightness of that act. If a citizen's disobedient act causes judges and 
system designers to render decisions that affect the rule of law and the 
separation of powers, then the values inherent in the rule of law and 
the separation of powers are reasons for action that must be included 
in the balance that determines the rightness of the citizen's disobedi-
ence. If that balance nevertheless favors disobedience, the citizen's act 
is right, and the citizen's subsequent punishment is then wrong, as is 
the subsequent punishment of the judge who rightly acquits that citi-
zen. On our best deontological account of morality, certain roles may 
provide actors with agent-relative obligations. But the institutional 
roles occupied by judges and system designers can provide such obli-
gations only by virtue of being contractually created (i.e., by oaths of 
office). And our best understanding of the content of deontological 
norms suggests that institutional actors cannot contractually assume 
an obligation to punish the justified. Hence, if a citizen's disobedience 
is right, it cannot be right to punish that citizen, and it cannot be right 
to punish a judge for not punishing that citizen. 
We must thus rethink our traditional understanding of the rule of 
law and the separation of powers. Our task is to square our commit-
ment to those principles with the recognition that their value cannot 
lie in their enforcement of rule-governed adjudication when the rules 
that are said to govern adjudication depart from the rules of morality. 
This is a task that calls upon us to vindicate the significance of imper-
fect positive law while recognizing that the only law that can be legally 
binding is natural law. Positive law does not possess the authority to 
give private and official actors reasons to do anything other than what 
is morally required of them, and morality does not justify the punish-
ment of those who in fact do what is morally required of them. 
I have elsewhere begun this task of reconceptualizing the impor-
tance of our systemic values with my defense of why democratic rules 
could and would continue to guide private and official conduct even if 
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they were fully recognized to possess only theoretical authority. 183 
This defense draws upon the epistemic significance of legislatively en-
acted rules, and the values inherent in their systemic application, to 
the continued project of constructing and implementing ou.r best un-
derstanding of the requirements of morality. If we have reason to 
think that positive law is good evidence of natural law, then we have 
reason to think that private and official actors should in most cases 
adhere to positive law. But their obligation to do so can be, at most, 
an epistemic obligation; it cannot be either a moral or a legal one. 
Hence, in cases in which the law clearly departs from morality (under-
stood as embodying the complex set of institutional values herein dis-
cussed), neither citizens nor judges can have any obligation to abide by 
it. 
183. See Hurd, supra note 22, at 1675-77. 
